**Tarja I. Tikkanen ; Hande Eslen Ziya ; Tord Austdal ; Silje Normand**

# Skills, skills formation, and mobility pathways of migrant workers

**SKILL PARTNERSHIPS FOR SUSTAINABLE AND JUST MIGRATION PATTERNS (SKILLS4JUSTICE)**
**No. 101132435**

**WP4 "Surveying Skilled Migrant Workers in the Countries of Destination and Origin"**

**NATIONAL REPORT 2025**

**NORWAY**

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This is the "Norway National Report" prepared for WP 4 within the scope of the SKILLS4JUSTICE Horizon Europe Project.

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# SUMMARY

This report presents the findings of the research for 'Work Package 4' of the Horizon Europe Project "Skill Partnerships for Sustainable and Just Migration Patterns (SKILLS4JUSTICE)," co-funded with support from the European Commission (S4J-project no. 101132435-HORIZON-CL2-2023-TRANSFORMATIONS-01/ 03).

Norway has experienced a long-term transition from a country of emigration to one of sustained immigration, shaped by global events, EU expansion, and humanitarian crises. As of 2025, migrants constitute 17.2% of Norway's population and represent remarkable diversity, with over 200 nationalities. The largest groups originate from Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Syria, and Sweden. Migration to Norway is driven by a combination of work, family unification, education, and refuge. The migrant population is mixed in age (slightly younger than the general Norwegian population but aging overall) and in gender composition, though some groups are highly gender-skewed (e.g., Thailand). More than half have lived in Norway over 10 years, indicating long-term settlement patterns.

Employment outcomes showed both strengths and challenges. Employment rate was strikingly high at 86%, and 47% worked in professional occupations. Healthcare, scientific/technical professions, retail, and construction were major sectors of employment. However, persistent skill underutilisation existed: while 91% felt competent at work, only about half experienced a good match between their qualifications and job. Overqualification was common, and foreign credential recognition remains a bottleneck - particularly for migrants from outside Europe or those with vocational and regulated professions (e.g., healthcare). Recognition was highest for recent arrivals and the highly educated, and lowest for migrants from non-EU Europe.

The survey revealed that migrants invest heavily in their education after arrival, mirroring the qualitative accounts of migrants who return to study because their foreign qualifications are undervalued. At the same time, 38% report receiving no adaptation support from employers, while others rely on on-the-job training, internal courses, or informal mentoring. Despite barriers, migrants generally report strong communication skills and trust in the availability of workplace training.

Experiences of workplace fairness were mostly positive, though younger migrants and men more often reported high-risk work environments or concerns about layoffs. Quantitative findings showed relatively low reported discrimination, yet qualitative accounts highlight subtle exclusion, stereotyping, and unequal recruitment practices, especially affecting migrants with non-European backgrounds. Language requirements and bureaucratic systems were perceived as disproportionately demanding and central mechanisms of structural gatekeeping.

Social integration was marked by active participation in both local activities (64%) and professional organisations (63%), though engagement declined the longer migrants had resided in Norway. Language-wise Norwegian dominated at work, but home-country languages were central in private life.

Policy developments over the past decade signal a shift toward more conditional integration, even as Norway continues to depend on migrant labour in key sectors. The temporary protection scheme for Ukrainians illustrates this dual approach of humanitarian openness combined with regulatory tightening.

Key conclusions

1. Norway has a well-established, diverse migrant population, with long-term settlement and strong demographic contributions.

2. Labour market participation is high, but skill mismatch and underutilisation are persistent structural issues, driven by demanding language norms and weaknesses in credential recognition.

3. Sectoral segregation remains pronounced, with migrants overrepresented in lower-wage, high-demand sectors (cleaning, hospitality) and underrepresented in regulated professions.

4. Integration policies are increasingly work-oriented yet often place the burden of adaptation on migrants rather than institutions.

5. Despite relatively positive perceptions of fairness, migrants still face structural and subtle forms of discrimination, affecting career progression and belonging.

6. Norway's future labour shortages and ageing population make improved skill recognition, targeted sectoral pathways, and inclusive labour-market practices both economic and social imperatives.

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# 1. Introduction

In this section we provide the context and background of the research in Norway in relation to the research questions in the Work Package 4 (WP4) in the Skills4Justice (S4J) project.

## 1.1. Immigrant Profile

Migration, both emigration and immigration, has played a significant role in shaping Norwegian society throughout history (Brochmann & Kjeldstadli, 2008). Demographic data show that Norway transitioned from being a country of net emigration to a country of immigration in the early 1970s (Vassenden, 2012). A closer consideration of the larger migration trends and patterns of the last century (Figure 1) can result in a periodization with four distinctive periods. At the beginning of the 20th century, circa 1900-1930, migration was marked by a substantial Norwegian emigration to America. This first period largely continuing a significant emigration trend to the United States dating back to the 1820s (Østrem, 2014). During the second period (1930-1970), this encompassing WW2 and post-war reconstruction, migration subsided, and migration numbers remained low and relatively stable, while continuing a trend of net emigration.

1971 marked the year a new pattern of sustained net immigration appeared. This third period, circa 1971-2004, was characterized by an initial noteworthy immigration from Asia (chiefly, Pakistan and Vietnam), but also included increased migration from Africa. In the 1980s and 1990s, immigration from African and European countries rose more substantially. This was in part due to societal unrest and conflicts in the Balkans, as well as economic migration from neighbouring countries.



**Figure 1. Net immigration to Norway: 1827-2024, 3-year average[1]**

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[1] Compiled and adapted graphic based on Vassenden (2012) for the span 1875-2000 and SSB Table 05803 for the span 2000-2024, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/05803

The last of these four periods, extending into the present-day situation, began with the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, when a pattern of immigration from the newly acceded EU countries started to dominate. This pattern of, largely, work-related migration from other European Union countries has nevertheless been accompanied by periods conflict driven migration, significantly from the mid-2010s, as well as a stable pattern of family migration driven by the existing migrant population in Norway.

### 1.1.1. Immigration profile and context

At the start of 2025 Norway's migrant population stood at 965 112 individuals, which amounts to 17.2% of the total estimated population of 5 594 300. While migrants from more than 200 different nationalities are registered in the migration statistics of Statistics Norway, more than half (56.3%) of all migrants have immigrated from another European country (Table 1 & Figure 2). Specifically, just over a third of all immigrants in Norway (36.6%), or 352 753 individuals, originate from the 27 European Union member states (EU27), while just under 20% of all migrants living in Norway come from non-EU27 European countries (19.7%), including a sizable Ukrainian population.

Migrants from EU27 member states thus make up a substantial portion of the Norwegian migrant population. Within this group, 216 749 individuals, or 22.5% of the total Norwegian migrant population, originate from countries that joined the European Union as part of the 2004 eastern expansion: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

**Table 1. Immigrant population by country background (regionalized) as of 1 Jan. 2025. Source: SSB[2]**

| Region of origin | Persons | Percent of migrant population (%) | Percent of total population (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EU Member countries (EU27) | 352 753 | 36,6% | 6,3% |
| *Of which 2004 expansion countries* | *216 749* | | |
| Non-EU27 European countries | 190 047 | 19,7% | 3,4% |
| Asia | 266 843 | 27,6% | 4,8% |
| Africa | 110 489 | 11,4% | 2,0% |
| South America | 23 049 | 2,4% | 0,4% |
| North America | 19 239 | 2,0% | 0,3% |
| *Of which US & Canada* | *13 214* | | |
| Oceania | 2 694 | 0,3% | 0,05% |
| Total | 965 112 | 100,0% | 17,2% |

The number of migrants from the geographically close Nordic countries, including the EU27 countries of Sweden, Denmark and Finland, totals 69 979, or 7.3% of the total immigrant population, while the number of migrants from non-EU27 EEA countries (including Iceland) is modest, 8 486 individuals.

Migrants from Asia and the Africa together make up 39% of the migrant population, corresponding to 6.8% of the total Norwegian population. Taken separately, the African migrant population, numbering 110 489, spans across 57 different

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[2] SSB Table 09817: Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by region, contents, year and country background, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09817; Table 10211: Population, by age, contents, year and gender, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/10211

countries and territories of origin. At the same time, close to half (48%) of all African migrants living in Norway originate from either Somalia (27 658) or Eritrea (25 523).



**Figure 2. Immigrant population in Norway by regions of origin, as of 1 Jan. 2025. Source: SSB[3]**

The Asian migrant population is more varied in terms of country of origin. However, approximately 80% of the Asian population in Norway (total population 266 843) originate from nine countries, with individual country shares ranging from 15.2% (Syria) to 5.5% (Vietnam). In contrast, 34 of the 49 Asian countries each account for 1% or less of all Asian migrants in Norway, and together these smaller volume countries comprise 21 554 persons.

For the Americas, the migrant population (4.4%) is evenly split between North America (population of 19 239) and South America (population of 23 049), while Canada and the US stand out with a combined migrant population of 13 214. Oceania, as the smallest region, consists primarily of migrants from Australia (population 2036) and New Zealand (population 572), yet 11 different countries and territories are represented in total

**Countries of origin.** While it is possible to find 215 different countries of origin (including dependencies and territories) in official statistics, immigration to Norway is nevertheless concentrated in terms of country of origin. Across all regions, the ten largest countries of origin (Figure 3) account for 45,8% of the migrant population, which corresponds to 7,91% of the total Norwegian population.

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[3] SSB Table 09817: Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by region, contents, year and country background, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09817

The largest country of origin is Poland with a migrant population of 111 376. Following the 2004 EU expansion, the number of Polish migrants increased sharply, while numbers over the last 10-years show that the population of Polish-born migrants has continued to grow steadily. Ukraine is currently the second largest country of origin, with 79 624 migrants. The numbers of Ukrainians increased drastically following the full-scale invasion of 2022, and the number of Ukrainians living in Norway rose from a modest 6 512 in January of 2022 to 36 803 a year later. Lithuanians make up the third largest migrant group in Norway. Like in the case of Poland, Lithuanian migration to Norway increased significantly following their EU accession in 2004, while numbers started levelling out after 2016. Over the past 10 years the Lithuanian population in Norway has nevertheless steadily grown, reaching 43 077 in 2025.



**Figure 3. Development for the ten largest migrant populations, 2015 to 2025 as of 1 Jan. 2025. Source: SSB[4]**

The numbers of Ukrainians increased drastically following the full-scale invasion of 2022, and the number of Ukrainians living in Norway rose from a modest 6 512 in January of 2022 to 36 803 a year later. Lithuanians make up the third largest migrant group in Norway. Like in the case of Poland, Lithuanian migration to Norway increased significantly following their EU accession in 2004, while numbers started levelling out after 2016. Over the past 10 years the Lithuanian population

The Syrian population in Norway, currently numbering 40 774, grew significantly following the escalation of the Syrian civil war in 2012. Sweden, as a neighbouring country, ranks also among the largest countries of origin with a population of 37 213 in Norway. Swedish migration has historically fluctuated somewhat, but following a steady 15-year increase, and with a peak in 2016, numbers fell slightly during 2017-2020 before picking back up and surpassing 2016 levels by 2025.

The African countries of Somalia (27 658) and Eritrea (25 523) are similar in terms of the number of migrants living in Norway, but their arrival and current developments differ slightly. Somali migration commenced notably in the late 1990s, largely driven by conflict, while Eritrean migration to Norway had a significant increase about a decade later, in the 2010s, also due to conflict and humanitarian challenges. However, over the past ten years the Somali population has increased

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only slightly from 27 333 in 2015 to 27 658 in 2025. For Somalia, during the period 2018-2025 there was a slight decline from the peak year of 2018 (28 754 persons). In contrast, the Eritrean migrant population has steadily increased over the past decade, from 14 741 in 2015 to 25 523 in 2025.

Germany ranks as the seventh largest country of origin for migrants, with a population of 27 379 at the beginning of 2025. Following a period of growth (2000-2015), the last ten years has been characterized by a stable, slow growth factor. Migration from the Philippines (total population 25 319) has also over the last ten years shown steady and relatively moderate growth. There is, however, a noticeable exception during 2020-2022, presumably due global movement restrictions. A notable feature of the Filipino migrant population is a significant gender divergence. This gendered migration pattern can be traced as a structural feature dating back to the 1980s, despite the male migration share increasing modestly in the period 2015-2025.

As a historically significant country of origin since the 1970s, the Pakistani migrant population in Norway has grown steadily over the last ten years, yet with a moderate average annual population increase of approximately 2,3 percent. Today, Pakistani migrants living in Norway number 24 244, while, as an established minority, the number of Norwegian-born children to Pakistani migrants is the highest of all migrant groups in Norway, numbering 18 971 in 2025 (SSB, 2025; Kirkeberg et al., 2024).



**Figure 4. The largest non-EU27 immigrant groups from 2015 to 2025 as of 1 Jan. 2025. Source: SSB[5]**

**Significant non-EU27 countries of origin.** More than one third of all migrants in Norway come from other European Union Member states. At the same time, 6 of the 10 largest Countries of Origin are Non-EU27 Countries. When excluding the EU27 countries (Figure 4) we can identify additional important countries of origin such as Iraq (23 776), Thailand (22 873), Russia (22 254) and Iran (20 520). Excluding Syria and Ukraine, these countries, while exhibiting diverse migration dynamics, have all been relatively stable countries of origin over the last decade, with Eritrea standing out with

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[5] SSB Table 09817: Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by region, contents, year and country background, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09817

the largest net growth for the period 2015-2025, going from 14 741 in 2015, to 25 523 in 2025, reflecting a growth of about 73%.

In more recent 2020-2025 developments (Figure 5), and considering the largest non-EU27 migrant population growth in percent, again excluding Ukraine (79 624, ↑1207%) and populations smaller than 100 individuals (Figure 5), include countries like Rwanda (1645, ↑150%), Jordan (1206, ↑98%), Moldova (2814, ↑97%), South Sudan (667, ↑88%), Argentina (2097, ↑84%), Turkmenistan (169, ↑84%), Bangladesh (2127, ↑65%), Tajikistan (199, ↑65%) and Georgia (527, ↑53%). In this group of countries, we can note several former Soviet republics, including the current EU-candidate countries of Moldova and Georgia.



**Figure 5. Non-EU27 immigrant groups with the largest gross percent increase from 2020 to 2025. Excluding Ukraine and immigrant populations <100, as of 1 Jan. 2025. Source: SSB[6]**

### 1.1.2. Migration motivations, length of stay, citizenship status, gender and age

Given the current migration situation, it would be useful to examine trends over the past decades before turning to the more recent picture. Compiling numbers from Statistics Norway (Figure 6) for the period 1990-2024 show that work (32%) and family (33%) are the leading reasons for migration. Seeking refuge accounted for 23%, making it the third largest reason for migrating to Norway during this period. Education, with a share of 9%, has, unlike the former categories, remained relatively stable over the last decade. The remaining 3% of migrations are labelled as none of the former (Other), or the reason is unknown.

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[6] SSB Table 09817: Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by region, contents, year and country background, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09817

The latest 2024 data next to this long-term perspective (Figure 7) reveal important shifts and variations that mark the present-day migration patterns in Norway. For Europe, the 2024 numbers are drastically influenced by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and refuge being the prevailing reason for migration (54%), while work accounted for 22%. At the same time, we can observe in the 2024 numbers that refugee flows from both Asia and Africa appear to be diminishing slightly, while family reunion increased slightly.

### Reason for migration to Norway,1990-2024 combined

9%
32%
23%
33%

- Work
- Family
- Refugee
- Education
- Unknown (2%)
- Other (1%)

**Figure 6. Reason for migration to Norway, all countries 1990-2024, excluding migrants with Nordic citizenship and undeclared citizenship, 1990-2024 compiled. Source: SSB[7]**

### Reason for migration by region 2024 and 2015-2023

0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90%  100%

Europe 2024
Europe 2015-2023
Africa 2024
Africa 2015-2023
Asia 2024
Asia 2015-2023
N. America 2024
N. America 2015-2023
LatAm- Carib. 2024
LatAm-Carib. 2015-2023
Oceania 2024
Oceania 2015-2023
Stateless 2024
Stateless 2015-2023

- Work
- Family
- Protection
- Education
- Undeclared
- Other

**Figure 7. Reason for migration by region 2024 and 2015-2023 compiled. Excluding migrants with Nordic and undeclared Citizenship. Source: SSB[8]**

For African migrants the primary reason for migration in 2024 was family (49%), followed by refuge (33%) while work accounted for 9%. Similarly for Asia, family reasons made up 51%, while refuge came second (22%), and work accounted for 15%. In contrast, for North and Latin America, with lesser seeking refuge, work features more prominently with 38% and 40% respectively. Family migration nevertheless features as important also in the Americas, with 39% and 45% respectively.

North America also shows a high proportion of education related migration (20%), and the numbers for Latin America nevertheless also show a small refugee portion (4%) in addition to some students (9%). Oceania has the highest proportion of work-related migration (59%), followed by family (32%) and education (7%). In 2024, all non-European regions show an increase in work-related migration when compared to the 1990-2024 average.

The 2024 numbers also show an increase in cases where the reason for migration is unknown. As noted by Kirkeberg (2024) this most likely relates to missing registration data from EU and EEA migrants following the implementation of the EU's Citizens' Rights Directive that grants EU and EEA citizens the right to move and reside freely within and between member states. For the year 2023, Kirkeberg (2024) identified migrants with undeclared reasons for migration as primarily originating from Poland (670), Lithuania (370), Spain (310), Romania (260) and Germany (190). Kirkeberg suggests that these migrants likely all fall within the categories of work or family related migration.

**Citizenship Status**. Since 2020, migrants living in Norway have been allowed to retain their prior citizenship(s) upon attaining citizenship in Norway. This change, inaugurated by the Norwegian Nationality Act of 2020, led to a significant increase in both citizenship applications and transitions, especially during the first three years following the implementation of the Act. Overall numbers peaked in 2021 (41 092 transitions) before numbers started subsiding in 2022 and 2023, and declining further to 27 460 transitions in 2024 (Figure 8).

Arnesen & Corneliussen (2024) and Vassenden (2020) suggests that, understood as a phenomenon and when analyzing trends, citizenship transitions are closely related to shifts in immigration legislation and migration policy, and exhibit differences when correlated to the reason for migration. In addition to the 2020 reforms in the Norwegian Nationality Act, Arnesen & Corneliussen (2024) point to the significant spike in transition numbers for 2017, finding this increase related to the announcement of a future new requirement to prove Norwegian oral proficiency at the A2 level. Other factors impacting transition numbers and migrants' citizenship ambitions are changes to residency and income requirements (subsistence or maintenance) as well as other economic factors including administrative expenses (Arnesen & Molstad, 2024).

Norway joined the Schengen Area in 2001, and it would be reasonable to presume that citizenship ambitions are more pronounced for migrants holding a citizenship from a country outside the EU/EEA due to the legal protections and rights that Norwegian citizenship offers. However, on a group level, and in the longer run, numbers from Statistics Norway show that migrants from EU27 countries, such as Poland and Sweden, are also actively seeking citizenship (Figure 9).

**Figure 8. Transition to Norwegian citizenship, by former region, 2015-2024. Source: SSB[9]**

A large proportion of these transitions from EU27 countries occurred recently (2021-2024), no doubt in relation to the beforementioned change in the legal framework of dual citizenship. Yet, migrants from non-EU countries like Russia and nationalities from the Balkans have also been seeking citizenship, while a larger portion of these transitions predate 2021



**Figure 9. Transition to Norwegian citizenship by former citizenship, 1977-2024. Top 15 countries. Source: SSB[10]**

[9] SSB Table 07114: Utenlandske statsborgere som har fått norsk statsborgerskap [sic.], by former citizenship, contents and year, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/07114

[10] Note: Serbia and Montenegro here include Yugoslavian citizenship. Combining numbers for Serbia and Montenegro with the post 2007 numbers for Serbia as an independent state alone, this group accounts for 19 928 transitions, making it

**Length of Residency.** Statistics Norway data show that at the start of 2025 over half (53%) of all migrants currently living in Norway has done so for more than 10 years. A closer look at the ten largest migrant populations (Figure 10) further shows that both large EU27 migrant groups as well as non-EU migrant groups, such as Somalis (81%) and Pakistani (71%) migrants, placing well above the 53% average. A general trend of long-term residency also marks several of the well-established NON-EU27 migrant groups in Norway (Figure 11). Notably, 85% of Iraqis, 71% of Iranians, 66% of Thais, and 66% of Russian migrants have lived in Norway for more than 10 years. When considering the large refugee populations over the last decade (Ukraine and Syria), however, we find an opposite trend. 93% of the Ukrainian population has been in the country for less than 5 years, while Syrians are distributing more evenly with one third (66%) of Syrians having resided in Norway for 6-10 years.



**Figure 10. Length of residency by country, as of 1. Jan 2025, 10 largest groups. Source: SSB[11]**



**Figure 11. Length of Residency by country, non-EU27 countries only, as of 1. Jan 2025. Source: SSB[12]**

the 7th largest group. Source: SSB Table 04767: Naturalisations, by citizenship, contents, year and gender, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/04767

[11] SSB Table 10598: Immigrants, by years of residence, contents, year and region, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/10598

[12] SSB Table 10598: Immigrants, by years of residence, contents, year and region, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/10598

**Gender composition**. The Norwegian migrant population consists of 48% women and 51% men. This closely mirrors the Norwegian population on the whole, composed of 49,6% women and 50,4% men. The gender composition of different migrant populations, however, varies significantly across countries of origin. At one end of the spectrum, some of the large migrant populations such as Thailand (84% women) and the Philippines (77% women), as well as smaller countries like Brazil (71% women), have a particularly high proportion of women. In contrast, although the gender difference is comparatively less pronounced, migrant populations from countries such as Poland, Afghanistan, UK, Italy, Portugal, Australia, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Ireland show a majority of male migrants, with men making up between 60% and 66% of these groups.



Migrant population by county of origin and gender 2025,15 largest

**Figure 12 Migrant Population by country of origin and gender 2025, 15 Largest. Source, SSB[13]**

**Age**. The Norwegian migrant population is, like the Norwegian population on the whole, slowly aging. The migrant population is nevertheless younger, and exhibit differences in age composition compared to the majority population (Dzamarija, 2025). There is a higher portion of working-age migrants between the ages of 25-54, while we find fewer young children and elderly migrants (Figure 13). However, the absolute and relative numbers of migrants aged 55 and over has nevertheless over the last decades increased, and close to 190 000, or 20% of migrants, living in Norway are now 55 or older (Dzamarija, 2025). This represents an increase of approximately 6 percentage points since 2015, when 14 per cent of migrants were aged 55 and over. By comparison, the share of the total Norwegian population in this age group increased by 3 percentage points over the same period, from 28% to 31%.

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[13] Table 05184: Immigrants, by country background, contents, year and gender, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/05184

## Total Norwegian population and Norwegian migrant population, age and gender. Percent, 2025



**Figure 13 Total Norwegian population and Norwegian migrant population, age and gender. Percent 2025. Source: Reproduced from Dzamarija (2025), based on SSB data.**

### 1.1.3. Common migration channels and pathways

In this section we provide an overview of the legal architecture and migration channels (entry categories) through which migrants can enter, remain, and potentially settle. The admission categories form the institutional foundation for longer-term settlement trajectories, which are also shaped by evolving policy design and socio-economic constraints.

Norway's legal framework for immigration is multi-layered and governed by the Immigration Act of 2008, and its corresponding Immigration Regulation. This legal structure defines the rights of foreign nationals to enter, reside, and seek employment. The administration of this regime is divided among several key actors, and most importantly, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion largely oversees immigration and integration policy, while the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) manages permit processing and act as first-instance decision authority. In the migration process migrants will typically need to interact with UDI through the application portal and meet with immigration authorities in person at the immigration unit at the local police station when filing certain types of

documentation and for interviews or identity verification.[14] Processing times vary for application types, and also to caseloads at time of application. Appeals against UDI decisions are resolved by the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE), an independent appellate body set up to ensure that decisions align with legal standards and obligations under the law, including international human rights commitments. This multi-level administrative structure reflects the rule-bound character of Norway's migration governance. Within this overarching structure of law and regulations, current immigration channels create differentiated migration pathways. On the one hand Nordic and EU/EEA citizens enjoy extensive rights while (a) third-country labour migration; (b) family migration; (c) education-related migration; and (d) protection and humanitarian immigration is subject to restrictions and differentiated access to social welfare and participation.

**Nordic and EU/EEA citizens.** Mobility within the Nordic region is regulated by the Nordic Passport Union, granting Nordic citizens the rights to reside, work, and study in Norway without a residence permit or mandatory registration. This is the most liberal mobility channel in the Norwegian immigration system and reflects long-standing Nordic labour market cooperation. Through the EEA-agreement, citizens of EU and EFTA countries also benefit from broad free-movement and rights and employment options, requiring only registration for stays beyond three months. These regimes effectively operate aside the discretionary admission system for third-country nationals, functioning instead as treaty-based entitlements that do not require prior authorisation for entry and residence. Nordic free-movement migration has historically constituted a significant component of immigration to Norway and shapes labour market dynamics against which non-EEA discretionary admission system is structured.

**Third-country migration: non-EU27 channels.** For citizens of countries outside the EU/EEA and the Nordic cooperation, access is governed by the Immigration Act and regulations that prescribe specific residence permits based on the applicant's purpose of stay. Migrants are, depending on the channel, subject to assessments of admissibility, mandatory advance authorisations, and strict requirements concerning skill level, labour-market relevance of skills, income thresholds, and requirements of financial independence according to set government rates.

(a) **Labour migration: Skilled workers.** Labour migration is governed by a multi-tier legal framework where the Immigration Regulation and UDI enforcement is under the influence of policy priorities.[15] The skilled-worker channel emphasise the need for skills based on national labour-market needs. The legal basis for residence and work permits for skilled workers derive from Immigration Act and §6-1 of the Immigration Regulation, which structure and specify the qualifications and conditions for the skilled-worker provision.

The skilled worker provision has a legal entitlement structure, meaning UDI is, within the frame of the scheme, directed to grant a permit if all criteria are satisfied. This legal structure signals an ostensible open policy stance, although procedural requirements and documentation demands are rigorous, and the channel is fully dependent on employer cooperation.

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[14] For labour migrants, select cities such as Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Kirkenes (Finnmark) have an inter-agency Service Centre for Foreign Workers (SUA) cooperation between the UDI, the police, the Tax Administration and the Labour Inspection Authority. Registration and initial processing of protection applications (asylum) has since 2024 been centralized to the National Arrival Centre located in Råde municipality outside of Oslo.

[15] Meld. St. 33 (2023–2024) *En forsterket arbeidslinje: flere i jobb og færre på trygd*

In 2002 a yearly quota system was introduced to widen the channel for non-EEA labour migration and reduce application times by forgoing the mandatory individual market assessment. In the early years this channel was dominated by eastern European countries that later joined the EU in 2004-2007. To qualify for a skilled worker visa an applicant must meet skill requirements and as a rule have a concrete job offer from a Norwegian-registered employer before applying. Employers must through their own application declare need for the skill and describe the applicants' skill set and qualifications in relation to tasks in the position offered.

Currently the quota for skilled workers stands at 6000 per year, and the yearly frame is set by the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion in consultation with the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Finance. The scheme was introduced in 2002 to simplify visa processing procedures and target the persistent skill shortages in sectors such as health care, engineering, and IT.

When introduced in 2002, the skilled-worker quota provision was framed in immigration policy as a recruitment scheme allowing "specialists" and workers with in-demand "special qualifications" to enter the workforce (UDI, 2002, p. 15). However, reviews indicate that quotas between 2002-2022 were persistently under-filled (Tronstad et al., 2025; Kirkeberg et al., 2024). When the quota of 5000 was reached in 2022, the quota has remained at 6000 per year. If, or when, the annual quota is met, visa applications will be assessed on a case-to-case basis, with more stringent conditions of employer needs and market skill situation.

To qualify as a skilled worker, an applicant is expected to have relevant and documented skills (formal vocational certificates at EQF level 4-5 or higher education) but the requirement can also be met by documenting special qualifications acquired through professional experience. Skilled workers also have a salary-level requirement. For professionals at EQF level 4-5, the requirement is a guaranteed income equivalent to the collective wage rate for the profession or position in that sector. In 2025 UDI significantly raised thresholds for applicants with higher education to a gross income of NOK 522 600 for bachelor-level jobs and NOK 599 200 for positions requiring a master qualification as a rule (UDI, 2025).

In addition to the skilled-worker quotas, UDI also issue temporary permits for non-EEA seasonal workers, specifically addressing demands for low-skilled agricultural workers in the agricultural and forestry sector. Seasonal worker permits are limited to six months, with a subsequent quarantine period of 6 months, and do not provide a route for permanent residence. Seasonal permits for work outside of the quota-governed agriculture and forestry sector can be issued after market assessment, where UDI needs to determine that the position cannot be filled by domestic labour or labour from the EEA/EFTA area.

Beyond the primary skilled-worker and temporary seasonal worker quota channel, Norway's migration regime contains a set of time-limited and niche work-related categories designed to accommodate specific labour-market functions that fall outside standard recruitment structures. These permits are typically narrower in scope, both in duration and in the rights they confer. The channels therefore operate primarily as instruments of labour-market flexibility rather than long-term settlement pathways. Temporary transfers or mobility within transnational businesses are generally exempt from labour-market testing, reflecting an assumption of firm-specific competence. Permits for self-employed individuals (entrepreneurs) are granted under conditions of income guarantee and assessment of economic viability and an assessment of the likelihood for a future business presence

in Norway. The Immigration Regulation also maintains a number of smaller, purpose-specific work permits enabling civil society activities, the arts and sports (religious personnel, cultural workers, practicing artist, athletes and coaches) but these operate largely as exceptions rather than substantial labour migration channels.

(b) **Family migration** represents a structurally significant migration channel for non-EU27 migrants, encompassing both family reunification, where a migrant joins a migrant relative already residing in Norway, and family formation, where a person migrates to Norway in order to establish a family with a citizen. Non-EEA migrants must demonstrate a qualifying familial relationship (spouse/partner, parent, or child) and, with certain exceptions, satisfy financial requirements based on the resident reference person's ability to support the family member. Following the new formula for calculation introduced in February 2025, the income expectation for most migrants is currently NOK 416 512 before taxes, and the equivalent (down-adjusted) amount for the previous year. Exact amounts are calculated according to a yearly-adjusted, fixed reference amount used to calculate most benefits in the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme (G). The recent policy adjustment increased from 2,7 G in 2024 to 3,2 G in 2025, reflecting broader political debates about immigration public welfare expenditures. Most non-EEA reference persons, including skilled workers and students, are subject to income requirements, while refugees granted protection by UDI are exempt from the general financial requirement when seeking reunion for their immediate family (partner and children) within a year of the asylum decision, while the requirement would apply for other eligible family members as defined by regulations.

(c) **Education** has historically functioned both as an independent admission channel across educational levels, and has provided a possible bridge into long-term residence through conversion to work permits. Under the Immigration Act and corresponding regulations, third-country nationals may be granted time-limited residence for both educational and vocational training and post-doctoral researchers. EEA citizens remain covered by free-movement rules, while for non-EEA nationals a study permit can be granted on the basis of documented full-time enrolment in an accredited institution of learning and documented financial maintenance. The threshold is currently NOK 166 859 per academic year (adjusted periodically). A study permit grants limited labour market access, where also the projected income from documented part time employment (up to 20 hours per week during term and full-time during holidays) can count towards maintenance demands. Tuition-paying students are required to document funding on ability to cover these additionally (see below).

Study permits are temporary and conditional on academic progression, and unlike for EEA-citizens, they do not count towards the requirements for duration and continuous residence when applying for permanent residency or citizenship. There is a stipulation of ability to return after completion of the programme, making it possible to deny permits where an individual might later be eligible for protection due to the social and political situation in the home country of the applicant.

Recent graduates and fixed-term researchers from non-EEA countries are eligible for a 12-month job-seeker permit to secure relevant skilled employment, provided financial requirements are met. The post-graduation grace period channel was extended from 6 to 12 months in 2016, and a successful transition typically proceeds through the skilled worker route which can open access to permanent residence. The current financial requirement for

recent graduates is NOK 27 116 a month (325 400 per year). Income from existing/future documented employment while looking to secure a qualifying skilled-worker employment can count towards maintenance demands.

A major structural change affecting the non-EEA-student flow was the introduction of tuition fees for non-EU/EEA degree-seeking students from autumn 2023. The reform signalled a significant policy change from the traditional tuition-free model and has already affected inflows at the master's level. Students from select countries can be eligible for tuition exemption and qualify for student stipends/financial aid equivalent to student support rates through government-run programs and international cooperations such as NORPART, NORHED, and Students at Risk.[16] At the time of tuition introduction, the government under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched The Norwegian scholarship scheme for students from selected partner countries (NORSTIP) to maintain student flows at the master's level, and secure further strategic partnerships with select countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America affected by new tuition demands. No further calls for applications under the NORSTIP scholarship scheme will be issued from the 2026 budget year onward, owing to reductions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget.

Outside of higher education a number of cultural exchange and trainee schemes and programs are also maintained. Exchange schemes such as Norec under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working-holiday schemes for several partner countries, working guests in agriculture, all of which allow temporary work combined with structured learning or cultural engagement. These schemes are time-limited, do not require labour-market testing, and are as such temporary, formally delinked from long-term residence pathways.

Their recent restructuring also includes the discontinuation of the au pair scheme for third-country nationals as of 15 March 2024, though existing permits may still be renewed within the frame of the scheme. Collectively, these categories illustrate the differentiated logic of Norway's labour-migration governance: while adapting entry channels, they remain tightly regulated and largely disconnected from permanent residence tracks, thereby reinforcing a policy orientation toward temporariness outside the skilled-worker track.

(d) Norway's **protection channel** aligns with existing commitments under the 1951 Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and related international migration instruments such as the EU Dublin Regulation. Asylum is extended to individuals with a well-founded fear of persecution, torture, or inhuman treatment in their home country due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a specific social group. Protection may also be granted to individuals not fulfilling the Refugee Convention criteria if still facing serious harm or loss of life if returned to their country of origin. The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) processes asylum applications in accordance with the Immigration Act Chapter 4, and the accompanying Immigration Regulations. Norway's asylum channel is characterized by the broader post-2022 pivot and the

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[16] Norwegian Partnership Programme for Global Academic Cooperation (NORPART) https://hkdir.no/en/programmes-and-grant-schemes/norpart; Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development in Higher Education and Research for Development (NORHED) under The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) https://www.norad.no/tema/temaseksjon/Utdanning-og-forskning/hoyere-utdanning--sentralt-for-ethvert-lands-utvikling/norhed-ii/; Students at Risk (StAR) https://hkdir.no/en/programmer-og-tilskuddsordninger/students-at-risk-star

subsequent policy recalibrations (collective protection, progressively narrower Ukraine-specific rules and quota reductions). At the same time policy seeks to preserve the central legal guarantees of asylum weighing these against municipal capacity and labour-market absorption concerns and declaring aims of integration while simultaneously incentivizing return.



**Figure 14 Total number of asylum applications, UDI first decisions granting asylum protection, collective protection permits and number of UN quota refugees 2014-2025.[17]**

Protection comprises three distinct channels: (i) *individual asylum* (Refugee Convention or humanitarian grounds); (ii) *temporary collective protection* (currently in force for displaced persons from Ukraine); and (iii) *resettlement* via UNHCR-referred quotas. Compiled UDI numbers (fig.) show the 2015-peak of 31 150 application and the subsequent positive first decision rate the following year (13 672). Currently the temporary protection provision account for the major share of migrants under protection, peaking in 2022 with 33 554 new decisions. End of the year figures for 2025 show that 12 940 were given protection under §34. The number of individual-based applications for asylum were steadily declining after the peak of 2015, while the 2022-2023 upswing is partly due to Ukrainian citizen applicants not eligible for collective protection and therefore sought individual protection instead. Overall, individual asylum applications fell from 4 970 in 2024 to 3 628 in 2025. The number of UN quota resettlement refugees has remained relatively stable between 2015 and 2022, within the range of 2124-3468, while numbers taking a downturn after 2022. With the record low announcement of 500 (and 570 approvals) in 2025, the current budget announced a new all-time low of 100 resettlement refugees for 2026.

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[17] Note: First decision to stay includes positive decision for all refugees according to the convention, non-convention refugees, humanitarian grounds and unaccompanied minor asylum seekers who have been granted a time-limited residence permits in Norway until they turn 18. Source UDI, https://www.udi.no/statistikk-og-analyse/statistikk/

Relative to labour, family and education channels, the protection channel combines (i) an initial rights-based admission logic (treaty and humanitarian obligations), (ii) policy instruments that seeks to control volume and composition, and (iii) a designated track to permanence and with rights and responsibilities to integration. Protection channels often intersect with family migration, as individuals granted refugee status and asylum may later sponsor family members, introducing cross-channel dynamics that shape overall immigration patterns. Protection and asylum channels are also a determining factor on the form and distributions of irregular migration patterns, and the shaping of national return strategies.

(e) **Irregular migration, return and emigration**. A key policy priority for Norway has been to limit arrivals of asylum seekers deemed not in need of protection, and authorities have been aligning their asylum processing procedures within the framed of the Schengen agreement and the Dublin Regulation since 2021. In 2004 UDI initiated a two-channel application processing flow, where applicants from countries that Norwegian authorities considered to be generally safe and could expect adequate state protection of citizens received an expedited 48-hour processing before removal procedures were initiated, while the evolving Dublin agreement greatly re-ordered asylum processing and facilitated new removal procedures.

Without reliable numbers on how many irregular migrants are currently living or working in Norway, researchers (Mohn et al, 2014) and the National Police Immigration Service (PU, 2017) nevertheless presume that individuals with a final rejection of their application for protection to constitute the largest segment in of irregular migrants.[18]

Other segments of this migrant population include non-EEA citizens who have entered the country and/or work using falsely obtained EEA-documents, individuals that have overstayed initial visa periods (or otherwise fallen out of status), foreign nationals that have received but failed to comply with expulsion orders (often following to criminal convictions), or victims of human trafficking and other organized labour exploitation schemes Lillevik & Tyldum (2021).

Removals by the National Police Immigration Services are categorized as i) effectuation of final decision in asylum case, ii) return to first-applicant country in accordance with the Dublin agreement, iii) return to another Schengen country already providing International Protection, iv) refusal of entry or stay, or v) expulsion (criminal convictions or serious threat to national safety). UDI manage voluntary assisted return programs for asylum seekers and qualifying irregular migrants, as well as repatriation schemes currently targeting Ukrainians and others under collective protection. Expanded schemes for assisted voluntary return exists for Afghanistan, Iraq, Morocco

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[18] The 2017 PU-initiated empirical study covering 2011-2016 found it reasonable to conclude that around 3% (or 110 – 490 persons, with a 99% CI) of all asylum seekers known to have gone missing could be presumed to still be in Norway, while 26% (an estimated 3 120 - 4 270 individuals, 99% CI) were assessed as equally as likely to still remain in the country as to have left. It should be noted that the PU study does not provide any assessments of other categories of migrants or forms of irregular migration. A benchmark 2008 modelling study by Statistics Norway (Zhang, 2008) presumed that 2/3 of the total population of irregular migrants were former asylum seekers. For a discussion see also Øien & Sønsterudbråten (2011, p. 18-19) and Mohn et al. (2014, p. 57-59). As of December 2025, a total of 353 migrants with an active obligation to leave (*utreiseplikt*) reside in a state-run reception facility. Many of these migrants are unable to return to their country of origin. https://www.udi.no/statistikk-og-analyse/statistikk/beboere-i-asylmottak-etter-statsborgerskap-og-status-i-soknad-2025/

and Somalia and these include stipends as well as locally anchored reintegration services. UDI numbers (Figure 15) show that 179 persons made use of the programs in 2024. 18 of the 179 returnees had at the time of departure stayed for more than 2 years with an active obligation to leave. Of these 18, 12 had stayed in Norway for 8 years or longer (UDI, 2024).

In 2024, the PU executed 1048 forced removals related to asylum cases. Of these, 812 individuals were either removed according to the Dublin agreement or transported to a country already providing International Protection (710 and 102, respectively), while 236 individuals were forcibly returned to a country in which they hold citizenship or have other residence status. Within the latter group of 236 deported, the largest countries of origin were Kosovo (22), Iraq (21), Colombia (18), Ethiopia (17), and Venezuela (16).



**Figure 15 Select return enforcements and UDI asylum rejections 2020-2025. Source: UDI and PU[19]**

Repatriation assistance applications saw an upswing after 2022. As an indicative baseline number, UDI received in 2021 a total of 32 applications resulting in 5 repatriations. In 2023 UDI received 1 278 applications, and registered 474 departures, while 2 880 applications and 1 555 returns under the program was indicated for 2024 (UDI, 2024, p. 39). Numbers for 2025 are not yet available. While open to other migrants under protection, Ukrainians are currently the largest group seeking repatriation assistance, and currently the largest group when looking at overall emigration statistics for Norway.

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[19] Compiled from UDI Statistics, https://www.udi.no/statistikk-og-analyse/statistikk/; UDI Annual Reports, https://www.udi.no/om-udi/om-udi-og-utlendingsforvaltningen/arsrapporter/; and National Police Immigration Services statistics, https://www.politiet.no/om-politiet/tall-og-fakta/uttransporteringer (unadjusted end-of-year numbers used).

**Figure 16 Emigration selected nationalities 2015-2024. Source: SSB[20]**

**Emigration**. Disregarding Norwegian figures, Ukraine accounted for nearly one-quarter of all emigrations in 2024 (5 487 people, or 24% of the total 22 808 emigrations). From the same dataset we can also assert that most of non-EEA nationalities with emigration numbers over 200 for the past decade exhibit stable or declining emigration trends for the period 2015-2024.

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[20] Table 05476 Immigration, emigration and net immigration, by citizenship 2003 – 2024, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank1/table/05476

## 1.2. Labour market, sectoral concentration, and employment conditions

### 1.2.1. Labour force participation of immigrants

As a group, migrants living in Norway exhibit lower employment rates compared to the non-migrant population. Register-based data from Statistics Norway (Figure 17) shows an overall migrant employment rate of 67,7% compared to 76,7% of the non-migrant population. This employment disparity lessened some in the period 2015-2024, while a new beginning trend of divergence followed in the wake of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Skjæveland & Villund, 2024).



**Figure 17  Employed persons. 2001 to 4th quarter 2024, Register based. Source: SSB[21]**

Migrant employment rates differ when taking into consideration length of residence, and the reason for migration. Migrants who relocate for work opportunities exhibit an employment rate that is on par with the rest of the population, and against trends for other categories of migrants, the length of residence does not affect the employment rate (IMDI, 2025, s. 48). Where work migrants might be quicker to find employment, or might even have contracts before arrival, refugees and migrants who move to Norway for family reunification typically take longer to find employment (Olsen & Bye, 2025; Skjæveland & Villund, 2024). This could in part be explained by participation in the state-mandated Norwegian Introduction Programme (IP), tailored for refugees and migrants seeking family reunification. The program can last from 6 months to 3-5 years, depending on individual assessments and preexisting education and skill qualifications. Migrants with documented full-time employment, and migrants seeking family reunion with such persons, can be conditionally exempt from the program, while some retaining the right and/or duty to a set number of language and/or citizenship classes. After 2022, IP policy changes in response to changes in refugee demographic composition focused on rapid workforce integration and job-oriented activities (Kvalø, 2025; Lunde, 2023).

The duration of the IP is also related to the individual's educational level, pre-existing qualifications and market needs. Migrants in employment display substantial variation in educational attainment across country groups (Figure 18). Tertiary

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[21] Table 09837: Employed persons. 4th quarter, by country background, contents, year, gender and age, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09837

education is common among workers from Germany and the Philippines, while Somali and Eritrean migrants more often have primary/lower-secondary schooling. Poles and Lithuanians are concentrated at the upper-secondary level. Ukrainians stand out with comparatively high tertiary shares, though labour-market entry remains uneven (Skjæveland & Villund 2024; Dzamarija 2025).

While employment numbers for migrants differ across migration reason categories, employment rates are also related to larger global economic trends and events. Fluctuations in employment is greater for the migrant population, especially during global, national or sectoral recessions. When the overall employment in Norway fell by 2,1 percentage points during the 2014-2015 global oil price drop, the employment rate for migrants fell 3,0 percentage points compared to 1,9 points for the non-migrant workforce. Conversely during the post-Covid recovery, the over-all rates for migrants saw a significant rise of 3,5 percentage points (up from 61,6% to 65,1%), while only 1,4 percentage points (up from 67,4% to 68,8%) for non-migrants (see also Olsen, 2023).



Figure 18 Educational level for employed migrants (20-66) by country of origin, ten largest, 2024. Source: SSB[22]

**Employment sector**. Migrants aged 20-66 are employed across an array of sectors and industries (Figure 19). In absolute numbers, the largest employment sectors for migrant workers are healthcare including social work activities (104 186 migrants employed), retail and sales (56 221 migrants employed), and construction (53 650 migrants employed). As a major national employment sector, 21,2 % of the entire Norwegian workforce is employed in the health care. Of all employed in the sector, migrants constitute 18,7% of the workforce, and, with a total of 104 186 migrant workers employed, 19,5% of all employed migrants in Norway (534 347) work within this sector. This pattern suggests an approximate population proportionality, while revealing a tendency toward migrant overrepresentation. Among migrant workers in the

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[22] Table 12692: Employed immigrants. 4th quarter, by level of education, contents, year, gender and country background, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank1/table/12692

health care sector, women make up about 76.8 % (82 287) and men account for 23.2 % (24 894). By comparison, the non-migrant healthcare workforce is slightly more female-dominated, with women comprising 79.8 % (388 898) and men 20.2 % (98 417) of those employed in the sector.



Migrant employment (20-66) by industry and gender, in percent. 2024

**Figure 19 Migrant employment (20-66) by industry and gender, in percent. 2024. Register based and SIC2007. Source: SSB[23]**

Retail and sales as one of the other large employment sectors, employs 354 411 workers nationwide, and 17% of these are migrants. Within the migrant group, women make up about 43% (26 333) while men account for 56,3% (33 912). This is close to the gender distribution among non-migrants for the sector, 45,5% and 54,6% respectively. This makes the retail and sales one of the sectors, where migrant and non-migrant employment distributions show relative gender parity, in sharp contrast to sectors such as construction, transportation or cleaning services.

Construction has a national sectoral share of 8,3% (218 150 workers) and is composed of 53 650 migrant and 164 500 non-migrant workers, meaning that approximately 10,0% of all employed migrants work within construction, compared to 7,9%

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[23] . Norwegian Standard Industrial Classification, SIC2007, based on NACE Rev. 2. Non-Migrant Workers (n=2 091 103) here includes Norwegian-born to two migrant parents (n=44 454). Data are for Q4 of 2024. Table 13215, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank1/table/13215.

of all non-migrant workers in Norway. Over the last decade 2015-2024 the proportion of migrants working in the sector has increased. This means that, addition to a slightly higher overall ratio of 24,6% migrant to 75,4% non-migrant workers, this traditionally male dominated sector has fewer migrant women (6,8% to 93,2% men) compared to non-migrant women (10,3% to 89,7% men).

Some sectors and occupational groups are dominated by migrant labour, while in others, migrants are underrepresented. Among the sectors where migrants are overrepresented include hospitality, food and beverage service, land passenger transport (such as taxi and public transportation). The most pronounced overrepresentations can be found in the level 3 category 82.1 Cleaning activities, where 76% of all workers are migrants. With the gender disparity taken into consideration, 55 % of all workers in this occupational group are migrant women.

### 1.2.2. Skill recognition, mismatch and de-skilling

Since 2023 the mandate for recognition of education and qualifications has been held by the Norwegian Directorate for Higher Education and Skills (HK-dir). A 2013 government review of the labour integration from outside the EU/EEA pointed out a slow and complicated recognition process, especially vocational certificates, arguing for substantial underutilization of foreign qualifications, limiting the effective use of migrants' skills in the Norwegian labour market (NOU 2013:13). In line with policy priorities signalled by the government in Meld. St. 14 (2022–2023) and Meld. St. 11 (2024–2025), HK-dir has attempted to streamline the recognition processes and expanded routes to recognition, and align with European directives and frameworks of cooperation (HK-dir, 2024). An automatic recognition pathway has been introduced for select and a limited number of educational credentials from select countries, while the introduction of fast-track processing aim to reduce barriers for employers who need to fill vacancies quickly (OECD, 2025, p. 298). Such measures have been framed as especially important given the arrival of large migrant groups with diverse educational backgrounds, including Ukrainians, and a recognized demand for vocational skills, and align with migration policies emphasizing workplace integration.

Measures have been made to expand the current Recognition scheme for foreign vocational education and training to include more countries (HK-dir, 2025). Specific policy ambitions signalled by the government in Meld. St. 14 (2022-2023) included an intent to explore possible avenues to align the recognition of VET-education from non-EU countries with procedures established under the EEA agreement. However, despite these very recent developments, persistent gaps and barriers remain, especially for vocational education and training credentials and for migrants from outside the EEA.

**Trends of skill match and mismatch.** Current indicators on in demand and supply of skills in Norway over the preceding decades (Table 2) suggests an increased demand for high-skilled, specialized labour, and recent migration policy changes reflect this (Norwegian Ministries, 2023, p. 20). While the early to mid-2000s saw strong growth and improved labour market matching (Kolsrud, 2018), more recent developments point toward growing skill mismatches driven by technological change, migration related shifts in labour supply, educational misalignments, and sectoral shifts. OECD assess Norway's skills mismatch as "considerable" (OECD, 2024, p. 46). These dynamics set the stage for examining current patterns of skill recognition and emerging shortages in the Norwegian labour market.

**Table 2 Summary of major trends in skills supply in Norway**

| Trend | Description | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Increased demand for skilled labour, alongside increased supply of, and higher level of VET, increasing skill mis-matches | Growing demand for high-skilled labour alongside increased skilled wages, and the adoption of skill-complementary technologies. The provision of high-quality services in Norway's large public sector is particularly dependent on skilled workers, further constraining labour supply in other parts of the economy | Bjørnstad & Skjerpen (2006); Carneiro, Liu & Salvanes (2023); Falch, Johansen & Strøm (2009); Pitukhina et al. (2020); Norwegian Ministries (2023); (Meld. St. 14 (2022 – 2023) |
| Impact of migration | A substantial labour supply "shock" resulting from migration from Central and Eastern Europe. Changes in migrant demographics after 2015 and policy development towards migrant skill utilization and development. | Friberg (2016); Bratsberg, Moxnes, Raaum & Ulltveit-Moe (2023); OECD (2022) |
| Investments in skills, educational reforms and mismatches | Despite substantial investments in education, the share of low-performing adults remains an issue. Government responses have focused on expanding education and improving educational attainment to increase the supply of skilled labour and maintain competitiveness in the global labour market | Billington, Nissinen & Gabrielsen (2017); Korpi (2016); (Kalcic & Keute, 2024) |
| Sectoral shifts | Movement from industrial to service sector employment | Rommetvedt (2002); Friberg, Tronstad & Dølvik (2012); Berglund et al. (2019) |

Norway's job vacancy rates for the 3rd quarter of 2025 (Figure 20) remained sizable with an estimated national labour shortage of 39 000 workers across private and public sectors. The number of vacant jobs have, however, close to halved since the peak of 2022, then estimated at 70 250 (Skjøstad et al., 2025). With employment numbers relatively stable for 2024 and 2025, we can also observe minor increases or modest decline in available positions compared to 2024, all within the range of -2.1% to 0,4%. Assessments by The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), Norway's main employers' organization, both highlights persistent recruitment challenges (Skjøstad et al., 2025; Furholt & Børing, 2025). NAV's 2025 National Business Survey, polling 11 311 employers, found that 21% of employers experienced difficulties in recruitment, with 12% ending up not filling vacant positions, while 9% had employed applicants that were either underqualified or had other formal qualifications than required (Skjøstad et al., 2025).

The National Business Survey also identify a substantial shortage of workers with vocational qualifications, particularly from upper-secondary VET programs, where demand for competent and certified workers within mechanical and machine-related fields alone exceed the current supply by approximately 4 000 workers, while within healthcare there is a demand for 2 300 workers at the upper-secondary level and 4 450 at the Bachelor level (Skjøstad et al., 2025). While labour shortages extend across tertiary fields, the scale and persistence of deficits in high-school-level VET-trained and certificate-holding workers highlight vocational skills as a significant constraint (Skjøstad et al., 2025; Furholt & Børing, 2025).

**Figure 20 Job vacancy rate 3rd quarter of 2025 by industry (SIC2007). Source: SSB[24]**

The labour market in Norway is characterized by high skill requirements, limited availability of low-skill jobs, and a long-standing policy on formal qualifications through education as the foundation for employability. Norway's labour market institutions, including strong unions and collective agreements, regulated professions, sectoral wage structures and strong public-sector employment, create a model in which education and certification for VET and tertiary-level professions also function as gatekeeping mechanisms. Lødding, Aamodt and Skule (2017) suggests that Norway could be described as having had a good alignment between educational programs and labour-market needs, as unemployment among recent graduates across educational levels have been, and remains low (see also Nyen et al., 2015). Norway's modified dual 2+2 system of VET sets a favourable frame for workforce transitions, and the gradual socialization into the labour force also increases the possibility to match the demands and supply of skills (Jørgensen & Tønder, 2018). Recruitment remains the problem. Longitudinal studies find educational mismatch and underemployment trends within

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[24] Percentage of job vacancy in relation to job postings, with added change from 2024, in percentage points. SSB Table 08771: Job vacancies, by major industry division (SIC2007, based on NACE2) 2010K1 - 2025K3, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank1/table/08771

recent graduates from higher education to dissipate over time (Wiborg et al., 2025). Some studies indicate that increased work migration has had an impact on the educational choices of non-migrants in Norway, decreasing the number of students pursuing vocational education within the programs supplying the sectors reliant on migrant-labour (Brekke et al., 2013; Røed & Schøne, 2016) and impacting the structure of VET programs (Arnholtz & Østhus, 2024).

Unrestricted EU-migration and measured labour immigration for high-skilled non-EU work permits has helped compensate for domestic skill shortages, but demands persist, and studies indicate downward pressure on wages and working conditions, also influencing young people's motivation to pursue certain trades (Friberg, 2016). Policy to increase the annual quota for seasonal and high-skilled non-EU workers has had limited effects, and reviews indicate the quotas are rarely filled (Skenteris et al., 2025; Kirkeberg et al., 2025).

While work transition and skill recognition is less of an issue for Norwegian-educated individuals with qualifications, research show that recognition of non-Norwegian degrees and qualifications remains a barrier, both in general (Støren & Wiers-Jenssen, 2010) and for regulated occupations requiring authorization or license, especially in the health care sector (Alecu & Drange, 2019; Alecu et al., 2022; see also Nortvedt et al., 2020).[25]

## 1.3. Immigration policies, social justice, and discrimination

Norwegian post-war immigration policy has undergone *several major transformations* shaped by economic cycles, regional integration, and shifting political priorities. In the immediate post-WWII years, national immigration policy adopted a liberal orientation with a migration regime shaped by economic optimism and commitment to emerging international cooperation frameworks. Successive Norwegian governments engaged in European recovery initiatives through the OEEC (later the OECD) and supported, albeit at times guardedly, regional labour-market initiatives that culminated in the establishment of a Nordic common labour market in 1954 (Høgedahl, 2025; Pharo, 1997). Such developments contributed to a post-war migration regime that largely facilitated labour mobility and aligned migration governance to the economic and political priorities of the period.

Migration policy historians further point to the 1950 Nationality Act, the 1956 Aliens Act, alongside a later 1969 government White Paper on the domestic labour market to highlight a post-war zeitgeist of unmatched "positive attitude" to international labour migration that also spanned the political spectrum (Brochmann & Kjeldstadli, 2008, pp. 188–189). This consensus extended across successive labour governments, a centre-right government (1965-1971) and the influential social democratic labour unions, the latter, in a frame of international worker solidarity, argued for a migration policy securing labour protections and wage parity (Brochmann & Kjeldstadli, 2008, pp. 188–189). By 1975, however, the ostensible progressive and future-oriented liberal stance on migration had shifted, emphasizing state control over immigration. Immigration policies after 1975 pivoted toward more stringent state control and a regime of national

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[25] For more information and current details on the regulated professions under the Professional Qualifications Directive (2005/36/EU) see https://hkdir.no/en/foreign-education/lists-and-databases/regulated-professions

migration regulation, increasingly coding into migration policy the distinction between desirable and undesirable types of immigration (Hagelund, 2003, p. 11; Brochmann & Kjeldstadli, 2008).

The 1975 immigration stop can be understood as a direct response to the spike in work-related migration during the years of 1970 and 1971, and the increasingly politicized debates surrounding the perceived "influx" of predominantly low-skilled labour migrants from non-Western countries (Hagelund, 2003). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, immigration had been dominated by migrants from other Nordic countries and Germany. Despite favourable economic conditions and an ostensibly liberal immigration policy, Norway did not seem to be a particularly preferred destination for non-European migrant workers until economic hardships and restrictions on work-related migration redirected flows towards the Nordic region in the 1960s (Eikrem, 2023, p. 42).

These developments set the stage for a broader policy reorientation, in which the early-1970s labour-migration patterns were recast as a national migration policy problem demanding immediate political intervention. Migration became lodged in the nexus of global and national labour market pressures and the sustainability of a universal social democratic welfare state in an age of global migration and cultural difference. In response to the 1971-72 events, the Labour government of 1973-1976, with the support of the large trade unions, and following similar policies already in place in Denmark and Sweden, issued a short-term moratorium on immigration in 1975.[26] The moratorium was extended several times before being codified in immigration laws and regulations during the 1980s. Scholars widely agree that the 1975 measure constituted a de *facto* immigration stop (*innvandringsstopp*) that reshaped the regulatory landscape for decade.

The restrictive immigration policies that marked the late 1970s (lasting into the early 1990s) were nevertheless designed to permit specialized labour migration through highly regulated routes, while also facilitating family reunification for existing migrants and, directed by international cooperation obligations, expanding the asylum institution. As a result, net-immigration continued, driven mainly by family reunification and asylum-related migration despite the new restrictions on labour entry.

As near political consensus existed on the need to regulate work-related migration, societal preoccupations with immigration increasingly centred on refugees and the existing immigrant population, targeting workforce participation, housing conditions, education, and welfare. This inaugurated a durable public debate on immigration centred on refugee integration while at the same time dominated by discourses on cultural difference, social cohesion and egalitarianism (Gullestad, 2002, 2006) and the protection of the Scandinavian model and the universality of the welfare state (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012).

These debates on migration increasingly shifted towards integration and the management of existing diversity, and laid the groundwork for the policy reforms that followed. The Immigration Act of 1988, while not a liberalization of migration policy *per se*, sought to strengthen the rights of migrants living in Norway, while it delegated extensive authority regarding migration to Parliament through deferring to Immigration Regulations, meaning Parliament would gain control over the details of immigration policy. The substantive provisions of the Act continued the restrictive orientation of the 1970s and

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[26] See also Gripsrud (2018). For a contrasting interpretation of the significance attributed to the 1970-71 events in shaping public opinion and policy, see Tvedt (2017).

1980s, as categories of exception were absorbed into the new adaptable regulatory framework (NOU 2011, p. 69). The regulations governing migration were applied with diligence throughout the 1990s.

Against this background of regulatory continuity and administrative consolidation, labour migration and immigration policy again came to the fore of political debate in the run-up to the 1994 EU membership referendum. Norway voted against full EU membership for the second time in 1994 (the first time in 1972) but gained access to the internal market via the 1992 Agreement on the European Economic Area. The agreement also regulated labour mobility within the established European Economic Area (EEA) and consequently, after 1994, EEA citizens could freely travel and reside in Norway for 90 days and take up employment with eventual access to national welfare programs (Cappelen & Skjerpen, 2012; see also DEMIG, 2015). Yet, and despite Norway also further integrating into the European Economic Area through the Schengen agreement in 2001, the number of non-Nordic migrants from other EU member countries remained relatively modest until the EU expansions of 2004 when Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia (and in 2007 Bulgaria, Romania) joined the union and gained access to the common labour market. Like most other EEA countries at the time, the Norwegian government chose to enact temporary provisions (*overgangsregler*) to control labour migration. By opting for a liberal policy while at the same time demanding minimum standards for employment including tariff-level salaries, rather than alternative regulation mechanisms such as country-specific quota schemes, labour union concerns regarding social dumping and political discourses regarding so-called "welfare tourism" were, in part, mitigated (Eldring et al., 2011; Friberg, 2006).

Since the national transitional provisions in response to Bulgaria and Romania's EU accession were scrapped in 2012, all citizens from EU/EEA countries could benefit from, broad, albeit conditional, rights of free movement and residence in Norway. Migration from non-EU/EEA countries continues to be governed by a regulatory framework under the auspices of the Directorate of Immigration, that, while having been subject to minor changes (Ødegård et al., 2022, p. 20), restricts labour migration to limited and narrow migrant categories, ensuring provisions for migration that can meet the skill demands of the labour market (Tronstad et al., 2025, p. 8).[27]

The 2000s included significant migration policy adjustments in relation to the EU labour markets, and continued a focus on integration of existing migrant populations through language and workforce inclusion with the 2003 Introduction Act. The significant migration policy changes over the last decade (2015-2025) however, have largely responded to the new migration patterns following the Syrian Civil War (2011-2024) and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine that escalated in 2022. Other significant changes in the legal framework included reforms to the citizenship law governing dual citizenship, which increased formal rights for a number of long-term migrants, while simultaneously reinforcing the state's return instruments through an expanded legal basis for cessation and return (Birkvad, 2023). Policy analysts find in the post-2015 period a European-wide turn towards a normalization of temporary protection measures with a focus on the possibility of return (Schultz, 2022; see also Hernes et al., 2023). As numbers of Syrians migrants in Europe increased

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[27] The four principal categories are: 1) Skilled labour migrants, limited to individuals who have a concrete job offer and fulfill skill requirements; 2) Family migration or reunion, that is individuals with family ties to somebody residing legally in Norway; 3) Students, trainees and participants in approved exchange programs; 4) Refugees, individually or collectively, and other individuals, who according to individual assessments, could qualify for temporary or permanent residence on humanitarian grounds. For a detailed overview, see Official Norwegian Reports (NOU 2022: 18).

rapidly during 2015, the Norwegian government too responded with temporarily reintroducing national border controls to temporarily control access, while also introducing changes in migration policy to control and temporalise settlement by introducing stricter criteria and longer timeframes for permanent residency and naturalization (Eggebø & Staver, 2020, p. 128).

The largely cross-party supported policy reform package of 2015-2016 introduced measures targeting the flow of refugees, while skilled workers and other non-refugee migrants from non-EU countries were less affected, yet labour migrants were subject to stricter requirements regarding employment status to qualify for permanent residency. A subsequent 2016 White Paper from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Meld. St. 30 (2015–2016) titled *From reception centre to the labour market - an effective integration policy,* further signalled these policy priorities by focusing on integration through education in refugee reception centres and securing pathways into the labour market, including, after individual assessment, the possibility to qualify for a temporary work permit while the protection case is in process

Further refugee-oriented policy developments followed from the 2021 Integration Act that sought to further the work-orientation of the state-mandated Introduction Program, aiming for faster integration in society through labour market participation with a goal of financial independence and stable attachment to working life (Lunde, 2023). The Act renewed existing frames of integration as a problem of insufficient market participation but added a new emphasis on "accelerated integration" and the role of individual assessments and career guidance as a pathway into the workforce (Slåtto & Toiviainen, 2025). The Act emphasized language learning, while at the same time sought to address issues of underemployment and poor skill recognition, and entailed new provisions for structured skill mapping, faster qualification assessments and new measures to recognise foreign education Meld. St. 17 (2023 – 2024). In this sense, post-2015 turn is not only an asylum-policy shift but also a broader governance orientation that links residence security more tightly to employment, language, and integration benchmarks, thereby shaping the long-term settlement prospects of multiple migrant categories.

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, in an extraordinary move, the Norwegian government activated the legal framework for temporary collective protection under the Immigration Act § 34 on 11 March 2022. Following other European countries, this granted Ukrainians fleeing the war residence permits through a simplified, group-based procedure that, without individual assessment of protection needs, shortened both processing time and the municipal settlement process (Tronstad et al., 2025). This temporary collective protection scheme secured, unlike Syrians in 2015, Ukrainians time-limited permits, granted for one year at a time, initially extendable up to three years (not constituting a basis for permanent residence), though subsequent regulatory adjustments enabled continuation. Concerns over settlement difficulties, municipal strain and integration resulted in progressive policy tightening. In 2023 and 2024 several restrictive measures were introduced, including ineligibility of Ukrainians with citizenship in a third country considered safe, limitations on return visits to Ukraine, and, most controversial, new applicants from Ukrainian regions deemed safe by UDI would no longer automatically receive collective protection but instead be processed on an individual basis (Skenteris et al., 2025). By early 2025, the collective protection scheme was further narrowed as UDI expanded the list of Ukrainian regions deemed safe, shifting applicants from fourteen additional oblasts to individual asylum procedures. These restrictions marked a decisive move toward a more selective protection framework.

Overall, the Ukrainian displacement remains the defining driver of recent migration policy trends, shaping policy adjustments across asylum, settlement capacity, and integration programming, while labour migration continues to play a stable but secondary role in Norway's migration landscape. Labour migration, while comparatively stable, was subject to minor regulatory tightening. In 2025 Norwegian authorities raised salary thresholds for skilled workers (UDI, 2025) and strengthened enforcement against social dumping, as well as expanded inter-agency cooperation to monitor employers more effectively (Skenteris et al., 2025). These policy changes reflected enduring concerns about maintaining acceptable working conditions and preventing exploitation in sectors reliant on migrant labour. The government has since 2022 upheld an openness to skilled labour migrants by increasing the yearly quotas for high-skilled non-EU workers (from 5000 to 6000) and targeted foreign entrepreneurs through modest adjustments to self-employment regulations. At the same time, other migration pathways have been tightened. In 2023 the centre-left government introduced tuition fees for students from outside the EU/EEA, departing from a long-standing arrangement of tuition-free higher education. According to Norwegian Directorate for Higher Education and Skills (Haugen et al., 2025) the policy led to a substantial decline in international students, making clear the correlation between non-EU student flows and cost barriers. Initial policy goals were economic sustainability in the higher education sector, and mitigating scholarship schemes for developing countries were introduced. In late 2025 the government signalled an intent to re-evaluate and modify the tuition demands (Mikkelsen & Tønnessen, 2025). The government also de facto terminated the au pair program in March 2024, stating concerns over the institution being misused to exploit low-wage labour (Skenteris et al., 2025).

At the start of 2026, a wide-reaching restructuring of the Introductory Program was announced (Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, 2026). The proposed changes signal a further shift toward workforce integration, rapid labour-market participation and stronger financial incentives to work, including making access to several welfare benefits conditional. The proposal was presented for public hearing 23 January 2026.

**Social Justice**. Norway's contemporary social-justice regime rests on existing anti-discrimination legal frameworks and expanding policy endeavours to promote equal opportunity and active participation in work and society. The Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act (in force 2018) consolidated earlier statutes and imposed a reporting duty on employers and public authorities to prevent discrimination and promote equality in the workplace. Against this legal backdrop, literature on labour market discrimination shows persistent ethnic disadvantages in access to employment. This persists despite a labour market situation with high overall employment rates and strong collective institutions. A foundational pre-2015 baseline by Midtbøen and Rogstad (2012) charted the scale and causes of discrimination in access to Norwegian labour market, and Midtbøen (2015) argued that for workplace entry the organizational context (formalization, volume of applications, role definitions) mediates discriminatory outcomes. Empirical studies using field experiments has shown lower callbacks for migrant and minority background-signalling job seekers, underscoring enduring barriers to labour-market access (Larsen & Midtbøen, 2024).

Between 2015-2025 policy broadened and attention shifted from emphasizing access to consider also post-hire inclusion, drawing on indicators and administrative microdata. IMDi's 2024 indicator framework functions as tool to provide a comprehensive, longitudinal picture of entry, inclusion, equal opportunities, and skill retention in the labour market. The data from this mapping show persistent gaps in hiring and advancement for migrants (and their Norwegian-born children),

uneven sectoral distribution, and higher volatility in downturns (Fedoryshyn & Falch-Monsen, 2025). The knowledge platform provided by reports and monitoring from the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Bufdir) and the Directorate of Integration and Diversity further consolidates existing survey-based and administrative evidence on ethnic and religious discrimination at work, including perceived disadvantage and attitudes to diversity in society and the workplace (Bufdir, n.d.; Fedoryshyn & Falch-Monsen, 2025; Wollscheid et al., 2021).

A second major policy development is the recognition that workplace justice increasingly depends on how migration and integration policies are designed, implemented, and interact. The government's Action Plan against Racism and Discrimination (2020-2023) and (2024- 2027) include labour market integration and emphasise implementation of measures to secure social justice.[28] Policy instruments expect employers to operationalise the Act's duties across recruitment, pay, promotion, and work-family balance.

Shifts in the composition of the migrant population (from the 2004 expansion to the post-2022 situation) and subsequent re-active policy measures have also shaped contemporary debates on quality and social justice. The authors of NOU 2022:18 found that many labour migrants, particularly from post-expansion countries, face weaker working conditions, low unionization, and limited inclusion, and proposes policy reinforcement (language, recognition, anti-dumping, participation). These conclusions situate labour market fairness within broader debates on the Norwegian model and the governance of mobility (Brochmann, 2024).

Education inequality influences later school-to-work trajectories and long-term labour-market opportunities. Studies suggest that educational and occupational segregation and credential recognition shape opportunities along the lines of ethnicity and gender in educational choices of both Norwegians with and without a migration background (Ballo et al., 2025; Lorentzen & Vogt, 2022; Vogt et al., 2020). Such patterns are consistent with evidence on ethnicity ascribed as "skill" in Norwegian low-wage labour markets (Friberg & Midtbøen, 2018).

Lastly, family migration regulations and the ongoing Introduction Program restructuring (Kvalø, 2025) directly affect workforce participation and long-term inclusion. Backed by an empirical study, Eggebø (2010; Eggebø & Brekke, 2019) shows how income rules and administrative practice within the application and formalization process impact who can reunify with whom and how quickly, with implications for overall social integration and labour market participation, as well as domestic gender equality influenced by household-workforce dynamics. At the same time reviews of the Introduction Program show how the recent, more explicitly work-oriented model, introduced for beneficiaries of collective protection, has coincided with higher post-program employment rates (Kvalø, 2025). Access to these gains remains, however, uneven. Men tend to transition faster than women (Kvalø, 2025), younger participants and those with higher education fare better, and outcomes vary across counties and municipalities, underscoring persistent structural and regional disparities in opportunity for social and economic inclusion through workforce participation (Lillevik et al., 2025).

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[28] The first plan was introduced in 2019 (Norwegian Ministries, 2020), followed by a second plan in 2024 containing 50 measures across labour, education, youth, and local communities (Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet, 2024). The government has also adopted targeted plans addressing discrimination against Muslims and combating antisemitism, and a plan against discrimination targeting the Sámi population.

## 2. Method

### 2.1. Research model

The research model for the WP4 empirical study carried out in Norway followed the mixed methods (quantitative & qualitative) methodology prepared by Ankara University for the Skills4Justice project.

### 2.2. Research ethics

#### 2.2.1. Ethical permissions

Our study(quantitative and qualitative) adheres the guidelines in the Norwegian National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH), as well as complies with Article 14 on Ethics and Article 13 on Confidentiality and security to the EC (ref. to the Methodology Guide of WP4), as well as with the *Ethics* Plan of the Skills4Justice project.

#### 2.2.2. Consent and data security

The Norwegian case study (quantitative and qualitative) was approved by the Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research (Sikt - Reference number: 291525). Participants were informed of their right to withdraw at any stage, and sensitive questions (e.g., around migration history) were adapted to minimise distress. All participants provided informed consent. Anonymity and confidentiality were ensured in line with project ethics protocols. The data has been stored following the UiS data security instructions (with use of Teams project site), including the use of Nettskjema solution for collecting the interview data. The latter complies with Norwegian data protection regulations (GDPR) and institutional data classification standards for "red" (sensitive) data.

### 2.3. Instrument design and data collection

#### 2.3.1. Quantitative data collection: Questionnaire

##### 2.3.1.1. Design of the questionnaire

We carried out both surveys in two languages, Norwegian and English. The questionnaire comprised 33 questions in total. Some local adjustments made to the joint S4J questionnaire. The first three questions covered screening (of the right target group) and consent (agreement to participate in the study). The remaining 30 questions covered the substance areas. Questions 4-31 were from the S4J main (joined) questionnaire. Most of these questions were multiple choice type and some of them were open questions (e.g. country of origin/ country of birth and length of stay in the destination country). The questions 31-32 were national/Norwegian adds. The First two of these were matrix type of questions, covering 'public awareness of the social, economic and political situ in their home country' (in local community/ colleagues at work) (Q31) and language and language use in different contexts (Q32). The last question (Q33) was an open question, allowing the informants to freely add further comments about the survey thematic.

### 2.3.1.2. Mode of delivery

Our aim was to reach a sample size of N=200 valid cases. To this end we carried out two parallel, similar surveys, one of our own at the University of Stavanger (UiS) and another one with the help of commercial market research company, Norstat (subcontracting). In this report we call these Norstat data and UiS data. Norstat data was collected in July 2025 and the UiS data during the period June-October 2025. For data collection we used Qualtrics, for both parallel surveys. Recruitment of the informants was carried out both locally (e.g. library, Red Cross), through social media (we made a Facebook group for this purpose), and nationally (Norstat used their national pool of informants, Facebook reached out both locally and nationally). More details about the recruitment below.

### 2.3.1.3. Participants and recruitment strategies

The prescribed eligibility criteria for the survey were a) age 18-68 years, b) born in a country outside of Norway, c) having immigrated to Norway, and d) worked in Norway for more than 3 months. The respondents recruited through Norstat had, for strategic reasons and the scope of this study, a stricter origin requirement: being born in, and migrated from, a country outside the EU/EEA. All respondents included in the analytical/main sample in this study are born in, and have immigrated to Norway from, a country outside the EU, understood as the 27 full member states of the European Union. Respondents born in an EU member country, and respondents with missing country of origin data have been excluded from the analytical sample.

Regarding the definition of a migrant, we followed the taxonomic framework developed by Statistics Norway (Dzamarija, 2019) and consider an "immigrant", or a "migrant", to be a foreign-born person with foreign-born parents who have, themselves, relocated to Norway. Migrant status is therefore not affected by acquisition or transition to Norwegian citizenship. Children born to two immigrants living in Norway are not classified as "immigrants", but constitute a separate statistical category, "Norwegian-born to immigrant parents". If the generations are discussed together the established overarching analytical category is Persons with a migrant or immigrant background (*personer med innvandrerbakgrunn*). All respondents born in Norway were excluded from the analytical sample.

No minimum response threshold has been imposed to determine inclusion in the analytical/main sample. This approach was chosen to avoid introducing bias related to item non-response. Despite the absence of a formal completion criterion, the overall response quality following the screening section was satisfactory, with most respondents answering a substantial proportion of the questionnaire items, ensuring robust data for analysis.

*Recruitment Strategies Online Survey*. Participants for the online survey were recruited by two different avenues. Initially, a sample of 150 respondents who met the pre-defined survey criteria was procured from the Norwegian data collection company, Norstat (https://norstat.co/). They recruited participants from their pool of informants [according to their internal procedures]. Second, an additional research team-led effort recruited eligible respondents for an open-to-all version of the survey (UiS data).

Participants for the open-to-all online survey were recruited through a combination of online and offline outreach strategies and consisted principally of targeted posting on social media platforms and invitations through extended professional and stakeholder networks. On social media the recruitment strategy deployed was two-pronged and involved casting a wider net by approaching high-volume, place-based and active expat groups, as well as targeting a selection of smaller non-EU27

national networks and cultural associations. An initial review of the national Central Coordinating Register for Legal Entities was conducted to identify organizations, and the results informed the subsequent strategies to identify and reach out to relevant groups through Facebook's own search function, as well as other open search engines. The list of sources used for the online outreach strategies is shown in Appendix 1.

To supplement the online outreach efforts and broaden the composition of the sample, posters and flyers were distributed to various groups at events and at public locations across the Stavanger region by team members and associates, including language training centers, libraries, cafés and community centers, etc. Posters and flyers were bilingual (Norwegian and English) with a brief invitation and a QR-code directing potential participants to the survey website containing more detailed information on the scope of the study. A moderate gift card incentive (NOK 1000) was issued, and took the form of an optional, un-linked anonymous raffle. 125 respondents chose to enter the raffle.

### 2.3.1.4. Limitations and challenges

The total number of responses was N=581, of which 314 were valid cases, i.e. country of origin given. Thus, we reached our goal n=200 in that regard. Our challenge was to find a sufficient number (min. 100) of informants who had both migrant status and had named their country of origin. Table 3 below shows the results of the cross tabulation of these two variables (by continent, not country of origin). *Note: by cross tabulating these two variables we lose cases, who have not answered both questions.* As the table shows, more than a third (40%, n=120) of the total population had their status as 'legal migrant' (migrant with a residence permit, e.g. labour migrant, family reunification, student, etc.), excluding those with Norwegian citizenship. Out of these, a majority, 85% (n=102), were of non-EU, non-Norwegian origin. Thus, within these criteria our sample size would be N=102.

**Table 3. Informants by their geographical origin and migration status, % (n), N=301**

| Continent/Status | Legal migrant | The Migrant with Norwegian citizenship | Refugee/ Asylum seeker | Prefer not to say |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-EU (n=264) | 38,6 (102) | 56,4 (149) | 3,9 (10) | 1,1 (3) |
| Norway (n=6) | 33,3 (2) | 33,3 (2) | 0 | 33,3 (2) |
| EU27 (n=31) | 50,0 (16) | 39,3 (12) | 0 | 10,7 (3) |
| Total (n=301) | 39,9 (120) | 54,2 (163) | 3,3 (10) | 2,7 (8) |

However, after discussion with the other S4J partners, we agreed to include also those migrants who have stayed longer in the country and already obtained Norwegian citizenship, n=163. Including again only those of non-EU, non-Norwegian origin (Table 3), increased our sample size with 149 informants, totalling to a sample size N=251. In other words, removing from the data those, who had indicated their country of origin as within EU27 or Norway, and those whose status was refugee/asylum seeker or who preferred not to reveal their status, left us with a sample size of 251 valid cases/responses, counted as 'migrants' in this study. Due to missing data in some other variables included in the different analyses further down in this report, the actual number of cases may be somewhat lower.

### 2.3.2. Qualitative data collection: Interviews

Qualitative data were collected through semi-structured individual interviews with migrant workers residing in Norway. Each interview lasted approximately one to two hours. Participation was voluntary, and all interviewees received written

and oral information about the purpose of the project, data protection procedures, and their right to withdraw at any time without consequences. Written informed consent was obtained prior to participation.

The interviews aimed to capture migrants' lived experiences regarding migration decisions, educational and skill formation trajectories, recognition of qualifications, labour market integration, working conditions, and perceptions of fairness and inclusion in the Norwegian context. The semi-structured format enabled cross-case comparability while allowing participants to elaborate on issues they considered significant.

All data were handled in accordance with GDPR regulations and institutional requirements. The processing of personal data was assessed by SIKT (Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research), and all recordings and transcripts were securely stored. Audio files will be destroyed at the end of the project period (December 2027), and pseudonyms are used in all dissemination activities to ensure anonymity.

### 2.3.2.1. Design of the interview

The interview guide was developed collaboratively within the Skills4Justice consortium to ensure analytical coherence across participating countries while allowing limited contextual adaptation (maximum 25% additional questions). The guide followed a semi-structured design organised around five thematic domains:

1. Migration pathways
2. Skill formation
3. Skill mismatch
4. Justice and working conditions
5. Gender and broader support needs

The guide consisted of 19 core questions structured across these domains. The first section explored reasons for migration, decision-making processes, and potential return considerations. The second and third sections focused on educational trajectories, diploma recognition, vocational training, employment history, job search experiences, and perceived skill mismatch. The fourth section examined working conditions, hours, salary, informal work practices, union contact, and perceptions of fairness. The final sections addressed gender-related discrimination and broader reflections on support needs in the host country.

In the Norwegian case, three additional questions were included in line with the permitted adaptation margin:

- Whether language had been an issue in gaining employment or in performing work tasks;
- Whether participants had received support from agencies such as NAV, Chambers of Commerce, or Career Services;
- Whether participants perceived gender-related discrimination related to education and/or occupation in Norway.

These additions reflect key features of the Norwegian labour market context, where language proficiency is often a structural prerequisite for employment, institutional support mechanisms play a significant role in labour market integration, and gender equality is publicly emphasised yet may be unevenly experienced.

The interview guide was translated when necessary to ensure clarity and accessibility. Sensitive questions (e.g., migration status) were asked only if participants felt comfortable responding.

The overall structure ensured alignment with the project's three overarching research questions: migration patterns (RQ1), skill formation and employment trajectories (RQ2), and perceptions of social justice (RQ3).

### 2.3.2.2. Mode of delivery

**Interview process and environment**

Most interviews were conducted either face-to-face in quiet, private settings (e.g., university offices or agreed neutral locations) or digitally via secure video conferencing platforms when in-person meetings were not feasible.

For digital interviews, particular attention was paid to ensuring that participants were in a private environment and felt comfortable speaking freely. Sensitive questions were approached cautiously, and participants were reminded that they could skip any question.

Each interview lasted approximately 60 – 120 minutes. Field notes were taken during or immediately after interviews to document contextual observations and initial analytical reflections.

**Recording and data security**

All interviews were audio-recorded using the Nettskjema-diktafon app, a secure mobile application developed by the University of Oslo and widely used across Norwegian higher education institutions for collecting sensitive research data.

Nettskjema-diktafon complies with Norwegian data protection regulations (GDPR) and institutional data classification standards for "red" (sensitive) data. The procedure involved:

- Creating a dedicated Nettskjema form to serve as the secure storage repository.
- Linking the mobile app to the specific Nettskjema form via secure authentication (Feide login).
- Encrypting audio files immediately upon recording on the device.
- Delivering recordings directly from the app to the secure Nettskjema server.

For security reasons, recordings cannot be played back directly from the mobile device. Access is restricted to the secure Nettskjema browser interface. After successful transfer, recordings were deleted from the mobile device.

Interviews were transcribed within the secure Nettskjema environment using its integrated automated transcription function. All transcripts were manually checked for accuracy by the research team and anonymised prior to analysis. Identifying information was removed or generalised to prevent traceability.

Data storage followed institutional guidelines. Nettskjema was used for "red" classified data, and access was restricted to authorised project researchers only. All procedures complied with the consent form provisions regarding confidentiality, storage duration, and destruction of recordings at project completion.

### 2.3.2.3. Participants and recruitment strategies

The target group consisted of adult migrants, foreign-born and residing in Norway, with at least three months of work experience in the country. Participants were recruited through a combination of purposive and snowball sampling, as well

as via organisational networks and personal contacts. In total, 32 participants (19 women and 13 men) took part in the qualitative interviews. The aim was to ensure variation in migration background, sector of employment, gender, and educational level in order to capture diverse migration and labour market experiences. Participants represented diverse national origins, levels of education (ranging from high school to postgraduate degrees), and employment sectors such as energy, education, and health. This variation allowed us to capture both sector-specific experiences and broader challenges, including language barriers, recognition of qualifications, and skill mismatches. See Table 4 for more details.

**Table 4. Overview of Interview Participants**

| | Origin Country | Occupation in Norway | Edu | Gen | Age | Sector | Code |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Australia | IT developer | HS | F | 40 | Tech/IT | M-1 |
| 2 | Colombia | Laboratory manager | MA | F | 54 | Health/Lab | M-2 |
| 3 | Egypt | IT engineer | BA | F | 42 | Tech/IT | M-3 |
| 4 | Eritrea | Cleaner restaurant | BA | M | 40 | Hospitality | M-4 |
| 5 | Ghana | Dishwasher (biochemist) | MA | M | 31 | Hospitality | M-5 |
| 6 | Ghana | Dishwasher/cleaner (urb. plan.) | BA | M | 29 | Hospitality | M-6 |
| 7 | Ghana | Geologist/reservoir engineer | MA | M | 28 | Energy | M-7 |
| 8 | India | Language support teacher | MA | F | 38 | Edu/Acad./R&D | M-8 |
| 9 | India | Researcher/humanitarian worker | MA | M | 28 | Edu./Acad./R&D | M-9 |
| 10 | India | Teacher educator | PhD | F | 40 | Edu./Acad./R&D | M-10 |
| 11 | Japan | IT consultant engineer | BA | F | 29 | Tech/IT | M-11 |
| 12 | Mexico | Psychiatry health worker assistant | BA | F | 38 | Health/Lab | M-12 |
| 13 | Nigeria | Cleaner | MA | F | 38 | Cleaning Services | M-13 |
| 14 | Nigeria | Mechanical engineer subsea design | MA | M | 28 | Energy | M-14 |
| 15 | Nigeria | Mechanical engineer oil and gas | MA | M | 32 | Energy | M-15 |
| 16 | Russia | Sales associate | BA | F | 39 | Retail | M-16 |
| 17 | Serbia | School office manager | MA | F | 30 | Edu. / Admin. | M-17 |
| 18 | South Africa | Chef | MA | F | 27 | Hospitality | M-18 |
| 19 | South Korea | Art gallery manager/educator | MA | F | 39 | Arts/Culture/Edu. | M-19 |
| 20 | Sri Lanka | Technical assistant AI lab | MA | F | 35 | Tech/IT | M-20 |
| 21 | Sri Lanka | Bartender / food preparation | BA | M | 26 | Hospitality | M-21 |
| 22 | Sudan | Server /dishwasher | BA | M | 29 | Hospitality | M-22 |
| 23 | Syria | Restaurant owner / Transport | BA | M | 39 | Hospitality | M-23 |
| 24 | Taiwan | Server / food preparation | BA | F | 32 | Hospitality | M-24 |
| 25 | Thailand | University pedagogy teacher | PhD | F | 52 | Edu./Acad./R&D | M-25 |
| 26 | Turkey | Lecturer / Academic | PhD | M | 36 | Edu./Acad./R&D | M-26 |
| 27 | Turkey | Client operations associate (bank) | MA | M | 28 | Finance | M-27 |
| 28 | UK | Petrophysicist | BA | M | 56 | Energy | M-28 |
| 29 | UK | School exam monitor (invigilator) | BA | F | 40 | Edu./Admin | M-29 |
| 30 | Ukraine | Lecturer / Academic | PhD | F | 39 | Edu./Acad./R&D | M-30 |
| 31 | USA | UX Designer | MA | F | 28 | Tech/IT | M-31 |
| 32 | USA | Radiologist Health Sciences H. Ed. | MA | F | 44 | Health/Edu/R&D | M-32 |

Potential participants received an information letter describing the project's purpose, data protection procedures, and voluntary nature of participation. Interviews were conducted only after written informed consent was obtained.

This variation enabled us to capture both sector-specific experiences and broader cross-sectoral challenges, such as language barriers, recognition of qualifications, and skill mismatches.

### 2.3.2.4. Limitations and challenges

As with all qualitative research, the study entails several methodological and contextual limitations that should be considered when interpreting the findings.

First, the sampling framework was shaped by the overall design of the Skills4Justice project, which prioritised particular migrant categories. As a result, the Norwegian sample does not fully reflect the demographic composition of migration to Norway, where a substantial proportion of labour migrants originate from EU/EEA countries. While this alignment ensured cross-national comparability within the consortium, it limited the inclusion of certain EU labour migrant groups that play a central role in Norway's labour market, particularly in sectors such as construction, hospitality, and seasonal work. This represents a structural limitation of the project design rather than an omission at the national level.

Second, recruitment relied partly on network-based and purposive sampling strategies. While this enabled access to diverse and information-rich participants, it may have introduced a selection bias. Migrants who are relatively integrated, connected to institutions, or willing to speak about their experiences may be overrepresented, whereas those in highly precarious, informal, or undocumented situations may be underrepresented.

Third, language dynamics may have shaped both participation and responses. Although interviews were conducted in languages comfortable for participants, varying levels of Norwegian and English proficiency may have influenced how experiences were articulated. In addition, language barriers themselves emerged as a substantive theme in the interviews, potentially affecting access to employment and institutional support.

Fourth, the semi-structured interview format relies on self-reported experiences. Narratives are shaped by memory, interpretation, and the interactional context of the interview. Perceptions of justice, discrimination, and skill mismatch are therefore subjective accounts, though analytically valuable.

Finally, researcher positionality may have influenced the interview dynamics. As researchers affiliated with a Norwegian university, we occupy an institutional position that may be perceived as aligned with authority structures. At the same time, shared migration backgrounds or academic experiences in some cases facilitated rapport and trust. Continuous reflexive attention was paid to power dynamics, emotional cues, and the potential vulnerability of participants when discussing sensitive topics such as discrimination or precarious employment.

Despite these limitations, the study provides in-depth, contextually grounded insights into migration trajectories, skill use, and perceptions of social justice. The qualitative design prioritises analytical depth over statistical representativeness and contributes to understanding structural mechanisms shaping migrant labour market integration in Norway.

### 2.4. Data analysis

#### 2.4.1. Analysis of quantitative data

We analyzed the data using SPSSX. To clear the data from non-serious responses, we analyzed the response time in answering the questionnaire. Table 5 shows the distribution of the response time in minutes (from one minute to over 15 minutes). Almost half (45,3%) of the gross total of 581 respondents used a maximum of five minutes to answer the survey. The rest, 318 persons (54,7%) used more than 5 minutes, who most likely are the informants forming the study sample. The number of respondents who answered most or all the questions in the survey, varies slightly around 300, i.e. is higher than our final sample, N=251.

**Table 5. Distribution of the response time in answering the questionnaire, N=581**

| Time in minutes | N | % | Cum. % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 minute | 184 | 31.7 | 31.7 |
| 1-5 mins | 79 | 13.6 | 45.3 |
| 5-10 mins | 109 | 18.8 | 64.0 |
| 10-15 mins | 102 | 17.6 | 81.6 |
| over 15 mins | 107 | 18.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 581 | 100.0 | |

The distribution of the response time in the Norwegian final sample (N=251) is shown in Table 6. It shows that more than half of the response used over 10 minutes and more than 25% over 15 minutes to fill in the questionnaire.

**Table 6. Distribution of the response time in the sample in Norway in answering the questionnaire, N=251**

| Time in minutes | N | % | Cum. % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 minute | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-5 mins | 20 | 8.0 | 8.0 |
| 5-10 mins | 81 | 32.3 | 40.3 |
| 10-15 mins | 83 | 33.1 | 73.4 |
| over 15 mins | 67 | 26.7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 271 | 100.0 | |

To further explore the reliability of the data through response times, we cross-tabulated it with the continent of origin of the informants. We chose the latter variable because (a named) country of origin was one of the selection criteria for participation in the study. The results are shown in Table 7 for the final sample (N=251). Almost all (92%) respondents used 10 minutes or longer, most typically between 5+ to 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire (Table 5). Thus, we can conclude that the data based on the sample (n=251, Table 4) can be considered sufficiently reliable. There were no statistically significant gender or age differences in how long time the respondents used answering in the questionnaire.

**Table 7. Distribution of the response time by continent, N=251, % (n)**

| Continent/Answer time | ≤ 1 min | ≤ 5 min | ≤ 10 min | ≤ 15 min | > 15 min |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Africa (n=17) | 0 | 11.8 (2) | 23.5 (4) | 17.6 (3) | 47.1 (8) |
| Asia (n=94) | 0 | 9.6 (9) | 28.7 (27) | 31.9 (30) | 29.8 (28) |
| Europe non-EU (n=83) | 0 | 6.0 (5) | 34.8 (29) | 38.6 (32) | 20.5 (17) |
| North America (n=36) | 0 | 8.3 (3) | 41.7 (15) | 30.6 (11) | 19.4 (7) |
| South America (n=17) | 0 | 5.9 (1) | 35.3 (6) | 41.2 (7) | 17.6 (3) |
| Oceania (n=4) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 (4) |
| Total (n=251) | 0 | 8.0 (20) | 32.3 (81) | 33.1 (83) | 26.7 (67) |

We have described the findings with frequency and percentage distributions, including several tables and figures. For analyses by the background variables (comparisons across different groups), where appropriate, we used mainly Chi-square ($\chi^2$) stats, correlation analysis (Pearson, Spearman), and means testing (t-test, ANOVA). Background variables were gender, age, education, length of stay in Norway, and continent of origin. However, the low number of cases from most continents means that the findings need to be interpreted with caution. Towards the end of the findings from the quantitative study, we also calculated Cronbach's alpha for the sets of items covering skills match/mismatch, skills and skills development, justice at work, discrimination, and social participation and civic rights, for possible future use of these constructs in later analyses.

### 2.4.2. Analysis of qualitative data

The qualitative interviews were analysed using collective qualitative analysis and reflexive thematic analysis, following the approaches outlined by Eggebø (2020) and Braun and Clarke (2006, 2019). Reflexive thematic analysis was selected as a flexible qualitative method well suited to identifying, analysing, and interpreting shared meanings, processes, and patterns across the dataset. In this study, it was employed to examine migrants' decision-making processes, their experiences of labour market integration, and their perceptions of social justice within the Norwegian context.

The analysis proceeded according to Braun and Clarke's (2006, 2019) six-step analytical framework. First, the researchers familiarised themselves with the data through repeated and immersive reading of the interview transcripts, during which initial impressions and preliminary analytical observations were recorded. Second, initial codes were generated in a reflexive and collaborative manner to capture salient features of the data, including issues such as language barriers, denied recognition of qualifications, reliance on support networks, and experiences of discrimination. In the third phase, codes were systematically examined and organised into broader thematic patterns, through ongoing discussion and reflexive engagement with the data. In the fourth phase, themes were reviewed, refined, and further developed to ensure analytical coherence, clarity, and relevance to the research questions. In the fifth phase, themes were defined and named in relation to the study's research aims. Finally, the analysis was consolidated through the writing process, during which themes were developed through illustrative quotations and conceptual interpretation. The fourth stage involved reviewing and refining the emerging themes to ensure internal coherence, analytical consistency, and clear thematic boundaries. In the fifth stage, themes were defined and named in direct relation to the study's research questions. Finally, the analysis was consolidated through the writing process, during which the themes were developed through illustrative quotations and conceptual interpretation.

To operationalise this analytical process, coding was conducted using qualitative analysis software and was initially carried out collaboratively as a research team. As part of the collaborative coding process, the team of researchers engaged in a series of collective qualitative analysis workshops focused on jointly reviewing, mapping (coding) and sorting the collected data (code grouping) (Eggebø, 2020). During this phase, preliminary codes were developed jointly and discussed in depth in order to establish a shared analytical framework. In the later stages of analysis, coding was conducted individually, with researchers systematically documenting their reflections and interpretive decisions through analytic memos. These memos were shared among the research team to maintain transparency and collective awareness of emerging interpretations. Discrepancies were discussed until consensus was reached, thereby strengthening the credibility and reliability of the analyses.

The coding process was guided by the study's overarching research questions, which focused on (1) the characteristics of migration pathways and their implications for employment, (2) the formation, recognition, and utilisation of migrants' skills in Norway, and (3) migrants' perceptions of social justice. As the analysis progressed, initial codes were gradually reorganised into broader code families capturing recurring patterns across the data, including migration trajectories, deskilling and skill mismatches, barriers to qualification recognition, support networks, and justice-related perceptions.

### Analytical Framework

While the thematic analysis allowed us to identify these code families, they were not treated in isolation. Instead, they were brought together through what we term the *Integration Loop* framework. The Integration Loop is an analytical model developed within the project to capture the cyclical dynamics of migrant labour market integration. It highlights how skills are often underutilised or unrecognised, how language barriers and institutional bottlenecks reinforce exclusion, and how migrants' reliance on informal networks and emotional resilience emerges in response. By applying the Integration Loop, we were able to trace the interconnections between structural barriers, individual strategies, and perceptions of fairness. This framework thus guided our interpretation of the themes, ensuring that the analysis reflected not only fragmented experiences but also the processes that reproduce skill mismatches and perceptions of justice over time.

## 3. Results

## 3.1. Quantitative research results

### 3.1.1. Overview of demographics

#### 3.1.1.1. Geographic origin

The respondents to our survey originated from a wide range of countries, altogether 72, representing six continents. As the number of responses from most of the countries is low, we have presented the findings in this report based on the continents of origin. Distribution of the informants/migrants in the final sample (N=251) by their continents of origin is shown in Table 8. Most of them were from Europe (32%, not including EU27), Asia

**Table 8 Informants (migrants) by their geographical origin (continent), N=251**

| Continent | N | % |
|---|---|---|
| Africa | 17 | 6.8 |
| Asia | 94 | 37.5 |
| Europe non-EU | 83 | 33.1 |
| North America | 36 | 14.3 |
| South America | 17 | 6.8 |
| Oceania | 4 | 1.6 |
| Total | 251 | 100 |



(32%), and North America (13%). As the table shows, more than 70% of the informants originate from two continents, Asia (37.5%) and non-EU Europe (33.1%).

Tables 9 shows gender and age distributions of the migrants by their continent of origin. Overall, females are somewhat stronger represented in the sample (about 59%) than men (40%). However, continent-wise this only holds for those having their origins in Asia, non-EU, and North America. Most of those having their background in Africa, South America or Oceania are men. When it comes to age, there are slightly more (around 52%) of those who are less than 45 years of age. The highest rate of younger (below 45 years of age) migrants in our data come from South America (close to 65%). Among older migrants this rate is the highest for those from North America (64 years).

**Table 9 Continent of origin by gender and age % (n)**

| Continent | Gender (N=250) | | | Age (N=251) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | Male | No say | < 45 yrs | ≤ 45 yrs |
| Africa | 47.1 (8) | 52.9 (9) | 0 | 52.9 (9) | 47.1 (8) |
| Asia | 57.0 (53) | 40.9 (38) | 2.2 (2) | 53.2 (50) | 46.8 (44) |
| Europe non-EU | 67.5 (56) | 32.5 (27) | 0 | 51.8 (43) | 48.1 (40) |
| North America | 58.3 (21) | 41.7 (15) | 0 | 36.1 (13) | **63.9** (23) |
| South America | 47.1 (8) | 52.9 (9) | 0 | **64.7** (11) | 35.3 (6) |
| Oceania | 25.0 (1) | 75.0 (3) | 0 | 50.0 (2) | 50.0 (2) |
| Total | 58.8 (147) | 40.4 (101) | 0.9 (2) | 51.0 (128) | 49.0 (123) |

Table 10 shows distributions of the migrants by their length of stay in Norway across their continent of origin. Overall, while almost 60% of them had stayed in the country more than 10 years, there were only seven (about 3%) informants who had lived in the country less than a year. The highest rate of migrants with short stay in the country, max 5 years, originate from South America (59%), and those with the longest stay (10+ years) from North America (78%).

**Table 10 Continent of origin by length of stay N=250, % (n)**

| Continent | Length of stay | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | < 1 yr | 1 – 5 yrs | 6 – 10 yrs | 10+ yrs |
| Africa (n=17) | 11.8 (2) | 17.6 (3) | 17.6 (3) | 52.9 (9) |
| Asia (n=96) | 1.1 (1) | 25.8 (24) | 16.1 (15) | 57.0 (53) |
| Europe non-EU (n=92) | 2.4 (2) | 19.3 (16) | **24.1** (20) | 54.2 (45) |
| North America (n=38) | 0 | 16.7 (6) | 5.6 (2) | **77.8** (28) |
| South America (n=18) | 11.8 (2) | **47.1** (8) | 11.8 (2) | 29.4 (5) |
| Oceania (n=4) | 0 | 25.0 (1) | 25.0 (1) | 50.0 (2) |
| Total (n=250) | 2.8 (7) | 23.2 (58) | 17.2 (43) | 56.8 (142) |

The distribution of the informants by their country of origin is shown in Table 11. The two largest groups of the migrants were from Serbia (n=34) and the USA (n=27). The next largest groups with 10-20 informants were from Russia (n=15), Philippines (n=14), China (n=13), India and Iran (both with n=11 informants), and UK and Bosnia-Herzegovina (both with n=10 informants). The number of cases from all the rest of the countries was less than 10. Interestingly, from Ukraine our data involves 16 responses, but when we filter out those with their status as Refugee/ Asylum seeker (n=10) and Prefer not to say (n=3), are we only left with 5 responses from the country.

**Table 11 Distribution of the informants by their country of origin (N=215)**

| Country | N | % | Country | N | % | Country | N | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | 1 | .4 | Indonesia | 4 | 1.6 | Peru | 1 | .4 |
| Albania | 3 | 1.2 | Irak | 4 | 1.6 | Philippines | 14 | 5.6 |
| Argentina | 3 | 1.2 | Iran | 11 | 4.4 | Russia | 15 | 6.0 |
| Armenia | 1 | .4 | Israel | 1 | .4 | Serbia | 34 | 13.5 |
| Australia | 3 | 1.2 | Jordan | 1 | .4 | Somalia | 1 | .4 |
| Bangladesh | 2 | .8 | Kazakhstan | 1 | .4 | South-Africa | 3 | 1.2 |
| Belarus | 2 | .8 | Kenya | 2 | .8 | South-Korea | 5 | 2.0 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 10 | 4.0 | Kosovo | 1 | .4 | Sri Lanka | 2 | .8 |
| Brazil | 4 | 1.6 | Kyrgyzstan | 1 | .4 | Thailand | 1 | .4 |
| Burundi | 2 | .8 | Macedonia | 1 | .4 | Turkey | 7 | 2.8 |
| Canada | 5 | 2.0 | Madagaskar | 1 | .4 | UK | 10 | 4.0 |
| Chile | 3 | 1.2 | Malaysia | 1 | .4 | Ukraine | 5 | 2.0 |
| China | 13 | 5.2 | Mexico | 3 | 1.2 | USA | 27 | 10.8 |
| Colombia | 4 | 1.6 | Morocco | 1 | .4 | Uzbekistan | 2 | .8 |
| Congo | 2 | .8 | New Zealand | 1 | .4 | Venezuela | 2 | .8 |
| Ghana | 1 | .4 | Nigeria | 4 | 1.6 | Vietnam | 2 | .8 |
| Iceland | 1 | .4 | Pakistan | 9 | 3.6 | Yugoslavia | 1 | .4 |
| India | 11 | 4.4 | Panama | 1 | .4 | | | |

### 3.1.1.2. Gender and age

Figure 21 shows the distribution of gender (for education, see section 3.1.3.1), based on the sample (N=251). Females were slightly overrepresented (59%) in our data. The informants were evenly divided between under 45 years of age and at/above it. Distribution of age is shown in Table 12.



**Figure 21 Gender distribution of the migrants, N=251**

**Table 12 Age and length of stay of the migrants in Norway (N=251)**

| Age | N | % |
|---|---|---|
| 18 - 24 | 2 | 0.8 |
| 25 - 34 | 43 | 17.1 |
| 35 - 44 | 83 | 33.1 |
| 45 - 54 | 76 | 30.3 |
| 55 - 64 | 40 | 15.9 |
| 65 - 67 | 5 | 2.0 |
| 68 or older | 2 | 0.8 |
| **Total** | **251** | **100.0** |

### 3.1.2. What are the characteristics of the migration patterns of labour migrants? How do these impact their employment in the destination countries? (RQ1)

#### 3.1.2.1. Reason for migration

When it comes to reasons for migration, the informants could respond by choosing several alternatives presented in the questionnaire. Overall, the most often stated reasons for leaving their country were for Personal motivation (n=85), Family issues (n=81), and Long-term work in Norway (n=52) (Box 1).

1. Personal motivation/Wanted a change or new challenges in my life (n=85)
2. Family issues (e.g. marriage, family reunion, etc.) (n=81)
3. Long-term work in the country where I live (n=52)
4. Economic crisis in the country I come from (n=40)
5. Education in the country where I live now (n=40)
6. War/civil war in the country I come from (n=26)
7. Fear of persecution in the country I come from (n=19)
8. Discrimination in the country I come from (n=13)
9. Temporary work in the country where I live (n=14)
10. Climate/natural disaster in the country I come from (n=2)
11. Other (n=31)

**Box 1 Main reasons for leaving the country they came from (several choices were possible, ordered by frequency of each choice) (N=251)**

Table 13 shows the main reasons for migration by gender, age, and length of stay. The main findings in short below. The most often mentioned reasons turned out to be different for men and women:

| Men | Women |
|---|---|
| 1. Discrimination in the country I come from (62%), | 1. Family issues (70%), |
| 2. 'other' (61%), | 2. Economic crisis in the country I come from (63%), |
| 3. Fear of persecution in the country I come from (58%), | 3. Personal motivation (60%), and |
| 4. Temporary work in the country where I live (57%). | 4. Climate/natural disaster (100%, NB. n=2!). |

The most often mentioned reasons varied somewhat also by age of the migrants (Table 13):

| Age under 45 years | Age 45 years or older |
|---|---|
| 1. Temporary work in the country where I live (93%), | 1. Fear of persecution (79%), |
| 2. Education in the country where I live now (73%), | 2. Discrimination (69%), and |
| 3. Personal motivation (68%), | 3. War/civil war (65%) in the country I come from. |
| 4. Long term work in the country where I live (62%), and | |
| 5. Climate/natural disaster (100%, n=2!). | |

Further, the reasons for migration varied by length of stay in Norway (Table 13). Not unexpectedly, most of those who had the shortest stay, a maximum of 5 years, had mentioned Temporary work in Norway (72%) as the main reason for leaving their country, and that way more often than any other reason.

| Stayed in the country max 5 years | Stayed in the country 6-10 years | Stayed in the country over 10 years |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Temporary work in the country where I live (72%) | 1. Economic crisis (30%) | 1. War/civil war (84%) |
| | 2. Climate/natural disaster (50%) in the country I come from | 2. Fear of persecution in the country I come from (72%) |
| | | 3. Family issues (69%) |

**Table 13 Main reasons for leaving the country by gender, age, and length of stay (several choices were possible, in order by frequency of each choice in total), n (%) (N=251)**

| Reason | Total N | Gender* | | Age (yrs) | | Length of stay (yrs) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Female | Male | < 45 | ≤ 45 | Max 5 | 6-10 | 10+ |
| Personal motivation/Wanted a change or new challenges in my life (n=85) | 85 | 51 (60) | 33 (39) | 58 (**68**) | 27 (32) | 34 (40) | 21 (25) | 30 (35) |
| Family issues (e.g. marriage, family reunion, etc.) (n=81) | 81 | 57 (**70**) | 22 (27) | 34 (42) | 47 (58) | 16 (20) | 9 (11) | 56 (**69**) |
| Long term work in the country where I live (n=52) | 52 | 28 (54) | 24 (46) | 32 (**62**) | 20 (38) | 19 (37) | 11 (21) | 22 (42) |
| Economic crisis in the country I come from (n=40) | 40 | 25 (**63**) | 14 (35) | 19 (48) | 21 (52) | 11 (28) | 12 (**30**) | 17 (42) |
| Education in the country where I live now (n=40) | 40 | 21 (53) | 19 (47) | 29 (**73**) | 11 (27) | 16 (40) | 10 (25) | 14 (35) |
| War/civil war in the country I come from (n=26) | 26 | 11 (42) | 14 (54) | 9 (35) | 17 (**65**) | 2 (8) | 2 (8) | 22 (**84**) |
| Fear of persecution in the country I come from (n=19) | 19 | 8 (42) | 11 (**58**) | 4 (21) | 15 (**79**) | 2 (10) | 3 (16) | 14 (**74**) |
| Temporary work in the country where I live (n=14) | 14 | 6 (43) | 8 (57) | 13 (**93**) | 1 (7) | 10 (**72**) | 3 (21) | 1 (7) |
| Discrimination in the country I come from (n=13) | 13 | 5 (38) | 8 (**62**) | 4 (31) | 9 (**69**) | 2 (15) | 3 (23) | 8 (**62**) |
| Climate/natural disaster in the country I come from (n=2) | 2 | 2 (**100**) | 0 (0) | 2 (**100**) | 0 (0) | 1 (50) | 1 (**50**) | 0 (0) |
| Other (n=31) | 31 | 12 (39) | 19 (**61**) | 14 (45) | 17 (55) | 6 (19) | 4 (13) | 21 (**68**) |

The reasons for migration broken down by continent of origin in Table 14. The table reveals small differences compared to the overall picture. Among the informants from Africa, Education is most often mentioned reason for migration, while it is Family issues for those coming from Asia and North America. For those coming from Europe, South America, and Oceania the most often mentioned reason was Personal motivation. However, again, the low number of cases from most continents means that the findings need to be interpreted with caution.

**Tabell 14 Main reasons for leaving the country by continent (several choices were possible, ordered by frequency of each choice in total) (N=251)**

| Reason | Africa | Asia | Europe* | North America | South America | Oceania | Total N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Personal motivation/Wanted a change or new challenges in my life (n=85) | 2 | 29 | **35** | 10 | **6** | **3** | **85** |
| Family issues (e.g. marriage, family reunion, etc.) (n=81) | 4 | **32** | 21 | **20** | 3 | 1 | 81 |
| Long term work in the country where I live (n=52) | 3 | 15 | 27 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 52 |
| Economic crisis in the country I come from (n=40) | 0 | 10 | 25 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 40 |
| Education in the country where I live now (n=40) | **5** | 22 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 40 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| War/civil war in the country I come from (n=26) | 4 | 13 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 26 |
| Fear of persecution in the country I come from (n=19) | 2 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 19 |
| Temporary work in the country where I live (n=14) | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 14 |
| Discrimination in the country I come from (n=13) | 1 | 7 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 |
| Climate/natural disaster in the country I come from (n=2) | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Other (n=31) | 1 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 31 |
| Total N of choices | 23 | 155 | 140 | 52 | 26 | 7 | 403 |

### 3.1.2.2. Returning to countries of origin to work there from time to time?

Circular migration, returning to home country to work there from time to time, was not of interest for the migrants (Table 15). Only 11% (n=28, out of n=250) answered that they would go back to the country they came from and work there from time to time, while the majority (89%) did not consider this as an option for themselves.

**Table 15 Circular migration across the continents of origin by gender, age and length of stay, n (%) 'yes' (n=251)**

| Reason | Total 'yes' | | Gender* N (%) 'yes' | | Age (yrs) N 'yes' | | Length of stay (yrs) N 'yes' | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | n | % | Female (n=147) | Male (n=101) | < 45 | ≤ 45 | Max 5 | 6-10 | 10+ |
| Africa (n=17) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Asia (n=96) | 11 | 11.8 | 4 (8) | 7 (18) | 9 (18) | 2 (5) | 4 (16) | 3 (20) | 4 (8) |
| Europe non-EU (n=92) | 7 | 8.4 | 3 (5) | 4 (15) | 4 (9) | 3 (8) | 2 (11) | 1 (5) | 4 (9) |
| North America (n=38) | 8 | **22.2** | 3 (14) | 5 (33) | 3 (23) | 5 (22) | 2 (33) | 0 | 6 (21) |
| South America (n=18) | 2 | 11.8 | 1 (13) | 1 (11) | 2 (18) | 0 | 1 (10) | 1 (50) | 0 |
| Oceania (n=4) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 28 | 11.2 | 11 (8) | 17 (17) | 18 (14) | 10 (8) | 9 | 5 | 14 |

*N=17 no-say not included in the table. None of them, in any country, had answered yes to this question

Table 15 shows these rates across the continent of origin by gender, age, and length of stay. None of the migrants from Africa and Oceania answered yes to this question. Continental-wise it was the North Americans (22%) who most often answered yes, as did males more often than females (17% vs. 8%). Also, by gender, age, and length of stay, in all categories of these variables, it was migrants from North America, who represented the highest rate of yes-answers to this question. Also, in all continents but South America, it was males and younger migrants, who more often returned to their country time to time to work (Table 15). By length of stay there was no pattern of circular migration.

Returning to work in the country of one's origin was associated with age ($\chi2=14.00$, df= 6, p<.05): the youngest migrants aged 18-24 and 25-34 years returning most commonly (100% and 21% respectively). We also found a trend regarding gender ($\chi2=5.15$, df= 2, p=.06), indicating that male migrant returned more often (16.8%) than women (7.5%),

and current level of education ($\chi2$=8.00, df= 4, p=.09), indicating that circular migration was more common among migrants with high education. While only one person of those with a maximum of secondary education reported of returning to their country, almost one in four (24%) of those with a PhD did so. Length of stay in Norway or the continent where the migrant originated from were not statistically significantly associated with circular migration.

### *3.1.2.3. Length of stay in Norway as the destination country*

Overall, length of stay in Norway as the destination country was very skewed dispersed in our sample. Almost six in ten (57%) had stayed in the country more than 10 years, while only about one in four (26%) a short stay of a maximum of five years (Table 16).

**Table 16 Length of stay in Norway (N=251)**

| Length of stay | N | % |
|---|---|---|
| Less than 1 yr | 7 | 2.8 |
| 1-5 yrs | 58 | 23.2 |
| 6-10 yrs | 43 | 17.2 |
| More than 10 yrs | 142 | 56.8 |
| **Total** | **251** | **100.0** |

## 3.1.3. What are the characteristics of skill formation and employment of labour migrants? (RQ2)

### *3.1.3.1. Education and recognition of diplomas*

Most commonly the migrants in our sample held a higher education degree, bachelor's (under 30%) or masters (over 30%), both before and after their arrival to Norway (Table 17). Many of them educated themselves further in their new home country. Comparing the migrants' current education level and that at arrival to Norway shows that Master's and PhD degrees had increased the most, in relative terms. The current rate of those holding a PhD degree is more than double compared to the time of arrival in Norway (10.2% vs. 4.9% respectively), and there is a 7 %-unit increase of those holding a master's degree (Table 17). Figure 22 illustrates distribution of the migrants in the main education levels at arrival and currently.

**Table 17. Education level at arrival to Norway and currently (n, %)**

| Education level | At arrival to Norway | | Currently | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | n | % | n | % |
| None | 22 | 9.0 | - | - |
| Primary | 19 | 7.8 | 8 | 3.3 |
| Upper secondary | 26 | 10.6 | 18 | 7.4 |
| Post-secondary, non-tertiary | 13 | 5.3 | 20 | 8.2 |
| Bachelor's or equiv. | 68 | 27.8 | 72 | 29.5 |
| Master's or equiv. | 82 | 33.5 | 99 | 40.6 |
| Doctoral or equiv. | 12 | 4.9 | 25 | 10.2 |
| Prefer not to say | 3 | 1.2 | 1 | 0.4 |
| No further education in Norway* | - | - | 1 | 0.4 |
| **Total** | **245** | **100** | **244** | **100** |

**Figure 22. Education level of the migrants at arrival to Norway and currently (%), N=244**

There was a statistically significant difference in education level between men and women ($\chi2=21.65$, df= 8, <.01). A majority of those with the lowest and the highest level of education were men (62% and 60% correspondingly). Among females the situation was the opposite: they were the least represented with the lowest and highest levels of education (35% and 40% correspondingly), and the rate of women linearly increased by education levels up to master's degree (from 35% to 69%). Women held master's degree more often (49%) than of men (31%) but compared to men, slightly less than a half of them held a PhD (15% and 7% correspondingly).

The three most common fields of studies were: Health, social welfare and physical wellness (25%), Engineering, manufacturing and construction (18%), and Business and administration (14%) (Figure 23).



1.Health, social welfare and physical wellness
2.Engineering, manufacturing and construction
3.Business and administration
4.Social Sciences, journalism and information, law
5.Education
6.Services (transport, cleaning technician, catering, etc.)
7.Arts and Humanities
8.Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and veterinary
9.Other

**Figure 23. The most common field of studies by the migrants (%)**

Most informants (67%) had their **VET/HE diploma recognized** in Norway, either fully (41%) or partially (27%), while 19% not at all (Figure 24). There was a strong association with the *length of stay in the country* ($\chi2=53.84$, df= 9, p<.001): those with shortest stay in the country (max. 5 years), had their degrees fully recognized much more often (72-86%) than those who had stayed in the country longest, more than 10 years (26%). Of those who had not gotten their degree recognized, 82% had stayed in the country more than 10 years.

Corresponding to the length stay in the country, *age* was related to getting their diploma recognized in Norway: ($\chi$2=37.71, df= 18, p<.01): most (70%) of the younger migrants, aged 18-34 years, got their degree fully recognized, and most of those who did not, represented the highest age categories.

As expected, *current level of education* was strongly associated with getting their diploma recognized in Norway ($\chi$2=29.50, df= 12, p<.01): almost half (48%) of those with master's degree and 68% with a doctoral degree or equivalent, got their diploma fully recognized, while 38% of those with bachelor's and 16-19% of those with lowest level of education. Of those who did not get their degree recognized, 40% had a maximum of upper secondary level of education. There was no statistically significant association with *gender* (Table 12).



**Figure 24. Rate of recognizing of VET/HE diploma in Norway (%) (n=238)**

The rate of diploma recognizing varied significantly by the region of origin ($\chi$2=46.77, df=15, p<.001) (NB the low number of migrants from most continents). The rate for full recognition of the diplomas was surprisingly the lowest, 37% for migrants from non-EU Europe (46% partially recognised). For other continents the rates were 47% for those from Africa, 38% from Asia, 46% from North America, 53% from South America, and 67% from Oceania. For no recognition the rate was the highest for migrants from Africa, 33%, and the lowest, 9%, from North America.

We also explored the rate of recognizing of qualifications by reasons of migration. The results are shown in table 18. The highest rates of the home qualifications being *fully* recognized in Norway – for most of them – where for those who had

**Table 18. Reasons of migration by the rate of recognizing of qualifications and gender (%)**

| Reason for migration | Recognition of qualifications | | | | Gender* | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Yes, fully | Yes, partly | No | Other | Men | Women |
| Personal motivation/Wanted a change or new challenges in my life (n=85) | **51** | 31 | 10 | 8 | 39 | **60** |
| Family issues (e.g. marriage, family reunion, etc.) (n=81) | 33 | 26 | 21 | 20 | 27 | **70** |
| Long-term work in the country where I live (n=52) | **52** | 39 | 8 | 2 | 46 | 54 |
| Economic crisis in the country I come from (n=40) | 45 | 42 | 8 | 5 | 35 | **63** |
| Education in the country where I live now (n=40) | **60** | 11 | 14 | 16 | 48 | 53 |
| War/civil war in the country I come from (n=26) | 23 | 19 | 27 | 31 | 54 | 42 |
| Fear of persecution in the country I come from (n=19) | 37 | 26 | 16 | 21 | **58** | 42 |
| Temporary work in the country where I live (n=14) | **69** | 8 | 15 | 8 | **57** | 43 |
| Discrimination in the country I come from (n=13) | 39 | 15 | 23 | 23 | **62** | 38 |
| Climate/natural disaster in the country I come from (n=2) | 50 | 50 | - | - | 0 | 100 |
| Other (n=31) | 28 | 21 | 24 | 28 | 61 | 39 |
| Total | 44 | 26 | 16 | 16 | 44 | 55 |

*The percentages do not always add up to 100, due to the category 'Prefer not to say' being left out from the table.

moved in the country for temporary work (69%), education (60%), long-term work (52%), and personal motivation (51%).

Box 2 shows how the respondents described their open response 'other' (14%) to the question about getting recognized their VET/HE diploma.

| | |
|---|---|
| -I don't know. Have not needed formal recognition for my degree.<br>-Dette er i prosessen. Jeg har sendt dokumentasjon til godkjenning.<br>-Flyttet til Norge da jeg var ett år. Er født av norske foreldre og har alltid hatt norsk statsborgerskap.<br>-Fra Iran ble alt godkjent<br>-Godkjent videregående<br>-Har bare grunnskole fra india<br>-Har ikke tatt utdanning i hjemlandet<br>-har kun grunnskole<br>-I did not take higher education in my country of origin, I took my Master's in Norway.<br>-I don't know. don't think it matters that much cause i work my hobby not my studies<br>-I got the diploma in the country I live in<br>-I have education from my country of residence only<br>-I have no idea<br>-I really have no idea<br>- I received my latest qualification from the country i live in noe<br>-Ikke relevant<br>-Ikke tatt utdanning annet sted<br>-My industry does not really do the diploma thing, nor does it have any official apprentice/journeyman/ master system. Some people take classes in college, some apprentice, and some are self-taught. It's kind of a weird, extremely niche field. | -Never asked<br>-Never looked for recognition of diploma here, but applied for a master and was denied due to grades conversion<br>-Not relevant<br>-Received al my education in Norway<br>-Recognized as a master's degree in unspecified subject<br>-Selve farmasi utdanningen er godkjent i sin helhet av tidligere NOKUT, men Helsedirektoratet godkjenner den som bachelor grad ettersom utdanningen er fra et land utenfor EU.<br>-Tok ikke høyere utdanning i hjemlandet<br>-Tok ikke høyere utdanning i usa<br>-Tok ikke utdannelse der<br>-Tok ikke.<br>-Tok ingen utdanning. Kom til Norge da jeg var 2 år.<br>-Tok utdanning i Norge, da jeg kom til landet dat jeg var 1,5 år<br>-Tok utdanning i norge. Dårlig skjema!<br>-Var under skole alder da vi flyttet.<br>-vet ikke |

**Box 2. Comments on 'other' concerning whether the migrants' *latest VET or HE was recognized in Norway*.**

*3.1.3.2. Skills formation and development in the destination country (on-job-training, self-training, trainings offered by support organisations, professional skills training)*

For the question about **the sites for occupational training in Norway** the two most common answers – and far more common than the other alternatives - were university, technical college, or trade school (n=116), and that they had gotten no vocational education at all (n=110) (Table 19). The next common was informal learning through guidance and/or mentoring at the workplace (n=29).

**Tabell 19. Sources of occupational training in the now-country. Number of times mentioned, multiple choices were possible (N=251)**

| Source of training | Number of times mentioned |
|---|---|
| University, technical college or trade school | n=123 |
| No VET at all | n=123 |
| Informally, through guidance and/or mentoring at the workplace | n=30 |
| Continuous vocational education or VET provider | n=16 |
| Vocational upper secondary school | n=17 |
| Vocational training center | n=14 |
| Through apprenticeship (formal) | n=12 |
| Other | n=10 |

In the questionnaire we also asked free-formed specifications of 'other' concerning occupational training in Norway. The findings are shown in Box 3.

> *Accreditation institution*
> *Adult education*
> *Fulførte mastergrad i samme yrke jeg ble utdannet i hjemlandet mitt*
> *Jeg måtte ta Nasjonale fag til å få autorisasjon.*
> *Jeg tok et studie som er fagskole pga realkompetanse.*
> *Kurs i nasjonale fag for helsepersonell*
> *Lege spesialisering i en av de 46 spesialitetene*
> *Måtte bestå nasjonalprøve til å få autorisasjon.*
> *Vet ikke om dette er relevant, da,jeg kom til Norge når jeg var 1,5 år*

**Box 3. Specifications to 'other' concerning occupational training in Norway (ref. Table 10)**

*Help from employers in adapting to a new job.* The results concerning different forms of help that the current/former employer had done to support the adaptation of the migrants to their jobs are presented in Box 4 (again, it was possible to choose several alternatives presented in the questionnaire). The three most often mentioned things that their current/former employer had done for their adaptation to their job were:

1.  guided on-the-job training (n=103, 41%),
2.  internal vocational courses (n=90, 38%), and
3.  provided individual feedback (n=77, 31%), while having
4.  done nothing was also very common (n=90, 38%) (Box 4).

Adaptation measures least frequently used were changing work practices (n=16), learning or quality circles (n=15), and exchanges or study visits (n=15). For more details see Box 4 below.

| | |
|---|---|
| Guided on-the-job training (n=103) | Self-study: Self-directed learning/e-learning, private lessons (n=40) |
| Internal vocational courses (n=90) | Attended LLL or general AE without employer's help (n=30) |
| Nothing (n=90) | Re-allocating work/tasks (n=23) |
| Provided individual feedback (n=77) | Changing work practices (n=16) |
| Conferences/workshops (n=63) | Learning or quality circles (n=15) |
| Performance monitoring (n=55) | Exchanges or study visits (n=15) |
| Mentoring/buddying scheme (n=54) | I am/have been self-employed (n=12) |
| External vocational courses (n=51) | |

**Box 4. Things current/former employer had done for the adaptation of migrants to their job**

### 3.1.3.3. Occupation and skill alignment

Distribution of the occupation of the migrants in Norway is shown in table 20, based on the ISCO-08 (International Standard Classification of Occupations). Almost half of them (47%) were professionals. The three next most common occupations were represented by service and sales workers (10%), technicians and associate professionals (5.6%) and managers (5.6%). Not unexpectedly, there was a statistically significant gender difference ($\chi2=39.35$, df=18, p<.01), most (53%) women working as professionals and as service and sales workers (10%), while these rates for men were 40% and 11%, respectively. Men worked more often as technicians and assistant professionals (7% vs. 4%), managers (7% vs. 5%), and plant and machine operators, and assemblers (6% vs. none).

**Table 20. Distribution of occupations of the migrants according to ISCO-08 categories.**

| | All | | Gender (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Occupation category | N | % | Men | Women |
| Professionals | 118 | 47.0 | 40 | 53 |
| Service and Sales Workers | 25 | 10.0 | 11 | 10 |
| Technicians and Ass. Professionals | 14 | 5.6 | 7 | 4 |
| Managers | 14 | 5.6 | 7 | 5 |
| Elementary Occupations | 9 | 3.6 | 2 | 4 |
| Plant and Machine Operators, and Assemblers | 6 | 2.4 | 6 | 0 |
| Clerical Support Workers | 5 | 2.0 | 1 | 3 |
| Craft and Related Trades Workers | 4 | 1.6 | 2 | 1 |
| Unable to categorise or not applicable (unemployed, etc.) | 37 | 14.7 | 19 | 11 |
| No answer | 19 | 7.6 | 5 | 9 |
| Total | 251 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Distribution of the occupations of the migrants within the system of NACE (Rev. 2) – Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Union – is presented in Table 21. Most migrants worked in health occupations or social work (24%) and professional, scientific and technical activities (18%), followed by education (9%). There was a statistically significant gender difference ($\chi2=44.75$, df=30, p<.05), women working most often in health care and social work (31%), scientific and technical activities (17%), and in education, while most men in scientific and technical activities (21%) and health care and social work (15%), followed by ttransportation and storage (7%).

**Table 21. Distribution of the occupations of the migrants by NACE (N=251)**

| | All | | Gender (%) | | Skills recognition* (%) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NACE category, Economic activity | N | % | Male | Females | Fully | Partially | Not |
| Q Human health and social work activities | 61 | 24.3 | 15 | 31 | 15 | 55 | 13 |
| M Professional, scientific and technical activities | 46 | 18.3 | 21 | 17 | 59 | 17 | 15 |
| P Education | 22 | 8.8 | 5 | 11 | 48 | 19 | 15 |
| N Administrative and support service activities | 16 | 6.4 | 5 | 7 | 33 | 13 | 27 |
| J Information and communication | 14 | 5.6 | 6 | 5 | 50 | 14 | 29 |
| K Financial and insurance activities | 9 | 3.6 | 3 | 4 | 44 | 22 | 11 |
| G Wholesale and retail trade (incl. repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles) | 8 | 3.2 | 3 | 3 | 13 | 38 | 38 |
| H Transportation and storage | 7 | 2.8 | 7 | 0 | 29 | 28 | 43 |
| I Accommodation food service activities | 7 | 2.8 | 4 | 2 | 86 | 0 | 14 |
| A Agriculture, forestry and fishing | 2 | .8 | 2 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| C Manufacturing | 2 | .8 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 0 | 0 |
| R Arts, entertainment and recreation | 2 | .8 | 2 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| F Construction | 1 | .4 | 1 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| S Other service activities | 1 | .4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unable to categorize or not applicable (unemployed, etc.) | 34 | 13.5 | 20 | 9 | 50 | 9 | 25 |
| No answer | 19 | 7.6 | 5 | 9 | 36 | 36 | 18 |
| Total | 251 | 100 | 100 | 100 | | | |

*Category 'Other' omitted, therefore the percentages do not always add up to 100 (rows).

Occupational variation conditioned also skills recognition ($\chi2=78.37$, df=45, p<.01), as shown in Table 21. Occupational domains (with n>10) where skills were most often *fully* recognized were Professional, scientific and technical activities

(59%), Education (48%), and Information and communication (50%). Correspondingly, the domains where they were most often not recognized at all were Administrative and support service activities (27%) and, again, Information and communication (29%).

**Current employment status** *(employed-unemployed, self-employed)*. A vast majority (86%) of the migrants were employed (out of these with contract n=209 and self-employed n=6), as shown in Figure 25. The rate of those unemployed were just under 10% (9.6%, n=24), while 4% (n=11) preferred not to reveal current employment status. Only one person was working without a contract. We also ran an analysis of employment by the background variables. It showed that employment was strongly associated with:



Figure 25. Current employment status, % (N=251)

- *age* ($\chi$2=92.59, df= 30, p<.001): migrants aged 35-44 and 45-54 years had the highest employment rates (91% and 86% respectively)

- *current level of education* ($\chi$2=25.98, df= 20, ns.) was not statistically significantly related to employment, as employment levels were high among migrants on all education levels, varying from 73% among those with a maximum of secondary level of education to 96% among those with doctoral or equivalent level of degree (83% of those with bachelors and 85% of those with a master's).

- *length of stay* in Norway ($\chi$2=45.24, df= 15, p<.001): Migrants who had been living in Norway 6-10 years had the highest level (88%) of employment. Half (50%) of the migrants, who were currently unemployed, but had been employed before, had stayed in Norway more than 10 years.

Gender or the continent of origin were not associated with employment.

**Size of the workplace.** Regarding the size of the workplace, most of the respondents were working in large companies (47%) or in SMEs (36%) (Figure 26). Another 13% were working in very small companies with under 10 employees, while the rest (4%) were self-employed. The size of the company was strongly related to current level of education ($\chi$2=57.19, df= 21, p<.001) indicating that higher educated worked more often in larger companies than those with less education or they had not received more/further education in Norway. There was also a vague trend regarding gender ($\chi$2=10.49, df= 6, p=.10), suggesting that men worked more often in the largest companies. It was not associated with age, length of stay in Norway, or the continent where the migrant originated from.



Figure 26. Company size, (%) (n=233)

*Skill mismatch (over-skilled, under-skilled).* Table 22 shows the distribution of the responses to the four statements about skills match/mismatch. Almost all the migrants *felt competent to do their work* in Norway (91%), and a half of them (about 49%) reported of *good fit between their education* from their home countries and skills required in their current job. About one in four (27%) felt they were *under-skilled* and needed additional training to match their skills with their current work, although the most common single response to this item was 'neither agree nor disagree' (27%). About a third (around 30%) estimated that they were *over-skilled* for their current job.

The four items do not form a strong measure together for Skills match/mismatch in the Norwegian data: Chronbach's Alpha is negative at -.17 (due to a negative average covariance among items, which violates reliability model assumptions). Item means and standard deviations also presented in Table 22 (scale mean is 10.76, s.d.=2.25).

**Table 22. Skills match/mismatch, % (n)**

| Skill match statements | Strongly agree | Agree | Neither agree, nor disagree | Disagree | Stronly disagree | Mean (s.d.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. My current job fits well with the education I received in the country I come from (n=226) | **25 (56)** | 24 (54) | 22 (49) | 13 (29) | 17 (38) | 2.72 (1.40) |
| 2. In the country where I live now, I feel competent to do my work (n=227) | **61 (138)** | 30 (68) | 7 (15) | 2 (5) | 0.4 (1) | 1.52 (0.76) |
| 3. I needed additional job training to match my skills with my current work (n=228) | 8 (19) | 19 (44) | **27 (62)** | 25 (56) | 21 (47) | 3.30 (1.24) |
| 4. My job requires a lower level of education than I have (n=228) | 12 (28) | 18 (42) | 24 (55) | **27 (62)** | 18 (41) | 3.21 (1.28) |

*Level of education* was statistically significantly related to the two statements about skills match. Higher educated reported more often of good skills match with their jobs (r=-.262, p<.001 – note: skills match scale reversed) and of feeling competent to do their work (r=-.254, p<.001). There was no statistically significant relationship between education and the two statements about skills mismatch (items 3 & 4, Table 22).

There were no statistically significant *gender* differences. However, there was a trend concerning **item 3** (Table 22) about under-skilling ($\chi$2=14.56, df= 8, p=.06), so that men agreed with the statement more often than women (34.4% and 22.6%, correspondingly, needing more training) and women disagreed with it more often than men (40.8% and 34.4% correspondingly). T-test (ANOVA) also revealed the same difference, F(2, 225)=4.13, p<.05.

*Age* was statistically significantly related to the items about skills match (**item 1**) (r=.16, p<.05) and about being under-skilled (**item 3**) (r=.14, p<.05). For both statements younger migrants agreed more often than older ones, who disagreed more often with them. For example, concerning the skills match, 59% of the migrants aged 25-34 years, 49% of those aged 45-54 years, and 33% of those aged 55+ agreed that their current job fit well with the education they had received in the country they came from. Correspondingly, the need for additional job training to match their skills with their current work was strongest among the youngest migrants: 32% among those aged 25-44 years, 26% among those 45-54 years, and 15% among those aged 55+ agreed with the statement.

Correspondingly to age, *length of stay in the country* was positively related to education-job match (**item 1**) (r=.21, p<.01) (the shorter the stay – the better fit), being under-skilled (item 3) (r=.25, p<.001) (the shorter the stay – the more

additional training needed for better skills match), and to over-skilled (item 4) (r=.13, p<.05) (the shorter the stay – the more over-skilled).

*Continent of origin* was not statistically significantly related to skills mis-/match. However, ANOVA results suggest that migrants from Europe non-EU27 (x̄=2.44) and South America (x̄=2.38) felt more often well-matched (**item 1**) *(scale: 1= strongly agree, 5= strongly disagree)* than those from the other continents (F(5, 220)=1.938, p=.08), and that migrants from Asia (x̄=3.04) and Africa (x̄=3.14) were more often under-skilled (need more training) than especially those from North America (x̄=3.82) and Europe non-EU27 (x̄=3.36) (F(5, 222)=2.125, p=.06).

**Finding the first job** *(processes, finding a job before or after arrival in the destination country, job search channels, duration, challenges in finding a job).* Concerning **the timing of finding the first job,** most of the respondents (72%, n=169) had found it only after their arrival in Norway, while 28% (n=67) already before it. There was no difference between men and women.

The first job was most commonly found through **job advertisements** (33%), more often by women (39%) than men (25%). Other means were by contacting employers directly (19% - female 18%, male 20%).) or through acquaintances / own social network (17% - female 15%, male 21%). These were the most common means for finding a job for men and women alike. Other means mentioned were by company transfer, ("Jobbsjansen"), through one's spouse, through education ('school provided interview with the company') or University, through an EU project, or through earlier employment in the same Norwegian company in another country.

**Time it took to find one's first job.** Figure 27 shows the distribution of time it took for the migrants to find their first job. Almost half of them (47%) got their first job in less than six months, quite a few of them (12%) having a job already before they arrived (= 0 week). Another 23% succeeded between 6 and 12 months and a further 15% between the first and second year of their stay in Norway. For the rest of them it took more than two years. Level of education, gender or age were not related time it took to find one's first job.



**Figure 27. Time it took to get the first job (%), N=251**

### 3.1.3.4. Skills and skills development

Table 23 shows the distributions of the responses to the statements about skills and skills development. In all regards, but the one about starting my own business, the responses were very favorable. In other words, the migrants seemed at ease when it comes to their skills and opportunities to develop them (most of them 'strongly agree' or 'agree' with the statements). For example, 91% were confident with their communication skills and 77% had trust in that training opportunities are in place, should they have the need for work-related skills development. Most of them (about 60%) also believed that their current skills are transferable to their home country, in case they should choose to return. When it

comes to the question about the desire to start their own business, the most typical response was 'neither agree nor disagree', while about 43% of them actually agreed with the statement.

The five item measure of skills and skills development have low internal consistency (poor reliability) in our data: Chronbach's Alpha is .398. Deleting the first item "I can communicate sufficiently with the local people to do my job" would slightly increase it to .440. Item means and standard deviations also presented in Table 14 (scale mean is 11.39, s.d.=3.13).

**Table 23. Skills and skills development, % (n)**

| Skill development statements | Strongly agree | Agree | Neither agree, nor disagree | Disagree | Stronly disagree | Mean (s.d.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I can communicate sufficiently with the local people to do my job (n=232) | **65 (151)** | 26 (61) | 7 (15) | 2 (4) | 0.4 (1) | 1.44 (0.69) |
| 2. In this country, I can enroll in the training courses needed for my work if needed (n=230) | **42 (97)** | 35 (81) | 17 (38) | 3 (7) | 3 (7) | 1.90 (0.99) |
| 3. In this country, I would like to start my own business if I get the opportunity (n=230) | 20 (46) | 23 (52) | **29 (66)** | 15 (35) | 14 (31) | 2.82 (1.29) |
| 4. I came to this country to become better in my professional area (n=228) | **25 (57)** | 17 (39) | 23 (53) | 16 (37) | 18 (42) | 2.87 (1.44) |
| 5. If I return to the country I come from, I can use what I have learned at work in the now-country (n=226) | 29 (66) | **31 (70)** | 22 (49) | 11 (25) | 7 (16) | 2.36 (1.21) |

*Level of education* was statistically significantly related to the last two statements (**items 4 & 5**, Table 23). Higher educated reported more often having come to Norway to become better in their professional area (r=-.22, p=.001) and more often than lower educated believed that their skills are transferable to their home country, in case of return (r=-.15, p<.05).

There were statistically significant *gender* differences only in regards **item 2** about being able to enroll in training for work one's work, if needed ($\chi2$=18.76, df= 8, p<.05). Men agreed with the statement more often (80%) than women (76 %, 'agree' or 'strongly agree'), while women disagreed more often (6.8%) than men (4.3%, 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree'). T-test showed no statistically significant gender differences for any of the five items.

*Age* was statistically significantly related to skills and skills development regarding all but the last item about transferability of their skills upon returning to their own country. – (**item 1**) Can communicate sufficiently (r=-.24, p<.001) older migrants agreed more often than younger (100% of those 55+ years and 80.5% of those 25-34 years); (**item 2**) enrolling training courses (r=-.18, p<.01) the older the migrants, the more often they agreed (strongly agree 22.2% of those 25-34 years and 80% of those 55+ years), i.e. felt that they have an opportunity to enroll training courses; (**item 3**) willingness to start their own business (r=.26, p<.001) younger migrants, under the age of 45 years, were clearly more often interested in entrepreneurial opportunity than the older ones; (**item 4**) coming to Norway to become better in their professional area (r=.30, p<.001), again the younger migrants agreed more often with the statement.

Correspondingly to age, and not surprisingly, there was a strong relationship between skills and skills development and *the length of stay in the country*. The latter was statistically significantly associated to confidence in communication (**item 1**) (r=.-32, p<.001) (the longer stay, the more agree), opportunity for training if needed for the work (**item 2**) (r=-

.26, p<.001) (the longer stay, the more agree), wish to start a new business (**item 3**) (r=.17, p=.01) (the shorter stay, the more agree), and motivation to enter Norway to improve in one's professional field (**item 4**) (r=.41, p<.001) (the shorter stay, the more agree). Regarding **item 5** there was a weak positive trend (r=.12, p=.06), indicating that the shorter the stay, the more the migrants agreed about the possibility of skills transfer back to their home country.

### 3.1.4. What are the perceptions of migrant workers on social justice?  (RQ3)

#### 3.1.4.1. Justice and Work Conditions

Table 24 shows how the migrants responded to the statements about justice at work. Taken that stronger agreement indicated more positive experiences about justice at work, the findings showed that majority of the migrants reported of a feeling of justice at work (63-75% agreed with the statements). Responses to the first statement about working in high-risk jobs in terms of occupational health, were also in line with these findings, in that majority of the migrants disagreed (60%) with the statement. Contrastingly, 10-23% of the migrants disagreed with the statements, indicating some issues with justice at work (Table 24).

The five items together form weak measure for Justice at work in the Norwegian data: Chronbach's Alpha is at .681. However, deleting **item 1** "I work in high-risk jobs in terms of occupational health" would improve the internal consistency to .801, which indicates a good reliability. Item means and standard deviations also presented in Table 24 (scale mean is 12.68, s.d.=3.90).

**Table 24. Justice at work, % (n)**

| Justice at work | Strongly agree | Agree | Neither agree, nor disagree | Disagree | Stronly disagree | Mean (s.d.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I work in high-risk jobs in terms of occupational health (n=228) | 7 (16) | 13 (30) | 20 (46) | **31** **(71)** | 29 (65) | 3.61 (1.23) |
| 2. I feel adequately informed about occupational safety (n=229) | 32 (74) | **43** **(99)** | 15 (34) | 8 (18) | 2 (4) | 2.04 (0.98) |
| 3. I am not worried about being laid off from my job because of being an immigrant (n=229) | **32** **(73)** | 31 (70) | 16 (36) | 11 (26) | 11 (24) | 2.37 (1.31) |
| 4. I feel comfortable when expressing my views on working conditions in the workplace (n=229) | 28 (63) | **38** **(86)** | 16 (37) | 8 (19) | 11 (24) | 2.36 (1.25) |
| 5. I think my job performance is evaluated objectively (n=227) | 24 (55) | **41** **(93)** | 22 (50) | 7 (16) | 6 (13) | 2.29 (1.09) |

*Gender* was statistically significantly associated with justice at work **(item 1)**: men reported more often that they work in high-risk job in terms of occupational health than women, 31% vs. 12% agreed with the statement, respectively ($\chi$2=22.32, df= 8, p<.01).

Like gender, *education* was statistically significantly associated only with **item** 1: while most of the migrants in all educational levels most typically disagreed about having a high-risk job in terms of occupational health (41%-79%), those with low levels of education did more often report of high-risk than those with higher education ($r_s$=.17, p<.01). Of

those with less than higher education 18% with maximum a secondary level degree and 35% with post-secondary, non-tertiary degree agreed with this statement while only 5% of those with PhD did so.

*Age* was statistically significantly related to items 2, 3 and 4 (Table 24) concerning justice at work: Older workers felt more often adequately informed about Occupational Safety (OS) than their younger counterparts (**item 2**) (r=.-21, p<.01). While 40-60% in the oldest age groups agreed with the statement, 24%-44% in the youngest ones did so. When it comes to not being worried about being laid off from their job because of being an immigrant (**item 3**), older workers were slightly less worried than younger workers: in the three oldest age groups about 39-100% strongly agreed and another 21-60% agreed with the statement, while in the three youngest age groups about 22-49% and 28-44% did so, respectively. Older workers felt also slightly more comfortable with expressing their views on working conditions (**item 4**) than younger workers ($r_s$=-.13, p<.05).

L*onger of stay in the country* was positively related to feelings of justice at work, indicated by three of the five items. It was statistically significantly associated with feeling informed about OS (**item 2**) (r=.-22, p<.001) – the longer their stay, the more satisfied they were with OS - and with not worrying about being laid off because of the migrant status (**item 3**) (r=.-13, p<.05) – the longer their stay, the less worried they were about being laid off for this reason. Additionally, there was a weak trend concerning **item 4** (r=.-11, p=.10) – corresponding to age, those with longer stay were felt more comfortable about expressing their views on working conditions in the workplace.

### 3.1.4.2. Discrimination

Discrimination appeared not to be a problem for most of the migrants who responded to our survey in Norway. From Table 25 we can read that most of the migrants disagreed (52-67%) with the three statements (**items** 2-4) referring to having been an offer of discrimination and agreed (47%) with the first (**item** 1), converse statement about not being discriminated against as an immigrant. To these statements the response was neutral by an additional 20-25% of the informants.

The six items together cannot be used as a measure for Discrimination in the Norwegian data: Chronbach's Alpha is only at .231. However, deleting the first item "I am not discriminated against as an immigrant" would increase it to an almost

**Table 25. Discrimination % (n)**

| Discrimination | Strongly agree | Agree | Neither agree, nor disagree | Disagree | Stronly disagree | Mean (s.d.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I am <u>not</u> discriminated against as an immigrant (n=226) | 20 (46) | **27** **(60)** | 25 (56) | 18 (41) | 10 (23) | 2.70 (1.26) |
| 2. I experience discrimination against my gender (n=227) | 4 (9) | 10 (22) | 20 (45) | 32 (72) | **35** **(79)** | 3.84 (1.13) |
| 3. I experience discrimination against my ethnicity (n=226) | 9 (20) | 16 (35) | 23 (52) | **31** **(71)** | 21 (48) | 3.41 (1.22) |
| 4. I experience discrimination because of the geographical region/country I come from (n=226) | 8 (18) | 16 (35) | 25 (56) | **32** **(73)** | 20 (44) | 3.40 (1.19) |
| 5. I don't feel safe here because of the anti-immigrant attitudes of some people (n=227) | 3 (6) | 8 (18) | 19 (43) | **37** **(84)** | 34 (76) | 3.92 (1.02) |
| 6. The area where I live has a high concentration of immigrants (n=226) | 10 (23) | 24 (54) | **27** **(62)** | 26 (59) | 12 (28) | 3.08 (1.18) |

acceptable level at .659. Item means and standard deviations also presented in Table 25 (scale mean is 20.35, s.d.=3.19).

*Gender*. There was a trend for males to agree more and for females to disagree more, regarding the statement about not feeling safe because of the anti-immigrant attitudes (**item 5**), but the association was not statistically significant ($\chi$2=14.43, df= 8, p=.07).

*Age* was related to several statements about discrimination. It was almost statistically significantly associated with experience of discrimination *against their ethnicity* (**item 3**) (r=.15, p<.05) – this type of discrimination was least often experienced in the youngest age groups (under 35 years of age) and the oldest (55+): in the oldest age group 76% *disagreed* with the statement, while 64% of migrants aged 25-34 years old did so. Contrastingly, it was migrants aged 35-44 years and 54-54 years that most often reported discrimination, 42% and 23% agreed with the statement, respectively (roughly 40% of them disagreeing). Age was also associated with the experience of discrimination because of the *geographical region* the migrants come from (**item 4**) (r=.20, p<01), correspondingly to discrimination against ethnicity above: most typical response in all age groups was disagree (57% of those aged 25-34 years and 76% of the 55+), strongest in the youngest and the oldest age group, while it was, again, in the age group 35-44 years, where the largest rate of the migrants (32%) agreed with the statement. Furthermore, age was related to not feeling safe because of anti-immigrant attitudes (**item 5**) (r=.19, p<01). The youngest migrants aged 25-34 and 35-44 years agreed most often (14% and 15%) with the statement, while still the most common response in all age groups was to disagree (60-85%). Finally, we observed a tendency that older migrants more often lived in areas with high concentration immigrants, compared to younger migrants, but the association was not statistically significant (r=-.11, p=.08): the two oldest age groups most often agreed with the statement (37 % and 42%), while the two youngest most often disagreed (45% and 43%).

*Education* was not statistically significantly related to the discrimination, any of the six items.

When it comes to *length of stay in the country* a statistically significant association was found with items 4 and 5: those who had shortest stay in Norway most often agreed about having experienced discrimination because of the geographical region/country they come from (**item 4**) (the shorter stay, the more agree) (r=.18, p<.01), as well as of not feeling safe in Norway because of anti-immigrant attitudes (**item 5**) (r=.13, p<.05).

*Continent of origin* was associated with experiencing discrimination against one's gender (**item 2**) ($\chi$2=41.52, df= 20, p<.01): while 21% of immigrants from Asia and 30% from North America agreed with the statement, only 1.3% did so from the non-EU27, the rates being 53%, 56% and 82%, correspondingly, for those who disagreed with the statement (Asia and non-EU27 were the two continents with most of migrants in our sample, followed by a less than half so many from North America, a reason why the rates for the latter should be taken with caution). It was also associated with experience of discrimination against their ethnicity (**item 3**): while 34% of immigrants from Asia agreed with the statement, only about a half (18%) did so from North America and 19% from the non-EU27 countries, the rates being 42%, 68% and 58%, correspondingly, for those who disagreed with the statement ($\chi$2=31.87, df= 20, p<.05).

### 3.1.4.3. Social Participation and Citizenship Rights

Social participation and civil rights were measured by four statements, shown in Table 26, together with responses from the migrants. The level of participation was not very high, but still on the active side. Concerning the statement about

participation in activities organized by people from the country they come from, the responses were largely dispersed across all the alternatives, yet, about 42% agreed with the statement. Most of the migrants also agreed with the statements about participation in local social and cultural activities (64%) and being a member professional chambers or unions (63%). Regarding of the statement of actively seeking their rights as an immigrant, the most common response was 'neither agree nor disagree' (39%).

The four items cannot be used as a joint measure for Social participation and civil rights in the Norwegian data: Chronbach's Alpha is a poor .585. However, deleting **item 4** "I am a member of professional chambers or unions" would improve the scales internal consistency to .665, which is still low. Item means and standard deviations also presented in Table 26 (the Scale Mean is 10.58, s.d.=3.20).

**Table 26. Social participation and civil rights % (n)**

| Statements about social participation and civic rights | Strongly agree | Agree | Neither agree, nor disagree | Disagree | Stronly disagree | Mean (s.d.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I participate in activities organized by people from the country I come from (n=226) | 16 (35) | **26 (59)** | 24 (55) | 21 (48) | 13 (29) | 2.91 (1.26) |
| 2. I participate in local social and cultural activities (n=226) | 19 (43) | **45 (101)** | 19 (43) | 13 (29) | 4 (10) | 2.40 (1.07) |
| 3. I actively seek my rights as an immigrant (n=226) | 8 (18) | 29 (66) | **39 (88)** | 17 (38) | 7 (16) | 2.87 (1.02) |
| 4. I am a member of professional chambers or unions (n=224) | **38 (84)** | 25 (56) | 7 (16) | 21 (46) | 10 (22) | 2.40 (1.41) |

*Age* was associated with all items about social participation and civil rights. It was strongly statistically significantly associated with participation in activities organized by people from the country of origin of the migrants (**item 1**) (r=.23, p<.001): migrants under 45 years of age most often agreed with the statement (50-51%), while in the oldest age group (55+) they most often disagreed (54%). Age was also statistically almost significantly associated with participation in local social and cultural activities (**item 2**) (r=.15, p<.05): those under 45 years of age were most active (71-74% agreeing with the statement), while the oldest age group (55+) was least active in this regard (disagreed most frequently of all age groups, 24%). Furthermore, it was the young migrants under 45 years of age who most actively were seeking their rights as immigrants (**item 3**) (r=.29, p<.001), while those over 45 years were the least active in this regard.

*Gender.* Woman tended to be slightly more active in participation in local social and cultural activities (68% agreed vs. 58% of men) (**item 2**) ($\chi$2=15.31, df= 8, p=.05). Further, there was a small but statistically a very significant difference between men and woman regarding being a member of professional chambers or unions (**item 4**) ($\chi$2=26.60, df= 8, p<.001): 64% of women and 61% of men agreed with the statement (were members).

*Education* was associated with social participation regarding **item 1** (r=-.16, p<.05), suggesting that those with higher education more often participate in activities organized by people from their country, and **item 3** (r=-.14, p<.05), suggesting that migrants with higher education more often actively seek their rights as an immigrant. Also, regarding being a member of professional chambers or unions (**item 4**) (r=-.14, p<.05), the higher educated were more often members than migrants with lower education.

Analysis of social participation and civil rights as a function of the l*ength of stay in the country* showed that those who had stayed longest in Norway, tended to be least concerned about these issues. Length of stay was positively associated with **item 1** (r=.23, p<.001) and **item 2** (r=.16, p<.05), indicating that those who had stayed longer in the country, participated less in these kind of activities (disagreed more with the statement), as well as with **item 3** (r=.36, p<.001), indicating that those who have shortest stay in Norway were most active in seeking their rights as immigrants. Length of stay was not associated with professional membership.

*Continent of origin* was almost statistically significantly associated with participation in activities organized by people from the country of origin of the migrants (**item 1**) ($\chi$2=32.81, df= 20, p<.05): about a half (48-53%) of the migrants from Africa, non-EU27 and South America (n.b. low counts) agreed with the statement, while migrants from North America most often disagreed with it (53%). When it comes to actively seeking their rights as an immigrant (**item 3**) ($\chi$2=46.45, df= 20, p<.001), migrants from Africa, non-EU27 and Asia were the most active, 60% (n.b. low count), 44%, and 34% agreed, respectively. Among migrants from all the other continents this rate was under 30%. Finally, regarding being a member of professional chambers or unions (**item 4**) ($\chi$2=37.65, df= 20, p=.01), the migrants from non-EU27 were the most active (75% agreed), followed by Africa (65%, n.b. low count), Asia (60%), and North America (56%).

### 3.1.5. Local questions added in Norway

We added three types of questions locally. The first question was a set of statements about the views held in the migrants' current local community and by their colleagues about their social, economic and political situation in their home country. The second was about their language skills and language use. Finally, at the very end of the survey, we had an open question, encouraging the informants to add any further comments and/or thoughts about the thematic in the survey.

#### *3.1.5.1. Migrants' social, economic and political situation in their home country*

The responses to the statements about the views held in the migrants' current local community and by their colleagues about their social, economic and political situation in their home country are presented in Table 27. Item means and standard deviations also presented in Table 27 (the Scale Mean is 12.29, s.d.=3.39). The results show that the most common response (by 34-40%) for all the four statements was neither agree or disagree, with no difference between the statements concerning the views related to local community and colleagues (all means are also very near 3). There were about 30% of both those who agreed or disagreed with all the four statements.

The four items appeared to have a strong internal consistency, with Chronbach's Alpha at .769. Deleting any of the items would only have a slightly decreasing effect to the value.

*Education* was not statistically related to any of these items.

**Table 27. The views held in the migrants' current local community and by their colleagues about their social, economic and political situation in their home country, % (n)**

| Statements | Strongly agree | Agree | Neither agree, nor disagree | Disagree | Stronly disagree | Mean (s.d.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People in my local community are knowledgeable about the social, economic and political situation in my home country (n=224) | 8.9 (20) | 20.1 (45) | **33.9** **(76)** | 24.1 (54) | 12.9 (29) | 3.12 (1.46) |
| It is important to me that people in my local community are knowledgeable about the social, economic and political situation in my home country (n=224) | 6.7 (15) | 21.9 (49) | **38.8** **(87)** | 20.5 (46) | 12.1 (27) | 3.09 (1.08) |
| My colleagues at work are knowledgeable about the social, economic and political situation in my home country (n=224) | 8.9 (20) | 22.3 (50) | **37.1** **(83)** | 19.6 (44) | 12.1 (27) | 3.04 (1.13) |
| It is important to me that my colleagues are knowledgeable about the social, economic and political situation in my home country (n=223) | 6.7 (15) | 23.3 (52) | **39.9** **(89)** | 19.7 (44) | 10.3 (23) | 3.04 (1.06) |

### 3.1.5.2. Language skills and language use

When it comes to language skills and language use, we had one question that covered several languages and contexts. The question was: *What language do you mostly use in different contexts''*. The five alternatives listed for the languages were: Norwegian, English, both Norwegian and English, a language from my home country, a third country language (that is not from my home country or Norwegian/English). In regards each of them, the informants were requested to indicate in which of the listed four contacts they were using them. The different contexts listed: (i) when I am working, (ii) during breaks and lunch, (iii) at home, and (iv) in community activities. The findings are presented in Table 28.

**Table 28. The migrants' use of different languages in different contexts in Norway, % (n), N=251**

| What language do you mostly use in these different contexts | When I am working | During breaks and lunch | At home | Community activities |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norwegian | **65.3** **(164)** | 59.0 (148) | 30.7 (77) | 52.6 (132) |
| English | **45.4** **(114)** | 23.5 (59) | 29.1 (73) | 38.6 (97) |
| Both Norwegian and English | 37.5 (94) | 27.2 (68) | 21.5 (54) | **37.8** **(95)** |
| A language from my home country | 8.4 (21) | 8.4 (21) | **55.4** **(139)** | 34.3 (86) |
| A third country language (that is not from my home country or Norwegian/English) | 4.8 (12) | 1.6 (4) | 8.0 (20) | **12.7** **(32)** |

### 3.1.5.3. Additional comments and thoughts on the survey's thematic

As the last question in the survey, we asked the informants to freely write down their possible comments and/or further thoughts on the survey thematic: *"Lastly, please feel free to write below if there is anything you would like to add about the topic of the survey."* Comments in English are shown below in Box 5. Most comments were written in Norwegian, shown in Box 6. In both cases the quotes are authentic, copy-pasted comments from the questionnaire responses.

> ;) super cool
> All processes are very slow and seem very bureaucratic here.
> -As a Jew born in Israel have have recieved threats to my life and work environment several times in the last two years I have expirienced a more quiet social exclusion and a disadvantage on the job market.  In addition, I have expirienced social exclution in Norway's Jewish community dince I had a disagreement with a rabbi over 10 years ago.
> -Basically everything is covered.
> -Discrimation towards skilled migrants are extremely pervasive in the Norwegian society. However, it is not intentional. Norwegians are just more comfortable witj Norwegians and find foreigners scary because Norwegians are just a very closed society.
> -Hey so on the English-language version of this survey, on the "Social participation and civic rights" page, every section had the options: "strongly agree / agree / neither agree nor disagree / disagree / strongly *agree*". Pretty sure that last one should have said "strongly *disagree*". You may want to fix that.
> -Hi, am zayed health care nurse assailant i want shift to norway to work please help me.
> -How do you find it easy finding job in the country yoe live in now?
> -I came in the country I live in now when I was 13. More Norwegian now as a Filipino.
> -I came to Norway age 13 with my American father and Norwegian step-mother. That was 40 years ago. I am now married to a Norwegian and have 4 kids with him. I speak English with my kids and Norwegian to my husband.
> I do not get discriminated against because my Norwegian is fluent since I was raised by Norwegian parents and we moved back and forth between the US and Norway when -I grew up - so I have lived in both countries and currently keep my English up by speaking it with my daughter and reading news and books in English. Also I look very Norwegian.
> -I have lived in many countries beyond home and current country, and could be interesting to include that perspective to map the international experience of immigrants coming into Norway.  Additionally, there should be a question on growth opportunity once you land the job, is there an equal opportunity?
> -I liked this survey, thank you.
> -I was born in the muddkeceast and grew up in the UK. Therefore some answers were difficult to respond to.
> -It would have been nice to be asked about perecptions of how other immigrants are treated. As a white American I am privileged, but I am accutely aware that there are serious issues facing people from other immigrant backgrounds.
> -It's very difficult to integrate to Norwegian society or to find a job here as a foreigner, especially if you're not from Western Europe countries. I didn't experience much discrimination in the society, but I feel the subtle discrimination/unconscious bias at work from foreign colleagues. Norwegian are mostly political correct, so they won't say anything, but the discrimination is subtle and it's there.
> -My family emigrated here when I was a minor and I have lived here for most of my adult life.
> -Nothing.
> - Nothing.
> - Nothing to add.
> - Nothing to say.
> -Some questions mistakenly had "strongly agree" at both ends of the scale.
> -The employer in this country is very powerful, they hire people based on their network rather than by competance, if dont have a network you can not find easily based job application, Since I am switching from academia to industry I have applied for more than 1300 jobs in last 3 years without success. I am doing contract jobs at universities.
> -The language plays a big role how we feel as an immigrant. Maybe also create more questions focused on how immigrants feel regarding learning the language, how that affected their adaptation and possibilities in the country and if they had the possibility of learning the language through their job or komune.

-The waiting time for almost anything takes forever like social support. Anything in Norway takes time which is causing so much frustration.

-There is a lot of pressure to learn Norwegian and use Norwegian at work really fast. I only started learning Norsk but I am expected to follow meetings in Norsk from the start which I was able to do with the use of translation apps.

-This survey is confusing for people who obtained education from a third country and have lived long-term in a third country before settling in this current country. Home country is an objective concept, not necessarily by birth.

**Box 5. Comments in English**

-Arbeidsinnvandrere er en stor gruppe med utallige mange variasjoner innad.  De som jobber på Equinor og Telenor som har et eller annet ekspertise på noe er litt annerledes enn de arbeidsinnvandrere som er fra EU-land. Spesielt de fra Polen og de baltiske landene.

-Ble født i USA av norske foreldre og kom til Norge 2 år gammel. Har tatt utdanning her og jobbet i over 45 år og nå pensjonist. Ikke nok svaralternativer for meg.

-Bra undersøkelse.

-Denne undersøkelsen synes å være utarbeidet for mennesker fra den 3 verden. Afrika osv.

-Dere får dårlige data fra meg; Som sagt er jeg født i USA, men av norske foreldre, som reiste hjem til Norge da jeg var tre år gammel. For alle praktiske, etniske, biologiske og kulturelle forhold er jeg norsk. Jeg har amerikansk statsborgerskap fordi jeg er født der, og dermed føler jeg tilknytning til landet som borger. Har dual nationality.

-Det er en enorm forskjell i hjelpen staten gir til asylsøkere og til befolkningen som kommer for å jobbe I Norge. Absolutt ingen hjelp til arbeidssøkere.

-Det er viktig å belyse hvordan innvandrere har det i det landet de bor i.

-Det er viktig å snakke hjemlandets språk med familien.

-Det er viktig at det jobbes i Norge for å forebygge utnytting av arbeidskraft fra utlandet. Folk som kommer vet ikke om alle rettigheter (plikter) som de har, er usikkre for å stå opp for sine rettigheter fra arbeidsmiljøloven og arbeidsgivere utnytter det.

-Det har muligens noe å si at - så langt - har jeg bodd i Norge tilsammen rundt 43 år. 1972 -1977, 1989 - 2025. Mellom 1978 -1989 var jeg hjemme i New Zealand, og i jobb.

-Folk må respektere hverandre.

-For å gi kontekst til svarene mine: Jeg er teknisk sett innvandrer, siden jeg ble født i USA, men begge foreldrene mine er Norske, og vi flyttet tilbake til Norge når jeg var 1,5 år gammel. Jeg har så vidt jeg husker alltid hatt norsk (og amerikansk) statsborgerskap, og har bodd i Norge siden jeg var 1,5 år gammel.

-Foreldre flyttet hit når jeg var et barn.

-Helt greit.

-Helt greit.

-Helt ok.

-Ikke noe spesielt.

-Ikke treffsikker: spm treffer ikke min situasjon: født i USA av norske foreldre/flyttet til Norge som barn. Har senere bodd og jobbet i USA noen år.

-Ingen komentar.

-Jeg hadde en dårlig opplevelse med jobbmuligheter eller veiledning. I en av voksenopplæringene søkte jeg hjelp med karriereveiledning, og etter at CV-en min var sjekket, sa saksbehandleren bare «lykke til videre». Eller da jeg allerede hadde sikret meg en plass i et veiledningsprogram for masteroppgaven organisert av en av kommunene, fikk jeg plutselig en e-post om at det avlyste fordi de hadde funnet en bedre kandidat. Eller etter at jeg var ferdig med norskkurset ved en av voksenopplæringene, foreslo rektoren at jeg skulle ta en annen videregående skole, selv om jeg hadde vært offentlig lærer i 10 år i landet mitt. Så begrenset informasjonen var da jeg bodde i landsbyen. Jeg er takknemlig for at en av lærerne kunne henvise meg til høgskolen som sto i avisen på den tiden.

-Jeg har høy kompetanse, mange års erfaring og norsk statsborgerskap, men sitter arbeidsledig og sliter forferdelig med å få jobb pga. opprinnelse fra Russland (som jeg flyttet fra for 30 år siden), fordi 70-80% av bedrifter, som er aktuelle for meg, offisielt ikke lenger ansetter slike som meg.

-Jeg jobber som leder på et apotek over mange år, nesten rett etter grunnleggende opplæring. Er godkjent som bachelor, med akurat same ansvar og oppgaver som alle andre som er godkjente som master. Det er bare lønn som er mye lavere og stillinger kan man ikke velge selv som andre som har godkjent master. Skuffende.

> -Jeg kom hit som barn grunnet min norske mor, så passer kanskje ikke helt inn i den kategorien dere prøver å nå (arbeidsinnvandrere?).
> -Jeg ønsker å ha med religion i denne undersøkelsen. Fordi noen føler seg utenfor p.g.a. sine TRO.
> -Jeg opplevde diskriminering i min første to år i Norge pga språk men det var mer subltle.
> -Synes det var klare og tydelige spørsmål.
> -Tematikken er relevant, men å få jobb avhenger av det som man har studert i landet han kom fra. En lege kan ha lang ventetid enn en sykepleier eller mekanikker. Med høy utdanning blir det vanskelig å få jobb.
> -Veld ig bra og produktivt.
> Viktig tema som tas opp. Jeg jobber i Oslo kommune og blir mildt sagt behandlet ufint av ledelsen i - Utdanningsetaten fordi jeg er mann, 45+ og utlending. Det er fordi de automatisk har sett for seg at vi i den gruppen er mot pride og har forhåndsstemplet oss. Uten at dette er riktig.

**Box 6. Comments in Norwegian**

## 3.2. Qualitative research results

### 3.2.1. Overview of demographics

The Norwegian qualitative sample includes 32 migrants living and working or actively job-seeking in Norway in the three months prior to the interview. As shown in Table 1 in the methods section, the participants originate from a wide range of countries, with most nationalities represented by a small number of participants, reflecting the heterogeneity of the sample rather than concentration in specific origin groups. The group includes 19 women and 13 men. Educational attainment is high overall (15 with an MA degree, 12 with a BA, 4 with a PhD, and 1 with upper secondary education). Participants' current occupations in Norway span multiple sectors, including tech/IT (n=5), hospitality/food service (n=8), engineering/energy (n=4), education/academia/research (n=8), administrative/retail roles (n=3), health/lab work (n=3), and smaller representation in cleaning services, finance and arts/culture.

### 3.2.2. What are the characteristics of the migration patterns of labour migrants? How do these impact their employment in the destination countries? (RQ1)

The qualitative data from the Norwegian case reveal that labour migrants' migration patterns are highly diverse but patterned, shaped by a combination of education, family ties, labour market opportunities, political instability, and perceived life chances. Rather than following a single linear pathway, migrants often move through layered and sequential migration trajectories – for example, entering Norway as students, later transitioning into workers, or arriving as family migrants whose employment trajectories unfold more slowly. These migration patterns are closely connected to how, when, and under what conditions migrants access employment in Norway. The analysis below addresses RQ1 by examining four interrelated dimensions: reasons for migration, degree of voluntariness and constraint, choice of Norway as destination, and time spent in the destination country, drawing exclusively on verbatim interview material.

#### 3.2.2.1. Reasons for migration: education, family, work, safety, and life conditions

Across the dataset, *education* emerges as the most prominent initial reason for migration, frequently functioning as a structured entry route into Norway and, for some, into the Norwegian labour market. Many participants describe arriving explicitly as students, with education framed as both a personal aspiration and a strategic decision linked to future employment:

*"So coming to Norway, I came through school as a student." (M-13)*

*"I migrated as a student but now I'm a skilled worker." (M-15)*

*"I came to Norway as a student with the student visa and I finished my studies after two years and I got a job. Just immediately after my studies." (M-14)*

Education-led migration is often justified through perceptions of better-quality education, practical training, and international standards, particularly when contrasted with limited opportunities in countries of origin:

*"I realized that studying abroad was very good because you get exposure to new technology, and you get practical experience." (M-7)*

Others indicated having strategically selected their course of study and Norway as their destination country with the specific aim of entering their targeted profession:

*"With an advice and assistance from my undergraduate professor I was able to learn a little bit more about Norway and the educational institutions in Norway and how relevant the schools are to my future goals and future trajectories" (M-14)*

*"And when I tried to pick a country for my master's education, I was very much intrigued by the standard of operations in Norway, especially towards the energy industry. The standard of operations, especially within the engineering industry. and oil and gas industry and energy. And that's how Norway became my destination country because I believe that is a country that has everything I needed and it fits into my long-term goals and plans." (M-15)*

Alongside education, *family-related migration* including marriage, reunification, and trailing spouse arrangements constitutes a significant pathway. These trajectories often involve asymmetrical employment outcomes, where one partner's career is prioritised while the other faces delays or difficulties entering the labour market:

*"Okay, I mostly came because of my husband… I was not wanting to move here because I know that it's difficult for me to get a job here." (M-8)*

*"So now you can say it was kind of voluntarily, forced volunteer." (M-8)*
*"He had a permanent position, so we came here and so I came here without a job. I left my job that was, um, I was established, and I was going somewhere. And I, I completely left that and moved here without work." (M-32)*

A third cluster of migration reasons is linked to *political instability, conflict, or human rights violations*, where migration is framed not as choice but as necessity:

*"Nobody likes to escape from his country unless he's enforced to go." (M-4)*

*"Everybody obligated to escape from that situation." (M-4)*

Finally, some participants describe *work-oriented migration*, particularly in sectors such as energy and engineering, where Norway is perceived as offering stronger labour demand and long-term prospects:

*"There's a shortage of opportunities in the UK for what I do… Whereas the oil sector in Norway… is booming." (M-28)*

### 3.2.2.2. Drive and trajectory: voluntary, involuntary, and constrained migration

While many participants initially categorise their migration as voluntary, the data reveal a continuum ranging from fully voluntary decisions to structurally constrained mobility shaped by economic, political, or relational pressures. Some migrants emphasised autonomy and deliberate planning:

> *"100%, nobody forced me to do anything." (M-3)*

Others articulate a more ambivalent position, describing migration as formally voluntary but strongly influenced by external constraints:

> *"Yes and no… I don't know if the push factor would be as strong had I come from a country that was more economically and socially stable." (M-17)*

> *"So now you can say it was kind of voluntarily, forced volunteer." (M-8)*

However, in cases involving conflict, economic hardship or authoritarian regimes, migration is described as fundamentally involuntary:

> *"Either you tolerate that hardship or you leave the country."* (M-4)

> *"In my country we were not economically stable at that time […] there was chaos at that time […] I had to go"* (M-21)

Our data shows that these distinctions have clear implications for employment. Migrants with planned, education-led trajectories often describe clearer pathways into work, while those arriving through family reunification or forced migration are more likely to encounter delayed labour market entry, deskilling, or occupational mismatch.

### 3.2.2.3. Choice of Norway: targeted, comparative, and contingent decisions

Moreover, the choice of Norway as a destination is shaped by a mix of targeted selection, comparative evaluation, and contingent opportunity. Some migrants describe systematic comparisons between countries:

> *"I did some research on the pros and cons between the US, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries." (M-3)*

> *"I did a Pros and Cons table with an Excel sheet." (M-3)*

Others frame Norway as one option among several, or as the country that responded first during application processes:

> *"It wasn't like this was my country of choice… it was the first one that replied." (M-17)*

Other participants were clear about their choice of Norway from the start:

> *"If I had to move, I would go for something that is what I consider the best. And Scandinavia is the best to me. So Norway is one of the best." (M-25)*
> *"The reason why I chose Norway was that it was economically good because we weren't going to pay fees […] I wanted to do something related to petroleum. And then based on my background research, I realized Norway is the second... producer in in Europe […] so here in terms of job prospect it was going to be good " (M-7)*

For our participants frequently cited pull factors include education without tuition fees (at the time[3]), work–life balance, safety, labour protections, and positive word-of-mouth narratives:

*"People speak about the country in a very good way… the education system, the work system, the working laws." (M-23)*

*"It's one of the most peaceful places on earth… salaries are good." (M-22)*

These perceptions shape expectations about employment and quality of life, sometimes leading to optimism, but also to later disappointment when labour market access proves more complex than anticipated.

### 3.2.2.4. Time in destination country and employment outcomes

Time spent in Norway plays a crucial role in shaping employment trajectories. Several participants describe extended periods between arrival, graduation, and stable employment:

*"I'm like, okay, I hope to find a job now. And that's taking a while." (M-18)*

Others emphasise eventual alignment between education and employment, particularly among those transitioning from student to skilled worker:

*"Where I am applying the skills and competencies that I got from the master's program." (M-14)*

In family-led migration pathways, time is often marked by delayed labour market participation, especially for accompanying partners:

*"She had to wait for about seven or eight months before she could work." (M-28)*

Overall, the data show that time functions as both a resource and a barrier: prolonged residence can enable language acquisition, credential recognition, and network-building, but it can also coincide with periods of uncertainty, underemployment, or dependency.

Hence, the Norwegian qualitative data demonstrate that labour migrants' migration patterns are multi-layered, sequential, and deeply consequential for employment outcomes. Education-led migration often provides the most structured pathway into skilled employment, while family-based and forced trajectories are more frequently associated with delayed or uneven labour market integration. Degrees of voluntariness, the logic behind choosing Norway, the sector of employment, and the amount of time spent in the destination country all shape how migrants navigate employment opportunities. Taken together, these findings underline that labour market outcomes cannot be understood without close attention to migration pathways, legal status transitions, and the temporal dimensions of settlement.

### 3.2.3. What are the characteristics of skill formation and employment of labour migrants? (RQ2)

This section addresses RQ2: What are the characteristics of skill formation and employment of labour migrants, focusing on how migrants' educational backgrounds, skill development trajectories, and experiences of skill recognition shape their employment outcomes in Norway. Across the qualitative material, migrants demonstrate high levels of formal education and professional experience, often acquired across multiple countries. However, their labour market integration is frequently shaped by uneven recognition of qualifications, segmented opportunities for skills development, and structural barriers related to language and credentialing. The analysis below is organised into four sub-sections: (1)

education and recognition of qualifications, (2) skills formation and development in the destination country, (3) vocational training and on-the-job learning, and (4) language skills and language training.

### 3.2.3.1. Education in origin and destination countries and recognition of qualifications

Our data show that most labour migrants possess substantial educational capital, often including bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees obtained in their home countries or abroad. Several respondents describe complex transnational education trajectories, where qualifications obtained outside Europe are treated differently from those acquired within European or Western systems. For some participants, qualifications obtained in non-European countries were not recognised or only partially recognised in Norway, requiring them to restart their education or pursue vocational training:

> "Actually, no. I don't know how, especially African. In particular Eritrea, our education is not formal, it's not informal. The system is confusing system in Eritrea. You know, somebody go as military and you study under the tree and nobody officially accept… Norway or some European, they don't accept foreign credit… they underestimate it." (M-4)

> "But I had quite a lot of problems in getting my documents approved because they kind of don't recognise all the degrees which is in India, for any other form of education than engineering. which I'm quite irritated and frustrated about." (M-8)

Others noted that obtaining official recognition of non-European qualifications could be a lengthy process:

> "Since I already have a master's from Norway, I didn't have to actually, like, use my Indian degrees here. So, I didn't personally get the chance to go through the recognition process. But I know that I have many, you know, like I have many people whom I know whose masters were recognized in Norway. But they had to go through a long, long process to get it recognized." (M-9)

> "It took some time for me to find out. And then it also took them almost a year to decide. And I paid a bunch of money for it. So that door got closed." (M-32)

Others explained that their qualifications from outside (Syria) and inside Europe (Cyprus) were recognised differently:

> "The one in Cyprus was accepted straight away… But to go into the university, I needed to… 60 credits… I tried [to get the degree from Syria approved] but it didn't work okay and then I was involved more in work." (M-23)

Participants working within regulated professions such as healthcare and education highlighted the difficulties of getting their professional qualifications recognised:

> "I come from a very well-known facility that trained me. And… It's a health care institute that also has a clinic, a college, a medical college. So… But it didn't matter. It had to be apples for apples. So the classes needed to look the same, be called the same, be the same level of credits. And they basically said you have to do all of it over again. In Norwegian." (M-32)

Several highly qualified respondents described forms of relational or organisational deskilling, where technical expertise was recognised and utilised, but opportunities for leadership, progression, and fuller integration into

workplace hierarchies were constrained. In these cases, migrants were positioned as technical specialists rather than as potential managers or decision-makers, often attributing this to cultural and communicative norms in the workplace. As one highly experienced professional in the oil industry explained:

> *"And I guess the other thing I could do, I could manage people. But I don't have the skills to do that here because it's cultural. And I'm quite happy not to do it. So it's something I've done a little bit of before. So I guess that limits my ability to progress a little bit further here." (M-28)*

Taken together, these accounts point to hierarchies not only of *credential recognition*, but also of *organisational inclusion*, where education and expertise may be formally recognised yet still translated into constrained career progression, shaping migrants' employment trajectories in different ways.

### 3.2.3.2. Skills formation and development in the destination country

Beyond formal education, migrants actively engage in skills formation in Norway, often through self-training, workplace learning, or additional education. Several respondents emphasised that maintaining employability required continuous upskilling, particularly in response to labour market demands. One participant described how limited recognition of prior skills pushed migrants to develop new competencies independently:

> *"You see people now switching to learn entirely different things that they studied back in school. Like I know someone … she has been applying for jobs and nothing is coming. […] So she decided to upgrade her skills and learn things concerning coding and concerning cloud management and database, all of that. And she was lucky to land a job." (M-13)*

Others highlighted how skills development occurred informally through work experience rather than structured training:

> *"At the university I had access, and I was able to do like a lot more of different techniques… Here it's more narrow, it's microbiology and analytical… But yeah, so I'm not a marine biologist. I'm more like a microbiologist." (M-2)*

These narratives show that while migrants often possess adaptable and transferable skills, the opportunity to deploy them depends heavily on institutional access, sectoral openness, and language requirements.

### 3.2.3.3. Vocational training, on-the-job training, and informal skill acquisition

Vocational training emerges as a key pathway for labour market entry, particularly for migrants whose formal education is not recognised. Some respondents described vocational education as a way to "start from scratch" despite previous qualifications:

> *"The vocational training was like starting from the scratch. That's why I started because they even sometimes say no, leave these things and start here school." (M-4)*

On-the-job training and experiential learning were also common, especially in sectors such as hospitality, cleaning, and construction:

*"This vocational school was part of my training, especially this construction… [for] three years… Then I joined it, that bachelor's degree." (M-4)*

Highly skilled respondents in engineering and energy sectors reported fewer barriers to skill utilisation, often noting labour shortages:

*"I think that there is skill shortage… especially in the oil and gas industry in Norway." (M-15)*

This contrast highlights sectoral segmentation, where certain industries facilitate skill utilisation while others confine migrants to low-skilled roles regardless of qualifications.

### 3.2.3.4. Language skills and language training

Language proficiency consistently emerges as a central structuring factor shaping both skill recognition and employment outcomes. While many migrants possessed strong English skills, Norwegian language requirements often limited access to skilled employment. Several respondents described the cost and accessibility of language training as a barrier, pointing to restrictions regarding who was eligible:

*"Language programs in Norway are too expensive… I decided that I will not learn language from the Læringssenter because it was too expensive for me." (M-8)*

*"When we first settled here, I felt it was important to kind of get into the language. And so we applied straight away to the learning center that was right across the street from us. [...] We were rejected a place because we weren't refugees or asylum seekers. We were paying customers. So we didn't get a spot until the next fall. So it was 10 months." (M-32)*

Others emphasised that language, rather than skill level, was the decisive factor in employment or in-house promotions:

*"My degree is overqualified for this job…they put out job roles in-house. You could apply for it, but when you go through the requirements also, the language is a big thing. [...] So the language is a very big part of integrating." (M-13)*

Even when Norwegian was not required for daily tasks, it shaped hiring decisions and workplace inclusion:

*"All the jobs I've had have not required me speaking Norwegian… Whenever you apply for a job, the ads always say you must be good at Norwegian … then you get there and it's like, not a word of Norwegian spoken … Why is it on [the ad]?" (M-1)*

These accounts show that language operates not only as a communicative tool but as a *gatekeeping mechanism*, reinforcing segmented labour market outcomes. Taken together, the findings indicate that labour migrants' skill formation and employment trajectories in Norway are characterised by a structural decoupling between skills acquisition and skills utilisation. While migrants often enter the destination country with substantial educational qualifications and professional experience, frequently accumulated across multiple national contexts, the translation of these skills into appropriate employment is uneven and highly conditional.

Regarding characteristics of skill formation and employment of labour migrants within the qualitative data we observe three analytical patterns as emerging. First, *the geography of skill legitimacy* plays a decisive role:

qualifications obtained in European or Western institutions are more readily recognised and activated in the labour market, while the recognition process of education and training acquired in non-European contexts is less straightforward. This produces differentiated pathways in which some migrants are able to "continue" their professional trajectories, while others are required to restart them through retraining, vocational education or low-skilled work. Second, *skills formation in the destination country* functions as a strategic or compensatory mechanism rather than a linear progression. Migrants engage in additional training, self-learning, vocational education, and on-the-job skill development not primarily as advancement, but as a way to overcome institutional barriers to recognition. In this sense, skills development in Norway often serves to *re-legitimate* existing competencies rather than to build entirely new ones. Third, *language operates as a cross-cutting gatekeeping mechanism*, shaping both access to employment and the valuation of skills, even in positions where Norwegian is not strictly required for task performance. Language proficiency here thus functions less as a technical requirement and more as a symbolic marker of employability, belonging, and trustworthiness within the labour market. Overall, these dynamics suggest that labour migrants' employment outcomes are not determined by skills alone, but by the institutional conditions under which skills are recognised, validated, and decided usable. The findings highlight how skill formation is deeply embedded in broader regimes of credential recognition, linguistic norms, and sectoral labour demand, producing stratified employment trajectories despite high levels of human capital among migrants.

### 3.2.4. What are the perceptions of migrant workers on social justice? (RQ3)

This section examines how migrant workers perceive social *justice* in relation to work conditions, employment security, social participation, and everyday life in Norway. Rather than treating justice solely as a matter of formal rights or welfare provision, our participants articulate justice through *lived experiences of fairness*, *recognition*, *security*, *belonging*, and the *ability to make use of their skills and efforts*. These perceptions are shaped by structural constraints, institutional practices, and cultural norms encountered in both the labour market and wider society.

#### 3.2.4.1. Justice, fairness, and precarity in employment

Across sectors, migrants frequently associate perceptions of injustice with *employment precarity*, particularly temporary contracts, underemployment, and informal or semi-formal work arrangements. Several participants describe short-term contracts that allow employers to easily terminate employment, creating insecurity and fear of dismissal:

> *"They were looking for people because it was like hot season summer… they had like three-month contract… after those three months of course business is not that busy… so since they have three months contract, they can just fire people easily." (M-24)*

They describe contractual arrangements that formally guarantee low hours while requiring substantially more work in practice, particularly in service sectors:

> *"Sometimes your contract can be only like 20%, but you actually maybe work 80%... if you get sick and your contract is only like 20%, they will only pay you 20%." (M-24)*

Highly educated migrants also report deskilling and labour market segmentation, where qualifications are not recognised or cannot be used due to language requirements or lack of local experience:

> *"Most of African background students who come there after they graduate, they don't work on their field. Yeah, they do what they are given. They work what they are allowed to work. I saw someone who had a PhD, they were doing delivery work." (M-4)*

Perceptions of injustice are reinforced by recruitment practices that migrants experience as *exclusionary*, particularly when repeated applications yield no response:

> *"Daily I send my CV… but I don't get response most of the time… sometimes even if you ask without salary, they don't accept." (M-4)*

> *"I applied to nearly 50 positions, for nearly 50 positions … But I made it to only three interviews." (M-25)*

Together, these accounts show that justice at work is perceived not only in relation to wages or legal protections, but through stability, access, and the ability to progress.

### 3.2.4.2. Recognition, effort, and unequal standards

Many migrants describe a perception that equal performance is not sufficient, and that they must work harder than Norwegian colleagues to achieve similar recognition or security. This is particularly evident among highly skilled and academic migrants:

> *"It's just us foreigners that works more… publishing at the same level with others like Norwegians won't be enough, you need to make a difference." (M-26)*

This perceived need to "prove oneself" is framed as a structural condition rather than an individual choice:

> *"We have to prove ourselves. So, it is kind of you are proving yourself and you are a part of the Norwegian society," (M-8)*

Language emerges as a key mechanism shaping perceptions of fairness. Migrants acknowledge the importance of Norwegian, but often experience language requirements as disproportionate barriers, especially when skills could otherwise be utilised:

> *"If you don't speak perfectly the language… even though your skill is at a high level… you may face problems." (M-4)*

At the same time, some migrants recognise differentiated opportunities across sectors, noting that language barriers matter less in technical fields:

> *"For engineering… numbers are the language." (M-15)*

These dynamics contribute to a perception that justice is unevenly distributed across occupations and sectors, even within the same labour market.

### 3.2.4.3. *Social justice beyond work: belonging, way of life, and access to justice*

Perceptions of social justice extend beyond employment into social inclusion, everyday interactions, and access to remedies when things go wrong. Many migrants describe Norwegian society as safe and well-organised, while simultaneously experiencing emotional distance and social exclusion:

> *"I don't really get the chance to be with Norwegians… I think I have a way to go." (M-9)*

> *"I have tried quite hard to be with the Norwegians that I'm with. But it isn't easy. It isn't. And I feel like the ones that are most accepting to immigrants are the ones that have either been immigrants themselves or have immigrant families. Or have really travelled. And had exposure." (M-32)*

Several participants describe cultural distance as affecting their sense of belonging:

> *"It's kind of hard to be a part of these people (Norwegians)… they are kind of cold people… yeah I don't know I'm not a part of these people (Norwegians)…" (M-22)*

Work–life balance is often cited as a positive feature of life in Norway, but migrants also note that this balance is unequally accessible, especially for those in low-paid or precarious positions:

> *"For Africans we don't have any vacation… when you miss a certain period of time you need to do a catch up which is not easy." (M-6)*

When experiencing unfair treatment, some migrants indicated refraining from seeking formal justice due to the emotional and time-related costs involved:

> *"It'll cost me so much trouble if I have to go through the whole process to complain… not everybody got that time or energy." (M-24)*

This leads many to prioritise coping strategies over formal claims-making, reinforcing feelings of limited agency despite the presence of legal protections.

Overall, migrant workers' perceptions of social justice are shaped by a tension between strong formal systems and uneven lived experiences. While Norway is widely recognised for its welfare state, labour regulations, and quality of life, migrants' accounts reveal persistent gaps related to employment precarity, recognition of skills, language regimes, and social inclusion. Social justice, as perceived by migrants, is therefore not reducible to institutional design alone, but depends on whether formal equality translates into everyday security, dignity, and belonging. These findings highlight the importance of addressing not only structural barriers, but also the cumulative emotional and temporal costs migrants face when navigating work, society, and access to justice.

### 3.2.5. Satisfaction with the decision to migrate and future plans

This section examines labour migrants' satisfaction with the decision to migrate, as well as their future plans, including considerations of return migration, circular mobility, and long-term settlement. Migrants' reflections reveal that satisfaction is rarely framed as a simple positive or negative assessment. Instead, it emerges as contextual, relational, and conditional, shaped by employment opportunities, family situations, life-course stage, and comparisons between Norway, the country of origin, and other potential destinations.

### 3.2.5.1. Satisfaction with the decision to migrate, expectations and outcomes

Many migrants express overall satisfaction with their decision to migrate, particularly when comparing Norway to their countries of origin in terms of safety, infrastructure, welfare systems, and quality of life. For some, the decision is described as clearly justified and anchored in the present:

> "My life is here now… I love how it is in Norway. I think it's a very beautiful country… more developed and it's safer and more opportunities." (M-18)

Others emphasise employment-related outcomes, highlighting better labour protections and work–life balance compared to previous destinations:

> "The working environment is so much better here in Norway… you have better rights. You can take more vacation. It's more flexible to work." (M-31)

At the same time, satisfaction is often qualified or ambivalent, especially among migrants whose skills are underutilised or whose expectations regarding career progression have not been fully met:

> "I'm happy… but it's really hard actually." (M-27)

For several respondents, satisfaction is framed less in terms of professional fulfilment and more in relation to stability, safety, and personal autonomy, particularly when compared to political, economic, or social constraints in origin countries.

### 3.2.5.2. Considering return migration: conditions, constraints, and possibilities

Return migration is widely considered across the sample, but rarely as an immediate or unconditional plan. Instead, migrants articulate conditional, delayed, or partial return scenarios. Some respondents clearly distinguish between visiting and returning permanently:

> "Just for visiting, not for living. Because… my life is here now." (M-18)

Others express a strong emotional attachment to their home country, while recognising that return is constrained by family, employment, or social conditions:

> "I always consider going back to Serbia… I don't think this will be my final destination… but I don't think what I want to do exists there." (M-17)

Family responsibilities play a central role in shaping return considerations, particularly care obligations toward parents or children:

> "I will go back to India when my parents are getting old." (M-9)

In some cases, return is linked to structural vulnerability, especially for female migrants whose legal or economic dependence constrains their choices:

> "The government… puts women migrants in a more vulnerable position… they will rely on their husband even more." (M-24)

### 3.2.5.3. Circular and transnational orientations: skills, identity, and life course

A prominent pattern across the interviews is the articulation of circular or transnational future, rather than permanent settlement or definitive return. Many migrants express a desire to transfer skills, knowledge, and experience gained in Norway back to their countries of origin at a later stage:

> "If I ever consider going back… it's to apply the knowledge I've gathered here… in the industries, in the educational sector." (M-14)

Others imagine return as a life-stage decision, often associated with retirement or later life:

> "Maybe when I'm older… run away from the cold." (M-13)

At the same time, several migrants describe a sense of in-betweenness, where neither Norway nor the country of origin is perceived as a complete or final home:

> "I don't think I fully would fit if I were to go back… I function in a different language." (M-17)

This reflects how migration decisions and future-plans are embedded in ongoing identity negotiations, rather than fixed endpoints.

Overall, migrants' satisfaction with the decision to migrate is best understood as *situated and dynamic*, rather than absolute. While many express appreciation for safety, welfare, and quality of life in Norway, this satisfaction can also coexist with career frustrations, emotional ties to home countries, and uncertainty about long-term belonging. Future-plans are similarly characterised by conditionality and flexibility, with return migration imagined not as a simple reversal of migration, but as part of a circular, transnational, and life-course–dependent strategy. These findings highlight that migration decisions are continuously reassessed over time, shaped by changing personal circumstances, labour market opportunities, and broader social conditions.

## 4. Discussion

### 4.1. Quantitative study - reflections against the overall situation in Norway

The quantitative results paint a picture that is broadly consistent with the demographic and structural migration patterns described in the introduction, yet they also reveal several distinct nuances that help deepen the understanding of labour migrants' trajectories in Norway.

A first clear parallel is the dominance of *Asian and non-EU European migrants* in the sample - together over 70% - which mirrors the national landscape described in the introduction where these two regions constitute some of the largest growing migrant groups. This alignment suggests that the survey captures, to a significant extent, the demographic reality of labour aged and long settled migrants in Norway. Due to the informant selection criteria and due recruitment, our findings do not compare to the national statistics, where EU27 migrants, especially from Poland and Lithuania play a major role.

A second strong connection arises around *length of stay.* The introduction highlighted that more than half of all migrants in Norway have resided in the country for over ten years; the survey mirrors this, with 57% reporting such long term residency. This longevity plays a defining role in many of the observed outcomes: higher diploma recognition rates for earlier arrivals, greater occupational stability, stronger communication skills, and more pronounced feelings of workplace justice. Migrants with shorter stays report more under skilling and training needs, consistent with national patterns of delayed labour-market integration among newcomers, particularly those arriving for family or protection reasons.

Patterns *in reasons for migration* also resonate with the broad historical trajectories presented in the introduction. The survey shows a mix of economic, family related, motivational, and forced migration drivers. In Norway more broadly, the introduction documented distinct migration "waves": early labour migration (South Asian, 1970s), conflict driven arrivals (Somalia, Eritrea, Syria, Ukraine), and the more recent prominence of family and work mobility. The sample echoes this mix: younger migrants and short-term residents often report education and temporary or long-term work motives, consistent with contemporary labour and educational mobility; while older migrants and long-term residents cite war, persecution, and discrimination - aligning with the older refugee cohorts described nationally. The gendered patterns - women emphasising family and men emphasising persecution or discrimination - also reflect known gendered pathways discussed in the introduction, where male dominated channels (e.g., early asylum migration) complemented female dominated ones (family reunification or care related migration).

The *high education levels* in the sample (with over 40% holding a master's degree and a doubling of PhDs after arrival) stand in partial contrast to the national distribution of migrants' education described in the introduction, where large groups - particularly Poles, Lithuanians, Somalis, Eritreans - tend to have upper secondary or lower levels. This suggests that the survey captures a highly educated subsection of migrants, many working in professional, technical or scientific roles (47% professionals). This overrepresentation helps explain the relatively high rates of perceived competency (91%) and strong access to workplace relevant training (77%). It also aligns with structural developments discussed in the introduction - namely the increased demand for highly skilled labour, the rise of Norway's knowledge intensive sectors, and the expansion of pathways for educated labour migrants.

At the same time, the data reveal persistent challenges reminiscent of those highlighted nationally. Even among this relatively highly educated group, *skill mismatch remains visible*: 27% report being under skilled for their job and 30% believe they are over skilled. This mirrors the introduction's discussion of "considerable" skill mismatch in Norway (OECD), especially in a labour market where certification requirements and regulated professions create barriers for migrants. The survey's finding that shorter stay migrants are both more over skilled and more likely to require additional training parallels national documentation that newcomers often find themselves temporarily in positions below their qualifications until recognition processes, language proficiency, or regulatory hurdles are resolved.

The *recognition of qualifications* also mirrors national structures. Diplomas were fully recognized for 41% and partially for 27%, with recognition being most common among younger and more recently arrived migrants. This matches the introduction's note on recent policy improvements (e.g., faster assessment pathways, automatic recognition mechanisms) as well as the continued barriers faced by migrants from certain regions. The finding that migrants from non-EU Europe had the lowest rate of full recognition (37%) aligns with known inconsistencies in recognition frameworks for qualifications from Eastern Europe or former Soviet republics.

Employment outcomes also tie closely to the national migration picture. The very high employment rate of 86% in the sample exceeds national averages but is not surprising given the high education levels and long residency. As in the introduction, employment is strongly stratified by age and length of stay, but not by gender or continent. The strong presence of migrants in *health, social work, education, professional and scientific sectors* echoes the introduction's finding that these are the largest and most migrant dependent sectors nationally. Still, the fact that 38% of migrants state that employers did *nothing* to support adaptation evidences persistent inclusion gaps - even in sectors that rely heavily on migrant labour.

Finally, *perceptions of social justice* in the survey (63–75% positive on fairness and transparency at work) complement the introduction's emphasis on Norway's strong institutional focus on equality and anti-discrimination. Yet the share (10–23%) who disagreed on justice related items, and the notable portion reporting subtle or structural discrimination in open comments, resonate with the national literature on continued inequalities in hiring, advancement, and recognition.

### 4.2. Qualitative study

The conclusions presented in this section are grounded in analytically identified patterns and tendencies observed across the qualitative material, rather than intended as exhaustive or universally generalisable claims about all labour migrants in Norway. Drawing on in-depth interviews, the analysis illuminates key dynamics shaping migration trajectories, skill use, and perceptions of social justice among the participants in this study. These findings should therefore be understood as empirically grounded analytical insights that highlight structural mechanisms and lived experiences evident in the data, while recognising the diversity of migrant situations and pathways beyond the cases examined here.

Bringing together the findings across migration pathways (RQ1), skills and employment trajectories (RQ2), social justice perceptions (RQ3), and future orientations, the qualitative analysis reveals a recursive integration dynamic that can be conceptualised as an *Integration Loop*. This loop captures how labour migrants' efforts to integrate are shaped by the interaction between institutional structures, labour market conditions, and emotional experiences over time. At the entry point of the loop lies hope and expectations, often linked to education-led migration, professional aspirations, and

narratives of Norway as a fair, secure, and opportunity-rich society. These expectations are reinforced by strong welfare institutions, labour protections, and comparative evaluations vis-à-vis countries of origin or previous destinations. However, as migrants attempt to translate these expectations into employment and recognition,

they frequently encounter language barriers and credential recognition challenges, which limit access to skilled work and delay labour market entry. As illustrated in Figure 28, labour migrants' experiences of inclusion and social justice unfold through a cyclical integration loop. Differential recognition of skills and qualifications sits at the centre of the process, shaping labour market access, institutional interactions, emotional experiences, and coping strategies. Migrants' repeated efforts to adapt and reintegrate reflect resilience and agency but also highlight how structural barriers can sustain unequal outcomes despite formal inclusion.



**Figure 28. The Integration Loop: How skill recognition shapes migrants' experiences of inclusion and justice**

These barriers contribute to skills being only partially recognised or unevenly mobilised, leading to experiences ranging from deskilling and occupational mismatch to constrained career progression and limited access to leadership roles. As documented across sectors, this results in partial or segmented labour market inclusion, where migrants are present in employment but excluded from positions corresponding with their qualifications and experience. Over time, this exclusion produces institutional frustration, particularly in interactions with employment services and support structures that migrants perceive as difficult to navigate, slow to respond, or insufficiently tailored to their profiles.

In response, many migrants turn toward informal networks, including co-ethnic communities, peer groups, and self-organised strategies, as alternative pathways to employment, information, and emotional support. While these networks play a crucial compensatory role, they also reinforce segmented integration trajectories, often keeping migrants within specific sectors or forms of employment. This phase of the loop is accompanied by a significant emotional toll, characterised by fatigue, frustration, uncertainty, and in some cases resignation – yet also by *resilience, adaptability, and*

*continued effort*. Crucially, the loop does not end in disengagement. Instead, migrants frequently reinvest hope and recalibrated expectations, either by pursuing additional education, accepting temporary compromises, or reorienting future-plans toward conditional settlement, circular migration, or eventual return. In this way, integration emerges not as a linear process with a clear endpoint, but as a cyclical and uneven trajectory, marked by repeated attempts to align skills, recognition, and belonging within existing structural constraints.

Conceptualising integration as a *loop* rather than a pathway helps to explain why formal inclusion through residence, employment, or welfare access does not necessarily translate into substantive integration or perceived social justice. The findings show that integration is sustained through continuous emotional, social, and practical labour by migrants themselves, while structural barriers remain largely intact. *The Integration Loop* thus highlights the need to shift analytical and policy attention from individual adaptation alone toward the institutional conditions that repeatedly redirect migrants back into cycles of underutilisation, precarity, and recalibrated hope.

### 4.3. Joint discussion of the qualitative and quantitative findings

The results presented in this study illuminate a complex landscape of labour migration to Norway, one that resonates strongly with the broader demographic and policy context outlined in the introduction part. Norway's transition from a country of emigration to one increasingly shaped by inflows of diverse migrant groups provides an important backdrop for understanding the patterns observed in the quantitative and qualitative findings. The data highlight how migrants' reasons for moving - ranging from personal aspirations to family reunification, economic crises, and forced displacement - map onto the wider systemic trends in Norwegian migration, where work, family, and protection remain the dominant entry categories. The diversity of motivations seen in the sample echoes national patterns in which regional differences, gendered migration flows, and global crises shape who arrives and under what conditions.

Across the results, migration trajectories emerge as a central explanatory factor for labour market integration. Migrants arriving for education or planned long-term work generally accessed clearer pathways into employment, aligning with national evidence that work migrants integrate fastest, while those arriving under forced or family-related circumstances often confront slower, more fragmented transitions. Challenges around qualifications recognition - persistent nationally despite recent reforms - were particularly evident among long-term residents and those from non-European countries (the latter in the qualitative, but not in the quantitative study), contributing to underutilisation of skills and occupational downgrading. This reflects well-documented structural barriers in Norway, where institutional gatekeeping in regulated professions and uneven assessment practices continue to delimit equal participation for many migrants.

Despite these constraints, employment rates in the sample were strikingly high at 86%, suggesting strong labour market demand and a capacity for migrants to secure work even when skills mismatch persists. Migrants in Norway for 6–10 years were most likely to be employed, echoing the broader national trend where time in the country increases access to stable employment. Yet, employment quality varied markedly. Many migrants reported feeling competent and settled in their roles. Nearly half considered their current job well matched to their prior education. Parallelly, a substantial minority experienced being either over-skilled (30%) or under-skilled (27%), underscoring how integration is not merely about

accessing work but accessing *appropriate* work. These findings are consistent with national concerns about skill waste and labour segmentation, particularly for non-EU migrants and those in low-wage sectors.

Perceptions of social justice and discrimination further contextualise these structural patterns, while revealing important nuances. While most respondents felt safe, informed, and treated fairly at work, concerns about discrimination – while generally low – high-risk jobs, or unequal expectations persisted for specific groups, especially younger migrants, short-term residents, and those from outside Europe. Such experiences mirror broader research showing that formal rights frameworks do not always protect migrants from subtle forms of exclusion, cultural distance, or unequal treatment. Social participation patterns – while on moderate levels, especially among long term residents, yet stronger among younger, more educated, and recently arrived migrants – also reflect the ambivalence of integration processes: opportunities for engagement exist, yet belonging is unevenly distributed and often shaped by language, networks, and time.

The quantitative findings depict a resilient migrant population that succeeds in entering employment despite structural constraints, but also one whose skills are not fully utilised and whose experiences of justice, belonging, and participation vary across demographic lines. Overall, the findings from the two WP4 studies underscore that labour migration in Norway is characterised by *high human capital, strong labour market attachment, but persistent structural barriers.* Migration motivations and individual trajectories intersect with institutional frameworks governing skill recognition, employment practices, and social inclusion. While Norway's welfare model and labour market institutions offer protection and opportunities, they also produce stratified outcomes, reinforcing the need – already highlighted in the introduction – to view integration not as a uniform process but as a differentiated and evolving negotiation between migrants and the systems they encounter.

## 5. Conclusion and implications

### 5.1. Quantitative study

Several conclusions can be drawn from the quantitative findings.

*Qualifications/skills recognition and early matching are decisive for long run outcomes.* High employment coexists with uneven diploma recognition and early skills mismatch; cohorts arriving earlier are disadvantaged relative to more recent arrivals, indicating scope for retroactive recognition and re-assessment pathways.

*Entry route shapes opportunity structure.* Migration for temporary work is associated with downstream mismatches, while conflict driven migration faces recognition hurdles; both pathways require tailored supports to prevent durable occupational downgrading.

*Workplace learning is a powerful equalizer – but access is uneven.* Structured onboarding and training concentrate in large organizations; extending comparable supports to SMEs could accelerate convergence in skills fit, especially during the first years after arrival.

*Justice perceptions are broadly positive, yet segmentation persists*. Men and lower educated migrants are more exposed to high-risk jobs; discrimination is limited overall but clusters by age, origin and recency of arrival, peaking among 35–44-year-olds and some Asian origin groups.

*Social engagement declines with tenure, masking latent barriers*. As social and rights seeking participation falls among long stay migrants, the high overall employment may obscure stalled progression; mid-career monitoring and inclusive advancement policies are warranted.

## 5.2. Qualitative study

The qualitative findings, taken together, point to a recursive integration dynamic, which can be conceptualised as an Integration Loop. Migration pathways (RQ1) shape access to skills recognition and employment opportunities (RQ2), which in turn condition migrants' perceptions of fairness, security, and belonging (RQ3). Limited recognition of skills and language-based gatekeeping often lead to segmented labour market inclusion, producing experiences of precarity, frustration, and emotional strain. In response, migrants invest in additional training, adapt expectations, and mobilise informal networks, thereby re-entering the integration process with recalibrated strategies and hopes. Integration thus emerges not as a linear progression toward stability, but as a cyclical and uneven process sustained by migrants' continuous effort within relatively stable institutional constraints. This loop helps explain why formal inclusion in employment and welfare systems does not necessarily result in substantive integration or perceived social justice in the Norwegian context.

## 5.3. Joint conclusions from the quantitative and qualitative study

Integrating the quantitative and qualitative findings, a more textured and dynamic picture of labour migrants' pathways and experiences emerges. The quantitative data show a long-established and diverse migrant population, with 57% having lived in Norway for more than 10 years. The qualitative material reinforces that migration to Norway is rarely linear: instead, it consists of evolving life course trajectories shaped by education, family responsibilities, political instability, labour market conditions, and the institutional frameworks migrants must navigate. Migrants who arrive with planned, education-led or work-led strategies often move through clearer pathways into skilled employment, whereas those coming through family-based or forced migration face more delayed or fragmented routes. These patterns mirror the national landscape described in the introduction, where migration category remains a strong determinant of labour market outcomes in Norway. In this section we first present the overall picture emerging from the quantitative and qualitative studies in WP4. After that we make conclusions concerning, on the one hand, the strengths of Norwegian working life and labour market, and on the other hand, the tensions and challenges in working life, labour market, and immigration policy. Table 29 introduces the latter two type of observations to be elaborated later in this section. Finally, and to summarize, at the end of this section we illustrate, what we call as a Migration–Skills–Opportunity Funnel (MSOF), showing where the Norwegian system supports or filters migrant integration.

**Table 29 Emerging strengths and challenges of Norwegian working life, in the labour market and immigration policy** (Source: the authors of this report)

| Strengths of Norwegian working life and labour market | Challenges in working life, labour market, and immigration policy |
|---|---|
| High employment levels and upward educational mobility<br><br>Strong Occupational Safety norms and procedural justice<br><br>Opportunities for a stable settlement and long-term integration<br><br>Positive experiences of autonomy and well being | Skill underutilization and persistent mismatch<br><br>Unequal access to skills/credential recognition<br><br>Structural gatekeeping via language<br><br>Sectoral segmentation<br><br>Discrimination and subtle exclusion<br><br>Policy incoherences and shifting regimes |

### 5.3.1. A mature, diverse migration landscape with uneven integration outcomes

The findings demonstrate that skill formation in Norway often functions not primarily as a pathway to upward mobility, but as a compensatory mechanism for overcoming barriers to credential recognition and labour market access. Many migrants enrol in additional education or vocational programmes primarily to counteract deskilling or institutional misrecognition of non-European qualifications. The qualitative insights add depth by showing how these structural conditions shape migrants' sense of fairness and belonging: being required to repeatedly demonstrate competence, facing language related gatekeeping, or occupying roles far below one's skill level contribute to feelings of injustice even when formal protections appear strong.

The combined evidence highlights that social justice for migrants is experienced relationally - through interactions with employers, recognition bodies, colleagues, and community networks - rather than solely through legal rights or occupational safety regulations. Migrants often evaluate justice not simply by whether discrimination occurs, but by whether they feel valued, included, and able to participate on equal footing. The mismatch between strong legal frameworks and uneven everyday experiences echoes longstanding findings in Norwegian migration research concerning structural inequalities, occupational segmentation, and limited recognition of foreign competencies.

Both data together underscore how time in Norway shapes not only employment and skills development, but also subjective experiences of justice, social integration, and agency. While longer stays improve occupational safety knowledge, job security, and communication abilities, they also correspond with reduced participation in social and civic activities - suggesting that integration is a shifting process, influenced by life course stages, work demands, and evolving expectations.

Our findings affirm that labour migrants in Norway contribute substantial skills and labour across key sectors but continue to navigate a stratified landscape where institutional gatekeeping, skills mismatch, and social distance shape their opportunities and lived experiences. Strengthening mechanisms of skills/qualifications recognition, workplace inclusion, and social participation would therefore be essential steps toward realising the full potential of Norway's diverse migrant workforce.

Both data sources converge on the idea that Norway has a comparatively solid institutional framework for managing migration - free movement in the Nordic/EU/EEA zone, a structured skilled-worker regime, and an extensive welfare-state–based introduction system for refugees. However, they also indicate that institutional complexity, together with strict language requirements, credential recognition barriers, and labour market segmentation, limits equal participation.

### 5.3.2. Strengths of Norwegian working life and labour market

*High employment levels and upward educational mobility.* The quantitative findings showed that 86% of migrants were employed, and the proportion holding master's or PhD degrees had increased substantially after arrival. Qualitatively, many described Norway as enabling professional growth through further education, access to welfare-state services, and job security.

*Strong occupational safety norms and procedural justice.* Across the quantitative sample, majorities reported feeling adequately informed about safety, fairly evaluated, and comfortable expressing their views at work. In the qualitative accounts, the Norwegian workplace was described as structured, predictable, rules-based, and generally fair.

*Opportunities for stable settlement and long-term integration.* The long average residence time, high citizenship acquisition in some groups, and the large numbers engaged in local associations indicate deep-rooted integration trajectories.

*Positive experiences of autonomy and well-being.* Qualitative findings showed that migrants value work–life balance, predictability, and social welfare protections – features that may help to explain why circular migration interest was low.

### 5.3.3. Tensions in working life, labour market, and immigration policy

*Skill underutilisation and persistent mismatch.* A central empirical pattern was *overqualification and deskilling*, especially for migrants from outside Europe (e.g. Africa), of non-Western and non-EU Europe origin. Although 91% felt competent at work, only half perceived job-education alignment. This aligns with qualitative material describing the need to "start from scratch", pursue additional education, or remain blocked from regulated professions.

*Unequal access to credential recognition.* Diploma recognition is both stratified and time-sensitive: recent arrivals and highly educated individuals fared better, while older migrants and those from non-EU regions had faced the greatest obstacles. Qualitative interviews described the emotional and financial cost of repeated testing, required Norwegian credentials, and unclear pathways.

*Structural gatekeeping via language.* While almost all respondents reported good workplace communication skills, language proficiency was cited qualitatively as the primary gatekeeper for both employment and advancement – particularly in healthcare, education, public sector roles, and managerial tracks.

*Sectoral segmentation.* Migrants were heavily concentrated in healthcare, retail, hospitality, cleaning, and construction. Qualitative interviews highlighted challenges such as: limited upward mobility, exposure to stricter monitoring or informal hierarchies, and employer stereotypes about "migrant skills".

*Discrimination and subtle exclusion.* While many did not report overt discrimination, qualitative data surfaced patterns of implicit bias, stereotyping, and unequal recruitment practices, forcing migrants to "prove themselves" repeatedly.

*Policy incoherencies and shifting regimes.* The introduction's historical overview and recent policy changes aligned with frustrations emerging from the qualitative data: a tightening asylum regime, high income thresholds for family migration, tuitions for non-EU students, restricted pathways from temporary to permanent residence.

Migrants perceived these changes as signals of conditional belonging.

### 5.3.4. Migration–Skills–Opportunity Funnel (MSOF)

Finally, and as an illustrated summary, we present a figure which portrays the "Migration–Skills–Opportunity Funnel" (MSOF), showing where the Norwegian system supports or filters migrant integration (Figure 29). The figure presents the stages in an integration process from the migration motives all the way to long-term integration. At each stage, the coloured arrows carry a particular meaning. Green arrows indicate where strong institutional support is available (e.g., safety standards, accessible further education). Yellow areas mark partial success (e.g., job finding, general employability), and the red ones bottlenecks (e.g., skills/credential recognition, regulated professions, discrimination, language barriers).



**Figure 29 Migration–Skills–Opportunity Funnel (Source: The authors of this report)**

While related projects, such as Link4Skills, analyse macro-level skill shortages, labour market segmentation, and AI-driven shifts in demand, our concept MSOF proposes a systemic, yet processual perspective. Rather than modelling labour supply–demand equilibria, MSOF captures how institutional recognition systems, credential regimes, workplace hierarchies, migration status, and perceptions of justice interact over time to narrow or expand migrants' opportunities across their migration–employment trajectories.

## 5.4. Implications

Based on the findings we propose the following implications in regards key issues/domains.

*For labour market functioning.* Norway faces persistent labour shortages, especially in VET fields (healthcare, mechanical, technical trades). Migrant underutilisation represents a structural inefficiency: the system imports high-educated labour but places many in jobs below their qualifications.

*For social justice and welfare-state legitimacy.* Unequal access to stable, meaningful employment can challenge perceptions of fairness. Migrant deskilling and discrimination undermine the legitimacy of integration policies rooted in egalitarianism.

*For long-term integration and demographics.* Given Norway's ageing population, higher retirement rates, and long-term dependency on migration, poor skill use is likely to exacerbate future labour shortages while diminishing immigrants' economic contributions.

*For trust, belonging, and retention.* Qualitative findings showed that while migrants generally appreciate Norwegian society, many felt socially distanced or "outsiders". If opportunities for progression remain limited, future return or onward migration may rise among skilled groups.

## 5.5. Recommendations and suggestions

The quantitative and qualitative study in WP4 pictures a Norwegian migration regime that is *high-capacity and high-quality, yet highly demanding* – producing strong employment but also unnecessary barriers to full skill utilization and equal opportunity. Addressing language, credential recognition, sectoral mobility, and discrimination will be central to advancing both labour-market efficiency and social justice. Below we propose several recommendations and suggestions, first concerning education, labour market, and migration policy, and thereafter for research.

**Recommendations for education, labour market, and migration policy**

*Strengthen and streamline credential recognition*

- Expand automatic and fast-track recognition for more countries and professions.
- Increase support for bridging programs, particularly in healthcare, engineering, and education.
- Improve transparency in recognition decisions and reduce administrative burden.

*Rethink Norwegian language requirements*

- Introduce phased language requirements allowing earlier labour-market entry with structured workplace language training.
- Widen subsidies for industry-specific Norwegian courses (e.g., for IT, engineering, healthcare).

*Build pathways out of low-skilled sectors*

- Create structured mobility programs enabling cleaners, hospitality workers, and transport workers to gain formal qualifications.
- Incentivize /continue to encourage and support employers to invest in skill development and internal promotion schemes for migrant workers.

*Reform migration pathways for non-EU skilled workers*

- Widen the skilled-worker channel and review unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles.
- Monitor salary thresholds to avoid excluding mid-skilled but needed professions (care, VET trades).
- Reassess tuition fees for non-EU/EEA students to ensure Norway does not lose global talent pipelines.

*Strengthen anti-discrimination enforcement*

- Enhance monitoring of recruitment processes.
- Encourage anonymised job applications in public (and private?) sector hiring.
- Expand support for diversity and inclusion initiatives at company level.

**Suggestions for further research**

*Employer-side analyses* to investigate hiring practices, expectations about "Norwegian language" versus actual job requirements, and sector-specific biases.

*Sectoral case studies,* especially in health, education, construction, ICT, and cleaning - examining mobility, workplace cultures, and structural barriers.

*Comparative migration-regime analysis* to study how Norway's recent policy changes (tuition fees, tightened protection, income thresholds) affect flows and integration compared to neighbouring countries.

*Social cohesion and everyday inclusion* to explore how perceptions of belonging vary by migration motive, gender, continent, and profession; examine how local communities facilitate or hinder inclusion.

*Underrepresented populations* - such qualitative research could deepen our understanding on low-educated migrants, temporary labour migrants, and those outside formal employment structures.

*Longitudinal skill trajectory studies* (while expensive to carry out) could track migrants over 10–15 years to understand how education, recognition, language learning, and labour-market transitions interact over time.

*A follow-up study of the recently revised Introduction Programme* concerning its success in terms of skilling and labor market access.

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# 7. APPENDICES

## Appendix 1. List of social media groups and pages approached

### Alphabetical (some special characters removed)

Argentinos en Oslo (Noruega)

Argentinos Residentes en Rogaland Noruega

Argentinos Residiendo en Bergen (Norway)

Bergen en español

Bergen Expats

bolivianos en oslo noruega

Brasileiros em Bergen

Chilenos de todo Noruega

Chilenos en Bergen

Cleaning in Norway - Jobs

Colombianos en Noruega.

Cubanos en Bergen, Noruega

Farmaceuti u Norveškoj

Filippinsk Norsk Kultur Forening (Info Page)

Gambian Association in Bergen Norway

Ghanaians in Norway

Gran og Lunner - ukrainere (flyktninger)

Hjelp ukrainske flyktninger i Norge

Indian In Norway

Indian students & PhDs in Norway

Indians in Norway

Indians in Norway /Indere i Norge

Inspirit Ukraine - Cultural hub in Northern Norway

Iranere I Rogaland ایرانیان استان روگالاند نروژ

Jobb i Bergen / Jobs in Bergen

Jobb som sykepleier i Norge

Kenyans in Norway

Latinos en Noruega

Latinos en Sandnes Kommune / Latinos in Norway

Marokanere i Norge

Mexicanos en Noruega

New Friends Bergen

New to Norway

Norge-Nepal forum

Norway - Africa Group

Norway Truck Drivers Group

Oil Industry Jobs in Norway

Oslo Expats

Servitør, Kokk, Bartender / Waiter, Chef, Bartender jobs in Norway!

Srpsko Udruzenje U Bergenu

Stand with Ukraine Stavanger

Stavanger Expats: Services

Support Ukrainians in Norway NO UA

The Filipino Community in Norway

Tjenester i Levanger av ukrainere. Послуги українців в Левангері.

Trabajar en Noruega

Ukrainere i Bergen

Ukrainere i Innlandet

Ukrainere i Kvam/ українці в Kvam

Ukrainere i Lier / Українці у Лієрі

Ukrainere I Lillestrøm/Українці в Ліллестрьомі

Ukrainere i Norge for Rettferdighet

Ukrainsk fellesskap ✓™Українці разом™✓ (Kristiansund,Molde)

Ukrainsk forening i Drammen og omegn - MRIJA / Українська спілка - МРІЯ

Ukrainsk kreativitet og identitet

Ukrainsk og internasjonal forening i Øvre Romerike

Україна - Норвегія - Осло - Берген - Тронхейм - Ставангер

Українці в Ларвіку/ Ukrainere i Larvik

Українці в Норвегії (Осло, Акерсхус, Хордаланн, Ругалан, Сер-Тренделаг)

Українці в Осло, Норвегія. Oslo Norway. Oslo Norge

University
of Stavanger